Why we have posted

The Anti-Government Movement Guidebook

on our Website

When we first heard of this publication as it was discussed by the Right Way Law monthly newsletter "The Light," we were very excited. It was described as a comprehensive manual for lawyers and judges on how to deal with patriots. We were expecting an "inside look" at what the strategies and tactics of the opposition may be as the patriot movement grows further and further into the mainstream of American life.

What we saw once we procured a copy of this manual was very disappointing. In truth we expected something more sophisticated and intelligent. But further reading of this work confirms, at least as far as this writer is concerned, an ongoing suspicion we have had for some time since many of us in Minnesota first became involved in this movement a few years ago.

The "conspiracy" that everyone seems to be panicking over is a conspiracy of ignorance and poor education. One will find that many patriots writing articles on the web seem to thrive on the idea that there is a vast secret plan, coordinated by power brokers, judges, and lawyers, to enslave us all and create a one world government. How many times, as you surfed the web from patriot site to patriot site, have you read claim that all lawyers and judges take a secret oath not to reveal the bankruptcy? Sound familiar?

If you are one who has spent any serious time and energy researching our lost legal history, then it would behoove you to read this manual before you ever go to court to try your hand at exposing the truth. It will teach you the most important lesson the patriot movement as a whole has yet to learn. Ninety-nine percent of the public officials and members of the legal community who you may be inclined to label prematurely as your "enemy" are merely folks who don’t have a clue.

These people don't know what you know.

If there existed a coordinated movement, a gathering of a cabal in a star chamber with sophisticated minions at their disposal to spread disinformation and discord, the State Justice Institute and the National Center for State Courts is not a member of that inner circle. Our reaction after a cursory reading of this thing was that we could have done a far better job writing a tactical manual on how to frustrate patriots than they did. It shows, if nothing else, just how distant and out of touch the legal community is from the "clients" to whom they at least claim to be their bread and butter. It shows beyond any doubt that those men and women who believe they are duly elected and appointed "public servants" have no real idea who they are and where they are. But most importantly it should reinforce the reality we of Minnesota Common Law Venue have been trying to stress both locally, as well as to folks in other states. Words, theories, and paper will not win this cause of freedom for us all. Only the conviction and fortitude of dedicated people will turn the hearts and minds of our nation back to the ideals upon which it was founded. You can be absolutely right, you can do everything right, and still lose. If you are not willing to risk losing, you cannot win. If you are not willing to suffer for what is right and good, you cannot be righteous. If you only seek to associate and work with those who think like you, you will be alone. Jesus said he did not come for the righteous, he came for the sinners. You were not awakened from your slumber to get rich, get out, and be left alone to relax and enjoy the good life. You were awakened to spread the word to those who are still lost. A thorough reading of the Anti-Government Movement Handbook should teach you who you are supposed to reach out to. You are being called to reach out to the very people who have harmed you. Read this manual thoroughly and ascertain for yourself the mindset of the person who is attacking you, whether he is the IRS, a prosecutor, or a cop. Resolve for yourself that these men and women are your brothers and sisters. Understand the worldview that they are trapped in. And when you go forth into battle, seek not only to win your case, seek also to win your adversary.

You say it can’t be done? I say you are wrong. I am a lawyer and I am a cop. And you succeeded in winning me over with nothing more than the truth. Every day I go to work the street in the squad I find myself in conflict with what I know and what I am expected to do on the job. I find that if I am willing to stand tall and not shrink in the face of a challenge, the challenge is not as bad as I thought. I question, and the guy next to me looks at me like I am nuts. I still question, and that guy starts to question too. I come back to work after a few days off and I find not only is he still questioning, he has three or four more doing the same.

The silver bullet the patriots furiously search for is not in a statute book or a case cite. It is not in a brief or the ultimate filing. It is reflected in the mirror in front of you. It is the only thing on this earth incapable of being bankrupt, so it is the only thing that can save us from ourselves. The silver bullet is the sovereign himself. God is always with you.

The Anti-Government

Movement Guidebook

The National Center for State Courts

The Anti-Government Movement Guidebook

This guide was developed under a grant. Award No. SJI-96-02B-B-159, "The Rise of Common Law Courts in the United States: An Examination of the Movement, The Potential Impact on the Judiciary, and How the States Could Respond," from the State Justice Institute. The points of view expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the State Justice Institute.

STAFF

Managing Editor

Mr. Chuck Ericksen

Acting Executive Director

Institute for Court Management

National Center for State Courts

Contributors and Primary Researchers

Mr. Chris J. Wesser, J.D.

College of William and Mary

Williamsburg, Virginia

Mr. Dov M. Szego, J.D.

College of William and Mary

Williamsburg, Virginia

Project Staff

National Center for State Courts

300 Newport Avenue

Williamsburg, Virginia 22185

(757) 253-20000

Ms. Catina N. Burrell

Senior Administrative Specialist

Ms. Amanda C. Murer

Intern

Research Assistants

Shawn Shurden

Koran Singh

Stuart Turner

Funding Agency

Ms. Cheryl Reynolds, Grant Manager

State Justice Institute

1650 King Street, Suite 600

Alexandria, Virginia 22314

703-684-7618

PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Mr. Chuck Ericksen

State Judicial Educator

Office of the State Court Administrator

Olympia, Washington

Mr. Peter Haskel, Esquire

Assistant Division Chief, Financial Litigation Division

Office of the Attorney General

Austin, Texas

Honorable Joanne Huelsman

State Senator

Madison, Wisconsin

Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton

Judge, 21^st Judicial District Court

Hamilton, Montana

Mr. Thomas McAffee

Professor of Law

Southern Illinois University

Carbondale, Illinois

Mr. Nick Murnion, Esquire

District Attorney

Garfield County Prosecutor's Office

Jordan, Montana

Ms. Cheryl Reynolds

State Justice Institute

Alexandria, Virginia

Mr. Stephan W. Stover

State Court Administrator

Supreme Court of Ohio

Columbus, Ohio

Table of Contents

Preface................................................................................................................... ix

Acknowledgements.............................................................................................. xi

Part I: Common Law and Uncommon Courts: An Overview of the Common Law Court Movement .......................................……………………………......................................... 1

Introduction.....................................……................................................................. 1

The Posse Comitatus............................................................................................... 3

Avoiding Legal Authority........................................................................................ 5

"Hidden History" as Justification............................................................................ 6

The Posse and the Common Law............................................................................. 9

The First Wave of the Common Law Movement.................................................... 15

Decline and Resurgence........................................................................................... 21

The Future of Common Law Courts?...........................................………….......... 32

Part II: Tactics in the Courtroom....................................................................... 35

Subpart 2.1 - Challenging Subject Matter Jurisdiction.......................................... 36

A. The Gold-Fringed Flag Issue..................................................…........................ 36

B. Typical Responses to the Flag Objection.............................….......................... 37

C. Additional Authority..........................................................…........................... 38

Subpart 2.2 - Challenging Personal Jurisdiction..................................................... 40

A. The "Sovereign" vs. the "Corporate" Citizen....…............................................. 40

B. Typical Responses to the Personal Jurisdiction Issue.....…............................... 41

C. Additional Authority...................................................................................... 43

Subpart 2.3 - Demanding Use of "The Common Law"....................................... 44

A. Demanding a Strict Interpretation of "Common Law"...….............................. 44

B. Typical Responses to the Common Law Demand.......….................................. 46

Subpart 2.4 - Significance of "The Bar"..................................…............................ 47

A. Refusing to Enter the Bar....................................................…............................ 47

B. Typical Responses to the Bar Argument............................…............................. 48

C. Additional Authority....................................…………………........................... 49

Part III: Disrupting the Operation of the Court..............…................................. 51

Subpart 3.1 -Refusing to Speak/Identify Oneself...................................................... 52

A. Refusal to Identify Oneself...........................................................……................. 52

B. Typical Responses to Refusals to Identify....................................................... 53

Subpart 3.2 - Silence/Filibuster.................................................................................. 55

A. Party Chooses to Remain Silent or Party Chooses to "Filibuster"...……............. 55

B. Typical Responses to Silence/Filibuster.............................……........................... 55

C. Additional Authority........................................................................................ 56

Subpart 3.3 - Demanding "Counsel of Choice"...................................………….................... 58

A. Party Requests to be Represented by a Non-Lawyer..........…..………….......................... 58

B. Responding to Requests to be Represented by a Non-Lawyer..…….................... 58

Subpart 3.4 - Verbal Threats Against the Court.......................…….......................... 60

A. Party Makes Verbal Threats Against the Court.................……............................ 60

B. Responding to Threats Made by Members of the Movement..……..................... 60

Subpart 3.5-Hunger Strikes...................................................................................... 62

A. Party Begins a Hunger Strike....................................................…….................... 62

B. Responding to a Hunger Strike.......................................….......…....................... 62

Subpart 3.6 - Attempts to Disqualify the Judge......................................................... 64

A. Judicial Disqualification.....................................................….............................. 64

B. Typical Responses to Judicial Disqualification or Recusal.....……...................... 65

Subpart 3.7 - Forms of Pleadings............................................................................... 67

A. Party Files "Odd" Documents/Uses Antiquated Pleading Forms.....……............. 67

B. Responding to Unusual Documents............................................……................... 68

Subpart 3.8 - Refusal to Sign Documents...........................….................................... 70

A. Party Refuses to Sign Documents..................................….........................……... 70

B. Responding to a Party's Refusal to Sign Documents..........…............……........... 70

PART IV: Tactics Outside of the Courtroom......................…........….................. 73

Subpart 4.1 - Interactions with the Clerk...............................…….…….................... 74

A. Appearance at Office/Window/Counter of Court Clerk......…….......................... 74

B. Clerk Responses to Members of the Movement.......………...….......................... 75

Subpart 4.2 - Actions Against Court Personnel.......................….......…………........ 77

A. Service of Process/Personal Suits Against Court Personnel....…...….….............. 77

B. Responses to Service of Process/Personal Suits .................…….….................... 77

C. Additional Authority.....................................................……..….......................... 79

Subpart 4.3 -Threats Against Court Personnel...........…….........…........................... 81

A. Threats Against Court Personnel............................................…......………......... 81

B. Clerk/Personnel Responses...............................................………..........…....... 81

Subpart 4.4 - Violent Actions........................................……................................. 83

A. Members of the Movement Become Violent...........………............................. 83

B. Clerk Responses..................................……...............….................................... 83

Part V: Trial Court Performance Standards..................................................... 85

Relationship Between Responses and the TCPS..................................................... 89

Appendix A: Resource Guide............................................................................... 95

1. Legislative Responses...................................................................................... 97

2. Helpful Websites.................................................…......................................... 110

3. Listserv................................................................…......................................... 111

Appendix B: Movement Sources..............................…....................................... 113

1. Movement web pages..............................................…...................................... 115

Appendix C: Movement Documents.................................................................. 119

1. Tactics..................................................................………................................ 121

2. Briefs/Filings................................................................………....................... 147

3. Movement Manifestos.............................................................………............ 169

4. Of Note..............................................................................................……….. 241

Preface

There is a movement afoot in this country today that is made up of disaffected and often dispossessed Americans who are seeking a better way through a wholesale return to their view of the past. This movement has been called many things: the antigovernment movement, the sovereignty movement, and the common law courts movement. Regardless of the name attached to the beliefs and the people who follow them, one common denominator exists: a feeling of despair, rooted in personal and pecuniary loss, and manifested in a new, defiant mistrust and spite for the ways of the current government. This guide focuses on the ways in which followers of these movements impact the operation of our state court systems.

While the commentators have discussed these movements from all angles -ranging from ridicule to outrage to fear - most of the mainstream pundits discount the powerful emotion that drives individuals from the fold of our everyday society and into the ranks of the modem patriots. This guide asks that our state courts not take these individuals and their problems and concerns so lightly. In 1928, Justice Brandeis said:

"Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example."[1]

The people who make up the movements that we are concerned with consistently speak out to say that our government today does not listen, it no longer serves the American people, it exists to serve its own ends. The merits of that argument are not within the purview of this guide. Rather, the authors wish to urge Justice Brandeis's warning upon those who administer our state courts. That is, while we do not advocate an ultra-sympathetic response at the expense of safety and the efficient operation of the courts, we do implore those charged with running our court system to do two things: learn the history behind the beliefs we are seeing spread across our land, and understand that these are not militia members or "Patriots" or "ultra-conservatives," but rather citizens who come before you seeking the same fair treatment that those without any label attached receive.

To that end, this guide is organized in the. following manner. Part I includes an essay that provides a historic overview of the "common law courts" movement. This essay was written by Dr. Mark Pitcavage, a widely traveled lecturer on the "militia movement" and operator of the Militia Watchdog website.

Parts II through IV include a discussion of many of the common tactics used by members of these groups - both in and against the courts - as well as typical responses to each tactic. Part V is a brief introduction to and discussion of the relationship between potential responses to the tactics and the Trial Court Performance Standards ("TCPS"). While not all courts have adopted or use the TCPS, they provide a good framework for making a broader assessment of the relative value of each potential response - because the TCPS value less tangible things as "access to justice" and "equality, fairness and integrity."

The final part of this guide contains three appendices. The first two of those, Appendix A and Appendix B, are general resource guides. These include sample state legislative responses, and links to Patriot, militia, common law courts and other antigovernment websites. Appendix C is a sampling of various "movement documents" -pleadings, essays and articles written by followers of the various movements. These stand less as a comprehensive compilation and more as a general overview - enough to introduce those who have not yet experienced dealings with the movement to the general tone and approach used.

Finally, the authors again ask the reader to consider Justice Brandeis's warning and remember that, when dealing with followers of the various movements, you are, foremost, representatives of the government they see as corrupt and they are, foremost, American citizens. The fairness and dignity with which you treat them from the outset will go a long way toward determining how they respond to you and your court.

Acknowledgements

The Anti-Government Movement Guidebook coalesced out of a grant from the State Justice Institute for the Institute for Court Management course, "The Rise of Common Law Courts in the United States: An Examination of the Movement, The Potential Impact on the Judiciary, and How the State Could Respond" (Dealing with Common Law Courts). On February 5-7, 1997, twenty-seven judges, court clerks, court administrators, and prosecutors met in Scottsdale, Arizona to learn about the so-called Common Law Court Movement (CLC), to develop responses the courts can take to deal with the CLC, and to make recommendations for establishing a curriculum for judicial educators to train judges and court officials on how to deal with CLC activities in their own jurisdictions. The course was very much a working group and sought to bring together individuals who have first-hand experience with CLC activists and who could use their experiences and insights to develop possible responses to the CLC.

Over the course of two and one half days, the participants heard a presentation on the history of the CLC, shared first-hand experiences in dealing with CLC activists, examined how the CLC disseminates its materials and ideology, heard from an investigative reporter who described his experiences attending CLC proceedings, and broke out into work groups to examine CLC-related issues and craft proposals for responding to CLC actions.

The work product of the groups was a set of recommendations and responses the courts might use to handle situations and inconveniences brought on by CLC activists better. These responses and the experience of conducting the course in Scottsdale formed the basis for the NCSC publication. Dealing with Common Law Courts: A Model Curriculum/or Judges and Court Staff: Instructor's Manual a precursor to this latest NCSC publication. The Anti-Government Guidebook.

The authors wish to thank the State Justice Institute for continued funding of the project; Hon. Roger Warren, President of the National Center for State Courts for supporting this project; and Ms. Cheryl Reynolds, State Justice Institute project monitor, for her support and helpful assistance throughout the project.

Acknowledgment is also due to the advisory committee, and especially to the ^f participants of the initial Institute for Court Management course. Dealing With Common Law Courts whose input and experiences with the common law court movement were critical to the formulation of this guidebook.

We would like to express particular gratitude to the following individuals for assisting in reviewing the guidebook and making recommendations on this project: The Hon. Louraine Arkfeld, Tempe Municipal Court, Tempe, Arizona; Ms. Colleen Danos, Court Information Resource Analyst, National Center for State Courts, Williamsburg, Virginia; Mr. Rick Neidhardt, Legal Analyst, Washington State Office of the Administrator for the Courts, Olympia, Washington; Ms. Cheryl Nyberg, Law Librarian, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.

Williamsburg, Virginia, 1999

Part I

Common Law and Uncommon Courts:

An Overview of the

Common Law Court Movement[2]

The verdict of the county court was predictable. Caught driving without a license or proof of insurance. Sherry Scotka received a $350 fine from the Ken" County, Texas, court for each offense. But Scotka, during the stultifying summer of 1993, was anything but predictable. Acting as her own lawyer, she appealed the county court's decision, requesting that the Texas Appeals Court transfer her case to the "Common Law Court of the United States of America." Her argument? That as a "sovereign citizen" she was outside the jurisdiction of Texas law or Texas courts.

The appeals court did not look upon her request with favor, noting that she could not even show that the "Common Law Court of the United States of America" existed.[3] This was not the first time that the Court of Appeals had faced this sort of peculiar argument. From the Texas hill country had come a rash of such claims in the past several years, all from strangely similar cases: traffic violations, foreclosures, frivolous suits. Brought to court, the defendants, usually operating pro se-that is, defending themselves-would demand that the case in question be removed to the "Common Law Court for the Republic of Texas." Finally, in 1992, the Appeals Court noted officially that there was no such thing. "We hold," said the court, "that the Common Law Court for the Republic of Texas, if it ever existed, has ceased to exist since February 16, 1846 "-in other words, when Texas state government was organized. It was then that the defendant changed the transfer reference in her pleading to the "Common Law Court of the United States of America," although interestingly the address on the legal documents remained the same.⁴transfer reference in her pleading to the "Common Law Court of the United States of America," although interestingly the address on the legal documents remained the same.[4] What the Texas appeals court was just beginning to perceive were the beginnings of a movement created by recalcitrant self-proclaimed "sovereign citizens" determined to wrest control of their lives back from all forms of government or authority. Appearing first in isolated spots in Texas and Florida, the notion of "common law courts" soon spread to Kansas and other farm states, then quickly across the nation. The "common law court movement," as it has somewhat clumsily come to be called, now exists in some form in every state in the country. In some states, activity is minimal; in others common law courts are a serious nuisance; in some, they are a plague on the judicial system.

Although featured on television shows like "20/20," common law courts did not really breach the public consciousness until the spring of 1996, when FBI agents surrounded a frigid eastern Montana farm to wait out two dozen recalcitrant tax protesters that locals dubbed "freemen." In reality, however, common law adherents had been active for years in different areas across the country. Frustrated county clerks knew of the strange filings made in their offices; puzzled policemen encountered confrontational motorists pulled over for homemade license plates; irritated lawyers discovered that bogus liens had been placed on their property by court opponents. But there was little public awareness or understanding of the movement. The media reported that Oklahoma City bombing suspect Terry Nichols had declared himself a "sovereign citizen," but treated it as a random, bizarre act by a right-wing extremist, not as an action by someone consciously part of an ideological movement.

Few people knew then that these activities were not just isolated phenomena. Fewer still, even today, understand that they are not just part of some movement, but that this movement has a much longer and more active history than most people ever suspected. The "common law court," so called, can be traced back nearly two decades as a form of right-wing social protest, with roots stretching back still farther. What common law court activists do and say today often seems strange and incomprehensible to the average person, but their deeds and words possess a coherent internal logic and are part of a very conscious overall ideology.

Understanding the origins of common law courts and why their members act the way they do will increase our understanding of them and assist in developing strategies to combat them effectively. That is the purpose of this overview.

The Posse Comitatus

The common law courts and sovereign citizens are the direct ideological descendants of the Posse Comitatus; any attempt to understand the common law courts must start with the this group. The Posse, though, is not necessarily an easy entity to understand. On one level, the Posse was a right-wing extremist organization with a more or less definable beginning. In 1969 a retired dry cleaner named Henry "Mike" Beach (a former member of the 1930s pro-Nazi group, the Silver Shirts) formed a group called the Sheriffs Posse Comitatus. In California, William Potter Gale started a similar organization, the United States Christian Posse Association, around the same time. From these beginnings, branches formed in other areas of the country, numbering around 80 or so by the mid-1970s. The farm crisis of the early 1980s, for reasons that will be explained below, caused membership to rise greatly, particularly in the plains states.

From the start, the Posse caused problems for local, state and federal authorities. As early as 1974, Thomas Stockheimer, head of the Posse in Wisconsin, was convicted on charges of assaulting an Internal Revenue Service agent. Indeed, the normally placid state of Wisconsin became a hotbed of Posse activity, due to leaders Stockheimer, James Wickstrom and Donald Minniecheskie. In northeastern Wisconsin, Wickstrom-who styled himself the "national director of counterinsurgency" of the Posse and liked to conduct paramilitary training-established the "Constitutional Township of Tigerton Dells," a "township" that consisted of a compound of trailers on a farm lot. From there Wickstrom waged a war against local authorities that resulted, in the mid-1980s, in the eventual destruction of the "township" and Wickstrom's arrest (one of many). In other states as well, most notably Kansas, Posse members repeatedly clashed-with resulting deaths and injuries-with local authorities.

It was, however, Gordon Kahl of North Dakota who achieved the most notoriety and became the Posse's first real martyr. Kahl was a virulent racist and tax protester who traveled to farm protest meetings across the country's midsection to win converts to the Posse cause. In 1983 four U.S. marshals and two local law enforcement officers set up a roadblock to arrest Kahl for violating the terms of his probation. A shootout ensued which resulted in the death of two of the marshals and the wounding of two others. Also wounded was Kahl's twenty-year-old son. When Kahl fled the state, a nationwide manhunt-and nationwide publicity-began. Months later, Kahl was tracked down in Arkansas, where he died during another gunfight in which a county sheriff was killed.

Eventually, though, the Posse declined as an effective organization, largely through loss of leadership. Faced with repeated imprisonment, some leaders such as James Wickstrom scaled back their activities. Other leaders, such as Henry Beach and William Potter Gale, died of natural deaths, the latter while appealing a conviction for threatening IRS agents. Still others, like Kahl, died violently. The result was that by the late 1980s the Posse was floundering. Always locally based, pockets of the Posse continued to survive here and there, but it was no longer a force.[5]⁵

As an organized right-wing group, the Posse did not really survive. But the Posse had never been simply an organization-indeed, it was hardly ever well organized. The Posse Comitatus was much more durable as an ideology. Thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of people who never formally belonged to any Posse group nevertheless subscribed to Posse ideology. The belief system survived even as the group faded.

The Posse ideology and the justifications that results from it are complex, but stripped of racist overtones, there are three main tenets to Posse ideology that are crucial to understanding how the Posse mindset works. In order of increasing importance, these tenets are 1) the importance of local control, 2) the need to avoid legal and financial authority, and 3) justifications derived from the revelation of "hidden history." The Importance of Local Control

The importance of local control to adherents of Posse ideology was the simplest and most visible feature of their philosophy. Indeed, the term "posse comitatus" itself is a Latin phrase that means "power of the county." Accordingly, Posse teachings argued that the county government was the highest authority of government in the country, a belief sometimes misreported as the county being the only form of legitimate authority. Actually, the Posse recognized the other levels of government, but contended that federal or state officials had to bow before the power of the county sheriff.[6]

Avoiding Legal Authority

Because of the emphasis given by Posse members to the county sheriff, many journalists well into the 1980s persisted in calling the Posse Comitatus a "law-and-order" group. But nothing was further from the truth. The Posse's motivation was essentially the exact opposite of law and order. The Posse wanted to be free of all obligations to laws its members didn't like, and to be free of financial obligations as well. Its entire ideology was specifically designed to achieve this. For instance, their emphasis on the importance of the county sheriff was not intended to support greater "law and order." The Posse argued that it was the sheriffs responsibility "to protect the people of his County from unlawful acts on the part of anyone, including officials of government... whether these be judges of courts or Federal or State Agents of any kind whatsoever."

In other words, the local sheriff’s duty was to shield the citizenry from the interference of federal, state and local government. If the sheriff neglected this duty, the people had "the lawful right under natural law to act in the name of the Sheriff to protect local jurisdiction." They could arrest people and hold them "for trial by a citizen jury empanelled by the Sheriff from citizens of the local jurisdiction, instead of by the Courts as is the current procedure in most Counties and which has no basis under law, any act of any legislature or directives issued by the judiciary or Executive notwithstanding."

Especially important to the Posse was that sheriffs not be used to enforce court rulings: "The unlawful use of County Sheriffs as LACKEYS of the Courts should be discontinued at once…The Sheriff is accountable and responsible only to the citizens who are the inhabitants of his County." Indeed, the Posse offered a thinly-veiled threat to sheriffs and others who did not accommodate the will of local citizens: "In some instances of record the law provides for the following prosecution of officials of government who commit criminal acts or who violate their Oath of Office: He shall be removed by the Posse to the most populated intersection of streets in the township and at high noon be hung by the neck, the body remaining until sundown as an example to those who would subvert the law." Many Posse members proudly wore a pin shaped as a hangman's noose as a symbol of their membership.[7]

"Hidden History" as Justification

The third defining characteristic of Posse ideology is the peculiar method by which Posse members justified their positions. They did this through an emphasis-some would say obsession-on "hidden history." In other words, they believed that the true history of the United States-and thus the true laws, the true obligations of citizens, the true government-had been hidden from the American citizen by a massive, long-lasting conspiracy. Indeed, the Posse's handbook noted that:

"the rule for the Judiciary, both State and Federal, has been subtle subversion of the Constitution of these United States. The subversion and contempt for the Constitution by the Judiciary is joined by the Executive and Legislative branches of government. It is apparent that the Judiciary has attempted to alter our form of Government. By unlawful administrative acts and procedures, they have attempted to establish a Dictatorship of the Courts over the citizens of this Republic. The legal profession has, with few exceptions, conspired with the Judiciary for this purpose."[8]

Later Posse leaders would develop this simple beginning into a complex tale of conspiracy and cover-up, over a period of over one hundred years, designed to subvert liberty. Given this notion, that the true laws of the United States had been covered up by conspiring legislators, judges and lawyers. Posse adherents seek to uncover the hidden history that has been deprived them. They do this through searching through law books and legal codes, the writings of the founders and early legal scholars, the Uniform Commercial Code, the Bible, and other documents. "People say we're creating our own laws," said Montana Freeman Russell Landers, "We're not creating anything. It's right there in the law already." Indeed, practically any document can become fodder for a Posse governmental theory. There is no end to what a creative Posse mind can come up with.[9]

One example is the "Missing Thirteenth Amendment," popularized by Texas activist Alfred Adask. Posse adherents discovered a draft Constitutional amendment from the republic's early days, one that would deny citizenship to Americans accepting titles of nobility. This was one of many amendments that failed because not enough states ratified it. But Posse adherents decided not only that it had been ratified, but that its ratification had been covered up by a conspiracy. Their erroneous beliefs were bolstered by discovering some old printed copies of the Constitution which listed the draft amendment along with other, actually ratified amendments. Posse "scholars" combed through state archives, looking for votes on ratification, or hints of cover-up, and concluded, not surprisingly, that there had indeed been a cover-up. Why did the Posse spend all this energy? Because of the way that they interpreted the meaning of the amendment. To the Posse, all lawyers had "titles of nobility," because they put the term "esquire" after their names. Therefore, lawyers were not legally citizens of the United States-but they had engaged to cover up the Thirteenth Amendment, which would have taken away so much of their power.

Another example of Posse creativity was the Committee of the States, the brainchild of Posse leader William Potter Gale in the 1980s. Gale argued that the Articles of Confederation, the document that governed the United States before the Constitution was ratified, had never been officially repealed and remained in force. Gale then pointed to a clause in the Articles which said that Congress could appoint a committee that would handle the general affairs of the United States when Congress was not in session (under the Articles, there was no executive branch). Gale interpreted this to mean that the Committee of the States was a second Congress, with full and equal powers-he promptly arranged for a (self-appointed) Committee to come into being.

These different facets of Posse Comitatus ideology shaped the evolution of the movement in the 1970s and 1980s. The Posse absorbed much of the tax protest movement, whose natural inclinations were very similar: to avoid the obligation to pay income taxes, and to use "hidden history" as a means, including re-interpreting obscure or out-of-context parts of the tax code and finding novel ways of declaring that the 16th Amendment had never been legitimately ratified. Another, more important, association made by the Posse during this time period was the development of close ties with the anti-Semitic religious sect Christian Identity.

Christian Identity, whose members believe that Jews are descended from Satan, was small in number but disproportionately influential in the far right. From the very beginning, Posse ideology was attractive to Christian Identity leaders (and vice versa). For Posse adherents looking for the "true law" that conspirators had erased, Christian Identity advocates pointed to the Bible, saying that the Constitution was divinely inspired. For Posse adherents looking for the source of conspiracy, Christian Identity could point to Jews or "international bankers" as the culprits. Identity theology and Posse ideology complemented each other. William Potter Gale, one of the founders of the Posse, was also one of the most prominent Christian Identity ministers. James Wickstrom, the most visible Posse leader, was likewise an influential Identity figure. Although Posse ideology could always be utilized without a racist component, for many, Posse and Identity beliefs went hand in hand.

The development of the Posse ideology also helps to explain its first rise to prominence during the farm crisis of the early 1980s, when inflation, falling land values, rising interest rates, and poor lending practices combined to create a financial crisis that threatened to overwhelm farmers of little or moderate means. The Posse offered a culprit - the international (Jewish) banking conspiracy which had destroyed the Constitutional/Biblical monetary system and replaced it with one based on credit designed to suck people dry. The Posse also offered a solution: its version of the common law. In February 1981 Missouri farmer Wayne Cryts confronted federal marshals preventing him from retrieving his crop from the grain elevator in which it was stored by telling them, "I am a sovereign individual and a citizen of the state of Missouri and am operating under common law. The court order is without the weight of law and does not have jurisdiction over me." The marshals stepped aside, allowing Cryts to recover his soybeans. This action, which made Cryts a hero to desperate farmers, symbolized the hope and the promise of the "common law."[10]

The Posse and the Common Law

The term "common law" is itself common, but most people do not know exactly what it means. Its meaning, though, is pretty simple: it refers to unwritten, judge-made law (as opposed to written or statutory law). Centuries ago, in England, most petty crimes or complaints were settled by judge-made precedents, rather than elaborate legal codes. Robbery was a crime because it had always been a crime, rather than because there was actually a statute which described it as such. English common law was easily transplanted to the American colonies, where the lack of elaborate legal apparatus-or even law books-facilitated such a judicial system. Gradually, as legal codes became more systematic, statutory law began to replace English common law, with the areas reserved for the latter growing ever smaller. Common law survives to this day. In states such as North Carolina, "common law robbery" is a punishable crime. In Michigan, prosecutors (unsuccessfully) tried to convict Dr. Jack Kevorkian on charges of common law murder for his role in assisted suicides.

Posse ideology, however, places a far different meaning and reliance on common law. Though there are many different strains and theories of Posse common law, a common thread that runs through most of them is that the common law is a separate, parallel legal/judicial system, one independent from and not subordinate to statutory or written law. For example, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Posse adherents came up with inventions such as "common law trusts" and "common law banks." What these concepts have in common is the notion that the normal written laws governing the establishment of trusts or the regulation of banks do not apply to these institutions, because they are beholden only to the "common law." In other words, the term "common law" was attached to the word "bank" as a (futile) attempt to avoid the law.

Every common law theorist or group has a slightly different explanation for the origins of and nature of their version of "common law," but the following broad summary of their beliefs is general enough to hold for most circumstances. The key, as mentioned above, is that Posse adherents believe in "common law" as independent of (and even hostile to) other alleged legal systems, rather than all being part of a whole.[11]

According to common law doctrine, the common law originated in the Middle Ages to protect property rights. The American Revolution destroyed allegiance to the British crown, but kept common law rights of property. This situation made every man "sovereign" over his own property. Neither Congress nor state legislatures nor county or city ordinance nor judicial ruling by any courts could deprive people of their common law rights, including their rights to "allodial" property (an ancient concept describing property that could not be lost for failure to pay taxes; it never applied in the United States, although some states did enact "homestead" laws). Grievances were to be settled by common law juries that decided the facts and the law of the case.

Common law, however, was not the only form of law possible. Common law theorists describe many other types of law, although sometimes they distinguish between them and sometimes treat them as synonymous. One such is "Roman Civil Law," which some argue is the system of law generally used in continental Europe. Roman Civil Law ignores rights to due process. Another form of law is Law Merchant, which deals not with money "of substance" (silver and gold), but rather with credit and negotiable instruments. These terms are often used interchangeably; one common law publication lists as types of "Roman Civil Law" all the following: Admiralty Law, Law Martial, Law Merchant, Maritime Law, Martial Law, Martial Law Proper, and Martial Law Rule.

Essentially, common law theorists argue that these other forms of law have been used by unscrupulous lawyers, merchants and others to subvert and replace the common law. Some include another type of law among the "unlawful" types; others consider it value neutral: this is Commercial Law, which governs commercial transactions "of substance." Commercial Law is very important to common law theorists; and is discussed below.

The subversion of the legitimate common law was a long process, with many steps. The original judicial system was based solely on common law and, when applicable, commercial law. Roman Civil Law in this country was confined to the law of the sea (Admiralty). Common law theorists cite the "missing" Thirteenth Amendment, the Limited Liability Act of 1851, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment as early steps along the way to the subversion of the common law. The last step is the most important. Most people know the Fourteenth Amendment as the Constitutional amendment that gave citizenship to the freed slaves after the Civil War. However, common law theorists see the Fourteenth Amendment as establishing an entirely new class of citizenship designed to make persons subordinate to the federal government. In the words of one theorist, "the [Fourteenth] Amendment was instrumental in shifting citizenship of each American from being primarily a state citizen to being citizen of the private corporation of government." Previously, the federal government only had authority over Washington, D.C., and federal territories.

With the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, citizens of the states could unwittingly give up their common law rights and contractually enter into the jurisdiction of the federal government. According to common law theorists, this was implemented by and designed to benefit large corporations or "international bankers." Now the law could be used to "financially enslave the masses and destroy the republican union." The theorists believe this led to further injustices from the removal of the gold standard and the declaration of states of emergency in the 1930s to the unjust "de facto" government that operates today.[12]

Common law theorists offer a way out of the predicament they assert exists. They argue that Americans become "Fourteenth Amendment citizens" only voluntarily-through entering into some sort of contract with the federal or state governments. "Contracts" are obviously defined quite liberally as any sort of agreement or reciprocal relationship, including paying income taxes, applying for social security numbers, and using drivers' licenses. Common law theorists refuse to accept the alleged subversion of common law rights. In the words of one common law tract, "Each freeborn. Sovereign American individual has the authority and the Right to deny and to disavow all Equity jurisdiction, and to refuse to acquiesce to the jurisdiction of Courts of Equity, or to Equity jurisdiction of any Executive or Legislative branch of government agency or agent. State or Federal or County…Compelling a freeborn. Sovereign American individual to do anything, except upon the verdict of a Common Law Jury, constitutes an enforcement of the alien and evil Roman Civil Law and is in fact fascist totalitarianism."[13] Simply stated, Americans can refuse to participate. Americans can revoke their social security numbers, their license plates, their income tax forms. They can declare themselves once more to be "sovereign citizens." In so doing, they remove themselves from the Roman or Admiralty Law, and are once again only bound by the common law. They gain near immunity from the "de facto" court system.

This solution explains much of the bizarre behavior of Posse adherents. Some are arrested repeatedly for driving without license plates, registration or a license, yet keep on doing it: they believe they have a biblical right to travel and refuse to enter into contractual relationships with the government. In court, sovereign citizens refuse to accept the aid of lawyers, who are "titles of nobility," and instead defend themselves, usually unsuccessfully. Most important of all, they continuously challenge the court on questions of jurisdiction and claim that the court has no authority over them. For instance, it is common for Posse adherents to point to a gold-fringed flag in the courtroom, which they argue is a sign that the court is an Admiralty jurisdiction court. They believe they are only answerable to a common law court. Common law literature dictates that "when summoned into any court, the first thing a party must do is analyze and identify the nature of the charges, jurisdiction of the court, and the status of the accused, to determine if the status of the accused falls within the statute and the jurisdiction of the court." This fervent belief often leads them to obstreperous and outrageous behavior when brought into a court they claim is illegitimate.[14]

The following brief excerpt from a March 1996 detention hearing for arrested Montana Freemen leaders Leroy Schweitzer and Daniel Petersen provides an excellent example not only of such behavior, but of the concerns of the defendants regarding jurisdiction and "titles of nobility":

THE COURT: The record should also show that standby counsel is appointed for both-

DEFENDANT PETERSEN: I object and take exception.

DEFENDANT SCHWEITZER: I object to any reference to standby counsel and related to Leroy Michael it's an invasion of privacy. I object. I ask that he be removed from the courtroom.

THE COURT: — are present in the courtroom.

DEFENDANT SCHWEITZER: I do not have assistance of counsel. None. I reject it. I'm not pro se. I am myself. This is a common law venue.

THE COURT: And I want to advise both defendants, Mr. Schweitzer present here in the courtroom, as well as Mr. Petersen from his cell, once again they are entitled-

DEFENDANT PETERSEN: I object and take exception, you f——g pervert.

THE COURT: -to the appointment of counsel to represent them in all proceedings, and I urge you to accept appointed counsel.

DEFENDANT SCHWEITZER: There will be no exception, no consent, unequivocal no. I will not accept a title nobility in common law venue. I do not waive common law venue.

No one is going to represent me as sworn in from the appellate branch of the Supreme Court which is voluntary jurisdiction. And you better start reading your law. Why do you think the code commissioner is now putting the codes back into special television programs that came out just recently because of the edict that we put on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And if you press want a story, go get it, because you are-

THE COURT: Mr. Schweitzer, your objection is clear I think, you're refusing counsel.[15]

Common law adherents are not just obstructionist. They also strike back. Common law theorists have "discovered" how to use that other form of law, commercial law, as a weapon against those people who persist in misusing Admiralty Law. The key weapon in the commercial law arsenal is the lien. Common law theorists claim that once you place a lien on someone's property, they must either successfully rebut your commercial affidavit, convene a common law jury, or pay the lien. The beauty of commercial liens, to common law theorists, is that they are "non-judicial." That is, the liens bypass the judicial system, which theorists believe has been thoroughly corrupted. Thus often one of the first retaliatory responses by a common law adherent to unwanted government interference is to place a lien upon the property of an offending official, In the real world, the illegitimate liens convey no obligations at all, but people on whose property such liens are placed often must go through considerable effort and expense to get them removed, even though they are invalid. Of course, the Posse adherents are well aware of this.

The First Wave of the Common Law Movement

Although the very first Posse booklet mentioned the importance of common law, it took years for such a complex and elaborate ideology to develop. But by the end of the 1970s the Posse common law framework was complete and well disseminated. People across the country acted in similar ways, indicating the degree to which Posse ideology had solidified.

Though Posse members such as James Wickstrom and Gordon Kahl were in the news more often, a less-known figure, George Gordon, provides an excellent example of how the common law philosophy was used in practice. Gordon, from Boise, Idaho, was a cantankerous man who adopted Posse ideology wholeheartedly as a way to rid himself of unwanted societal obligations. Primarily a tax protester, the high-school dropout began to study "common law" principles as a way to avoid paying federal and state income taxes, but his opposition expanded to include many court and police procedures. He developed a following in Boise, where he eventually established (in the basement of a local bar) the Barristers Inn School of Common Law. Gordon lectured on common law ideology to small audiences in return for fees. The following chronology offers some indication of the scope of his actions:

-April 1982. Gordon is arrested after refusing to comply with a traffic officer's instructions when pulled over. After being booked, he appears in court clad only in shorts and a T-shirt, because he tore up all his jail clothing.

-May 1983. Gordon files a $700,000 federal suit over a $615 tire bill he did not pay. A collection agency and local officials had taken him to court, and he filed his suit against them, claiming a violation of his constitutional rights in that he was coerced to submit to an oath against his religious beliefs. He also claimed to have been beaten and verbally abused by Ada County jail personnel. Officials successfully move for dismissal of the suit.

-August 1983. Gordon leads 100 people in a protest in a statehouse hearing room to demand the elimination of state income taxes.

-September 1983. Gordon leads another protest before a legislative subcommittee to demand reforms and reduction of government services and taxes. States Gordon: "I don't want your damned services and I don't want to pay for them…When the teachers scream for more money, let the children go home and be taught there. I don't want my children to go to public school. I'll teach them at home. I created them. I'll teach them." and "Did it ever occur to you that we might not want those services? Did it ever occur to you that we don't want the police driving up and down our streets spreading their police-court tyranny?"

-November 1983. Gordon files a $3 million lawsuit claiming a local hospital treated his daughter without permission and violated his civil rights in trying to collect $2,000 for care expenses. He claims hospital staff performed "pagan practices" on her against his will, then sought payment for her six-day stay. The suit alleges the girl was taken to hospital by an unidentified person and admitted on the grounds that state law allows a hospital to hold a child if there is a suspicion the child has been abused. The hospital successfully moves for dismissal.

-March 1985. Gordon loses a case in the Idaho Court of Appeals in which he argued that his constitutional rights to travel were violated by being required to have a driver's license. Gordon contends he is a "freeman" and exempt from regulations. The court sentences him to 35 days in jail for driving without a license, operating an unregistered vehicle and not having proof of liability.

-February 1986. Gordon, having moved from Idaho to Isabella, Missouri, now operates the George Gordon School of Common Law. He also travels around the plains states giving seminars on common law tactics, charging fees of $175 for individuals, and $225 for couples. He offers $1,000 week-long seminars for people in small groups and sells videotapes of his seminars. A promotional leaflet says: "We'll teach you how to stop a foreclosure, the common and civil law of real property, why national banks may not lend credit, the use of liens to supersede a bank mortgage, why bank fraud is an affirmative defense to foreclosure, and the courtroom strategy and procedure to accomplish these actions."

-November 1986. Gordon claims hundreds of students have been taught at his school, where he teaches them to not make "contracts" with the state. Payment for his classes must be made only in gold or silver, or barter. "I don't think I am a threat to anybody," he says. "I am a legal strategist. I don't give legal advice. I run a school and teach law, and that's freedom of speech." Gordon has been arrested more than 10 times in the past five years for various traffic violations relating to not having license or registration. He claims his school generated about $100,000 during the previous year, on which he paid no income tax.

-August 1995. Gordon is still living in Missouri and still operating the George Gordon School of Common Law. He charges 21 ounces of gold for a seminar. Says Gordon, "The average guy who walks in here, he's an anarchist, he wants to break the law. He wants to do what he wants to do without putting himself in the envelope of laws and rules. All George Gordon has ever done is research the law and learn how it is applied and made sure he is in that envelope. And I'm as happy as a clam at high tide."[16]

George Gordon, though his commitment to common law theories has been quite lived, was never a lonely practitioner. In fact, "common law" schools proliferated in the 1980s, under names like the "John Doe School of Common Law," the "School for the Last Days," and the "Universal Life University School of Law." Tax protest groups such as Your Heritage Protection Association also issued pamphlets, seminars and videotapes on common law ideology.

By the early 1980s, practitioners of common law ideology had gone so far as to advocate setting up their own court and jury systems, in full defiance of the "de facto" systems they opposed. William Potter Gale, visiting James Wickstrom in Tigerton, Wisconsin, in May 1981, responded to news that a Wisconsin legislator proposed a bill against paramilitary training by saying, "I think you guys ought to hang that son-of-a-bitch." Wickstrom replied that the legislator deserved some sort of hearing by a "citizen's grand jury" first. By December of the following year, Wickstrom had actually formed such a "grand jury," one of the first "common law courts" to begin operation. Nor was it the only one.

In January 1983, sheriffs in Kansas received letters from the "Citizens Grand Jury of Kansas," the members of which threatened local judges and said if they were not jailed, Grand Jury members "would take the law into their own hands and the judges would end up buried in a potter's field."[17] These self-styled grand juries and courts demonstrated the willingness of Posse members not only to oppose local or federal government, but to go so far as to set up parallel governments of their own. One of the best examples of this growing sentiment in the early 1980s was the "township" movement. The township movement was started by a Utah tax protester named Walter P. Mann III, who sold information packets for $20 detailing how to avoid filing federal income tax returns and offered $1,000 seminars on forming "common law governments." His seminars became popular, as did his ideas about townships. As early as 1980 a group in South Carolina formed a "township" based on common law. Self-described survivalists who were convinced that the United States was about to collapse financially, wanted to be ready with "an ancillary form of government."[18]

Walter Mann popularized the township concept. He argued for the creation of heavily armed communities based on "common law," which he claimed superseded the laws of the United States. By 1982, Mann boasted of chapters in 40 U.S. cities. The township concept was popular primarily because, according to the strictures, each township was completely autonomous, completely independent-most especially, independent from the federal government. Mann follower Gordan Jenkins established "Zion Township" in southern Utah, while James Wickstrom established the "Township of Tigerton Dells" in Wisconsin. Gordon Kahl was in the process of establishing a township the day marshals attempted to arrest him. Other notorious townships were established in Walla Walla, Washington and Texas. It was no coincidence that a decade later the Montana Freemen named their Montana refuge "Justus Township." These townships, according to Mann's theories, allowed their law to take precedence over the "'equity' court system."

Of course, local and state authorities were not particularly pleased with people setting up autonomous "townships" in their midst, often within the boundaries of other communities. Township advocates said that their townships had no geographical boundaries. Legitimate officials responded by enforcing tax laws, zoning laws and statutes against impersonating public officials. Typically clashes started over traffic tickets. For instance, a member of the "Southern District of Texas Township Court," a "people's court" operating north of Houston in the early 1980s, was issued a traffic ticket in Montgomery County, Texas. The townshipper attempted to pay the traffic fine with a bogus money order-thirteen years before the Montana Freemen would become famous for issuing such fraudulent financial instruments. When the city judge refused to accept the phony money order, the Township Court issued subpoenas and summonses for county officials to appear before it. Instead Texas Rangers and local officials raided the township court and arrested three members for tampering with government records and impersonating a government official. Common law adherents responded to such moves with their favorite weapon: liens. Richard Cooper, "Supreme Court judge" of the common law court of Zion Township, for instance, filed 41 property liens totaling $12 million in the early 1980s against various federal, state and local officials. In Walla Walla, Washington, Posse members issued "common law liens" totaling $29 million against ten officials. The courts ruled the liens invalid, as always, but the tactic nevertheless proved highly frustrating to public officials trying to perform their duties. Common law court adherents found placing liens a successful tactic because the liens discouraged officials from acting against Posse members, they clogged the legal system, and sometimes had other uses as well.

For instance, when Maryland officials decided to dispute the status of a Posse Comitatus group in Maryland that had claimed their posse was legal, the leader of the local group sent his followers to every courthouse in the entire state to file property liens against every district and circuit court judge. Posse members hoped this would disqualify the judges from hearing the case against them. However, they inadvertently missed one judge, who was secretly assigned to hear the case. He threw out the liens and declared the Posse's activities illegal. Another imaginative creation was the notion of "signature liens," used by a common law advocate, Raymond L. Montee, in 1982. Montee filed "common law signature liens" against sixty public officials and their spouses, which he claimed would prohibit officials from signing their name. Montee argued that if they were not allowed to sign their name, they could not vote and would have to be removed from voter lists.

The total amount of bogus liens placed by common law advocates on officials in the early 1980s is not known, but estimates run into the hundreds of millions of dollars. Many, if not most, public officials were uncertain how to respond to such pseudo-legal tactics. The federal government, however, soon made it illegal to place liens on Internal Revenue Service agents. Several states also adopted statues prohibiting the filing of bogus liens.

Decline and Resurgence

By the mid 1980s, the initial tide of common law activism surged and then waned. By this time a large number of leaders on the far right were either dead, in jail or in "retirement." Events such as the prosecution of members of The Order, the shutting down of the survivalist/Christian Identity compound of the Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord (CSA), the destruction of the township of Tigerton Dells, and the much-publicized trial of various white supremacist leaders for sedition in Fort Smith, Arkansas, worked to paralyze the leadership of the far right, including the Posse Comitatus and its adherents. For the Posse, too, the fact that the farm bankruptcy crisis had eased also resulted in a loss of support.

However, the Posse's ideas about the common law never disappeared. Tax protesters continued to espouse Posse ideology, and Posse believers continued, although with less frequency, to place fraudulent liens and use other Posse tactics. Perhaps one could think of the movement as existing in a state of hibernation, waiting to emerge again in a more favorable climate. The early 1990s seemed to provide that climate. Events such as the infamous standoff at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and the tragic end to the standoff at the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, gave renewed energy to the "patriot" movement, as it now called itself. It fueled the fires of those who believed that a tyrannical and illegitimate government was usurping the sovereign rights of freemen.

From this climate of anger and paranoia emerged a new leadership for the common law movement. Some of the faces were familiar. From Wisconsin came Thomas Stockheimer, one of the leaders of the old Wisconsin Posse Comitatus. Stockheimer and his associates formed a new group called Family Farm Preservation, which encouraged the use of bogus checks and money orders as a way to defeat creditors and government agents. From Texas came a roofer named Alfred Adask, who started publishing AntiShyster Magazine, a periodical devoted to popularizing common law tactics, particularly the use of bogus liens. Adask, running for a seat on the Texas Supreme Court in 1992, received more than 200,000 votes in that state. In Colorado, a veterinarian named Eugene Schroeder, a former leader in the Posse-sympathetic American Agriculture Movement, began publicizing the notion that the Constitution had been suspended since 1933.

Nowhere more than in Florida, however, was the movement so strongly resurgent. Tax protesters, white supremacists, common law court advocates and others combined to give new energy to Posse ideology. Some of the sovereigns' concerns were traditional, such as the banking system and the Federal Reserve. Other concerns included those events that catalyzed the related militia movement, such as the standoffs at Ruby Ridge and Waco. And there were new issues as well. For all the talk by common law adherents criticizing the intrusive federal government, what angered many of them most were the actions of local governments, particularly regarding zoning and building regulations. A catalyzing issue for many in the largely male movement was the issue of divorce settlements. Many "sovereigns" felt powerless in the face of a legal system that seemed to give them no say.

The emergence of Florida's first common law court in the mid-1990s reflected all of these concerns. The guiding spirit behind the court's emergence was Emilio Ippolito, a Tampa, Florida, property owner who possessed millions of dollars worth of low-income housing. Ippolito, along with his daughter Susan Mokdad, a co-owner, fought a long-running battle in the 1980s and 1990s with city authorities over various building code violations in Ippolito's apartment buildings. The structures incurred repeated fines for faulty wiring, and missing extinguishers and smoke alarms. Some were declared fire hazards and closed down. As their struggles with the city intensified, Ippolito and Mokdad became increasingly politicized. Ippolito first formed Defenders of Life and Property, Inc., in 1991, a group opposing city code enforcement boards. By 1993 he and Mokdad had become leaders in a more radical group that called itself Pro Se Litigants.

Pro Se Litigants met monthly in the Orlando Public Library, where its members discussed their various legal problems and passed around copies of Alfred Adask's Anti-Shyster. Some fought local authorities over permits and ordinances; others contested divorce settlements or fought wage garnishments. They represented an increasing frustration with a non-responsive court system in which the only winners seemed to be licensed attorneys. Among the group's other leaders were Charles Eidson, founder of the white supremacist Church of the Avenger, who repeatedly clashed with local authorities, not only for his racial views but for flouting laws on dumping of waste, and Daniel Schramek.[19]

Schramek himself had long been making a living by providing an alternative to hiring lawyers. Since the 1980s he had been a self-styled "estate planner," which meant he drew up legal documents for people, although he was not an attorney. He was also local director of a relatively mainstream group, HALT (Help Abolish Legal Tyranny). Schramek's participation in divorce cases brought him into frequent conflict with local judicial authorities and lawyers, many of who claimed he was practicing law without a license. Actions such as signing a dead man's name on a deed finally resulted in a court order in 1993 to stop Schramek from advising people on legal issues or preparing legal documents; this order caused Schramek's business to fail, but did not stop Schramek's practices.

Indeed, by 1993 Schramek, Ippolito, Mokdad, Eidson and others in the group had launched dozens of suits against lawyers, judges, the Florida Bar, and other organizations and individuals. Eidson went so far as to post a document in the Hillsborough County courthouse calling for the formation of a "posse comitatus." Ippolito and Mokdad even served brief stints in jail for fighting with bailiffs during one trial. By then they had lost much of their property in their continuing and losing battle with city authorities as it was seized or condemned for various building violations. Hardened veterans now, thoroughly disenchanted with the existing legal system, it was an easy step for them to form in mid-1993 a legal system of their own, the "Constitutional Court of We the People." Ippolito and Mokdad and others not only formed the court, but advertised in local papers that they would hear divorce proceedings for a $25 fee. Within a year they moved from bogus divorce proceedings to issuing arrest warrants for local judges. The Constitutional Court's "Fugitive Warrants Unit" warned judges to "schedule appointments" or face "physical arrest at your home or workplace by the Militia which could result in a dangerous confrontation."[20]

The common law court finally went too far when, in support of the California tax protest group called the Pilot Connection Society, it mailed threatening letters to the jury trying a fraud case against the tax protest group's leaders. Ippolito, Mokdad, and others were arrested and indicted in the spring of 1996 on conspiracy, obstruction of justice, and other charges, covering the arrest warrants, the Pilot Connection letters and threats against other federal officials and jury members.

The Constitutional Common Law Court of Ippolito and Mokdad was not the only such "sovereign" group in central Florida; indeed, it was merely at the center of a web of such activity. Charles Eidson had his own common law group, the "Tampa Freedom Center." He offered common law advice and issued bogus liens. Five sovereigns were convicted in the Premier Benefit Capital Trust scheme, which defrauded investors of more than $7.5 million; two of the principles, Janice Weeks-Katona and her son, Jason Weeks, were convicted on additional charges, including plotting to kill U.S. District Judge Steven Merryday in Tampa, Florida. Similarly, two couples, members of a group called the American Citizens Alliance, received sentences for threatening two judges and filing fraudulent $25 million liens against them in retaliation. Members of the Alliance openly advocated killing police officers; its leader is in jail on federal charges of fraud. Other Alliance members included George Sibley and Lynda Lyon, who fled Orlando on aggravated battery charges rather than give themselves over to a "fraudulent and unconstitutional court."

While fugitives, Sibley and Lyon murdered an Alabama police officer and are currently on death row. Three freemen in Orlando, members of "American National Freeman" as well as Ippolito's common law court, were convicted in early 1996 on 21 counts of conspiracy, mail fraud and obstruction of justice relating to bogus liens they filed. Other common law groups, such as the Guardians of American Liberty, were less openly confrontational, but still operated to spread the Posse ideology across the state, as did numerous individuals, who labeled themselves "freemen" or "sovereign citizens." Individuals were able to wreak just as much havoc on the legal system as groups.[21]

Florida was an early hotbed of common law activity, but the movement grew. From Florida and Texas and Wisconsin, and from resurgent Posse members in other areas, the common law movement spread like wildfire across the country. At meetings in Kansas and Oklahoma hundreds of people congregated to learn common law tactics, some of them paying large amounts of money for the privilege. Across the country, common law adherents began establishing versions of common law courts, which they called "Our One Supreme Court." They believe that the Constitution, referring to the judicial power of the United States being vested in "one Supreme Court," did not mean the establishment of one Supreme Court, but rather meant local common law courts that are the highest judicial authority in the land. By 1995, officials in Nebraska detected common law activity in almost half of the state's counties. Similar surveys in Ohio discovered common law activity in almost every single county in the state.

By mid-decade, certain hubs of activity had arisen: in Montana, the so-called Montana Freemen, fugitives from the law, offered classes on common law strategies, especially bogus money orders and checks, to people from around the country. In Ohio, groups such as "Rightway Law" offered common law seminars, while the central Ohio "Our One Supreme Court" received national attention for its activities. Indeed, by 1995 in Ohio, one common law leader had been killed in a traffic stop confrontation on a rural road, while another was in jail for assaulting a police officer and a third a fugitive for the same offense. Still another prominent leader had been convicted on fraud charges. Common law court activity was also especially high in California, Colorado, Idaho and Missouri, but no state was completely devoid of such activity.

As in the 1980s, there were many different types of common law activity, including tax protest activities, issuing arrest warrants, and establishing common law courts. Many common law actions were triggered by some sort of confrontation between a "sovereign citizen" and some authority figure, whether it be the IRS, a loan officer, or a state trooper issuing a traffic citation. It is at that moment that the adherent's fanatical nature is revealed, often turning the most minor incident into a violent confrontation or even an armed standoff.

One typical example is the case of James Conrad Gutschmidt of Mercer Island, Washington. In February 1996, Officer Glenn Sawyer of the King County Airport Police/Aircraft Fire-Rescue Division spotted a burned-out headlight on a car in a restaurant parking lot near Boeing Field Airport in South Seattle. Sawyer pulled up to the vehicle, occupied by Gutschmidt and two friends. Sawyer told Gutschmidt that the stop was only a safety stop and no citation would be issued. He asked to see Gutschmidt's driver's license. Gutschmidt replied that he was not "driving." Sawyer repeated his request. When Gutschmidt finally complied, Sawyer went back to the car and pulled up the license number on the computer, where he discovered a restraining order from a family law court, two failures to appear, two unpaid speeding tickets, and two suspended license actions for failure to appear. Sawyer asked Gutschmidt to step out of the vehicle. Gutschmidt refused, causing Sawyer to call for another officer to aid him. The two demanded that Gutschmidt leave his vehicle, which he finally did. After the confrontation, Gutschmidt was arrested on charges of obstructing an officer arrest. In the courtroom, Gutschmidt was no more cooperative. When the judge asked where he lived, Gutschmidt replied, "In my body, which is the temple of God." Gutschmidt having no fixed address, having been evicted earlier, the judge decided there was reason to believe Gutschmidt would again fail to appear at the readiness hearing and set bail at $1,000.

The police officers might have thought that the irritating episode was over, but retaliatory sequels to such events are a common occurrence. A few months later, Gutschmidt took his grievances to the local "Our One Supreme Court," where he charged the two officers with a variety of offenses and asked for a judgment of $10,000 in gold or silver (plus costs) against them. The common law court issued a summons to the two officers to appear before it, or face "judgment by default." The court also recorded for Gutschmidt an action against King County, the judge scheduled to try Gutschmidt's case, and Sawyer and the other police officer, and ordered that the case be dismissed and the thousand dollars in bail returned. The police officers ignored the summons and other documents, but were nevertheless worried about them, and not without reason. They could not guarantee that a group of sovereign citizens would not show up at their front doors and attempt to "arrest" them. In another, unrelated action, Gutschmidt secured a $170,000 common law court fine against Interest Savings bank, the bank that foreclosed on his house.

Not only do the common law courts issue summonses and judgments, but the courts and their adherents are especially active in placing bogus liens on the property of individuals or institutions with which they have disagreements. What was a nuisance in the 1980s turned into a serious problem nationwide in the 1990s. Common law court members filed liens against police officers, judges, city officials, banks, utility companies, businesses, and neighbors. Because such liens often go unnoticed until the recipient tries to sell his or her property, there could be thousands more liens still undiscovered. The filed documents look legitimate; in early 1996 a county sheriffs department in Colorado even served some common law court documents on a local church before noticing that they were bogus. Not only have Posse adherents become adept in drafting such documents themselves, but in a disturbing trend, some are finding legal practitioners willing to participate in such schemes. Several disbarred lawyers-as well as the occasional practicing one-have been known to prepare common law documents. To give but one example, in the spring of 1996, attorney Jerry Wilkins of Waxahachie, Texas, was one of four men convicted in that state of passing more than $61 million in fake money orders through their group "USA First." As a result, there is no shortage of people able to create realistic counterfeit money orders or bogus liens.

The paper value of the liens known about thus far runs into the trillions of dollars. The dollar amount of these liens is not as significant-because the liens, after all, are bogus-as is the fact that in many states it can cost up to thousands of dollars to have such liens removed. When the "Common Law Court of Pleas" in Arlington, Texas, filed a $1 billion bogus lien against the A. H. Belo Corporation (owner of the Dallas Morning News), the company had to pay $12,500 in legal fees to get it removed. A.H. Belo Corporation could spare the money; the average sheriffs deputy or county clerk cannot.[22]

Recently, many states have passed new laws making such liens easy to remove or making the filing of bogus liens criminal. Other states have dusted off old laws against impersonating public officials or criminal syndicalism in an attempt to deal with the actions of these courts. In most cases it is too soon to tell whether these new efforts will enjoy success. It is important to note, however, that in almost every case, the states have been reactive in nature, responding sluggishly to the tactics of the common law court movement. In contrast, the common law movement itself has so far proven itself extremely creative in discovering new strategies and tactics.

The most prominent example of common law activity, of course, is the group of people known as the Montana Freemen. Near Jordan, Montana, a group of unsuccessful fanning families decided to resort to common law activity to stave off debt and foreclosure, while to the south, in Roundup, Montana, a smaller group of tax protesters, steeped in Posse ideology, taught classes on how to use bogus checks and money orders. In both locations, quasi-standoff situations developed, local authorities not having the physical power to remove the Freemen from their foreclosed-upon land. Defiant, the Freemen escalated from frivolous lawsuits to bogus liens to common law courts and arrest warrants.

In September 1995, the Freemen in Roundup drove in a convoy north to Jordan and merged with the other group. By now the dark family ranch near Jordan had become, in true Posse fashion, "Justus Township." It also became a haven for common-law adherents fleeing from the law from Colorado, North Carolina, Utah and elsewhere. Garfield County, where the dark ranch lay, simply did not have the resources to deal with so many armed and committed extremists.

Common law adherents from across the country traveled to Jordan to learn how to use bogus checks from group leader Leroy Schweitzer. Not until March 1996, when federal authorities finally stepped in, was there a serious attempt at bringing the group to justice. Local citizens cheered as the FBI instituted a peaceful 81-day standoff that resulted in the surrender of the Freemen, now awaiting trial on numerous charges.

The resurgent common law court movement, though a direct descendant of its 1980s predecessor, has exhibited certain marked differences from its older incarnations. Of these, perhaps the most important is increased organization and increased cooperation between groups and individuals. The 1990s movement has exhibited an unprecedented degree of organization. Much of this has been due to the development of advanced technologies, including inexpensive fax machines, laser printers and the Internet. While in the 1980s a typical group might have operated only locally after attending some seminar on the subject, in the 1990s such groups are in contact with people of similar persuasion across the entire country. Magazines such as The AntiShyster and The Americans Bulletin cater to common law views, while the number of people traveling around to offer seminars (or seminars by videotape) is greater than ever. Even more obvious has been the impact of the Internet. World Wide Web sites that offer common law material are very numerous.

The range of this material is breathtaking, from long discourses and legal rationales for common law activity to detailed instructions on how to create "nonstatutory abatements" and "common law liens." Automated e-mail discussion lists allow common law adherents to share tactics with each other, something they do on a regular basis. The average common law proponent in the movement today potentially has much more information at his fingertips than did his predecessor a decade ago.

Another difference between the old movement and the new are the different strategies that have more recently emerged. While many of the goals of modem day common law court activists remain the same as those active in the 1980s, some goals have changed. The typical common law activist in 1983 might have been an angry farmer threatened by foreclosure who attempted to place a lien on his own property in an (futile) effort to forestall legal action. While a 1996 common law activist might engage in a similar battle, perhaps over a home mortgage, a zoning restriction, or in retaliation for a divorce action, there are a growing number of committed common law adherents who openly advocate common law tactics as a way to overload the legal and judicial system, with the ultimate goal of eventually bringing it down together. One of the reasons the Montana Freemen taught people how to issue bogus money orders was to destroy the hated Federal Reserve System. Others were content with lesser goals, such as flooding local county clerks' offices and local courts with so much common law activity that local officials would be too distracted to perform their lawful duties. This tactic has been especially effective in sparsely populated counties, where county governments have neither the staff nor resources to cope with such efforts. Another more immediate result of this strategy has been attrition, as many public officials and employees have become so frustrated dealing with these tactics that they have resigned from public service.

The common law court movement has also seen increasing violence and threats of violence, leading to great concern on the part of individuals whose jobs put them in contact with its members. Violence was always a possibility with the old Posse, particularly in farm states like Kansas, yet today the threat or actual use of violence seems much more widespread. Agencies like the Internal Revenue Service have long had to deal with the radical actions of the tax protest wing of the movement. People like Joseph Bailey, convicted of trying to blow up an IRS building in Reno, Nevada, in December 1995, keep the IRS vigilant. But now fanatical common law advocates have taken serious measures in their wars against other public officials. Many judges, prosecutors, police officers and other public servants have received arrest warrants; some have received death threats. In California, when Stanislaus County Recorder Karen Mathews refused to file the liens and other documents of the local common law group, Juris Christian Assembly, members of that group ambushed her in front of her home in early 1994, attacking her with blows and cuts from a knife. One assailant dry-fired a pistol repeatedly at her head, warning her to "do your job."

In Montana, the Montana Freemen were thwarted in 1995 in what was apparently an attempt to kidnap (and perhaps hang) law enforcement and criminal justice officials who opposed the Freemen. The following year, in Idaho, common law proponent Gary DeMott, head of a group called "Idaho Sovereignty," announced his plans to arrest not only a local judge but hundreds of county officials across the state. In the end, he backed down from his confrontational statements, but not before creating considerable concern and anxiety. The past actions of Posse adherents such as Gordon Kahl in the 1980s and George Sibley and Linda Lyons in the 1990s, individuals who translated threats of violence into the reality, demonstrate that such threats must be taken seriously.[23]

An additional feature of the resurgence of the common law court movement is greater numbers and distribution. The movement of the 1980s saw most activity in Wisconsin, the Great Plains states, and the Pacific Northwest, with incidents occurring in a number of other states, particularly in the West and Midwest. A decade later, there are sovereign citizen groups in every single state in the country. Moreover, these groups have exhibited a willingness to establish relations with other branches of the "patriot" movement. In several states, common law court leaders have expressed a desire that militia groups in their states act as marshals of the common law courts. So far, most militia units have been wary of such alliances, because of the danger it would place them in, but it is not uncommon for individuals to belong both to militias and to common law courts, particularly in rural areas.

Common law courts also have developed considerable connections with white supremacists, more so than has the militia movement. The sect Christian Identity maintains a very strong foothold within the movement, as evidenced by the Montana Freemen. In a few states, the common law ideology has taken a bizarre twist, resulting in secessionist movements. Not surprisingly, such movements have been limited to only a few states such as Hawaii, Alaska, and Texas. Texas has spawned the most notorious of such groups, the so-called "Republic of Texas" (ROT), which argues that Texas was never lawfully annexed and is therefore an independent nation. ROT grew quickly and spread across the state. It has co-opted most of the other common law groups and part of the militia movement in Texas. Its leaders act in open defiance of local authorities, who have obtained an arrest warrant (not yet served) for the rot's most visible leader, entrenched with his followers at a remote West Texas site.

The Future of Common Law Courts

Currently, the common law court movement is both widespread and pernicious. It shows no sign of decreasing in strength any time soon. In fact, new groups are formed regularly. High-profile operations such as the long-delayed arrest of the Montana Freemen have shut down the activities of specific groups but have not stemmed the activities of the overall movement. Some states, such as Missouri and Illinois, have conducted widespread arrests of common law court members on various charges, but these actions are too recent for us to see whether they have adversely affected statewide or regional common law activity.

Many states possess laws that are applicable to common law activity. These statutes range from simulating the legal process to impersonating a public official to criminal syndicalism. Enterprising public servants have begun to search the statute books for applicable laws, just as Posse adherents have searched law books for their own purposes. Some of these efforts are bearing fruit. Many states have passed new laws, or are in the process of doing so, that are specifically designed to combat the problem of retaliatory common law liens. Such legislation will provide additional tools for prosecutors and other public officials.

However, common law activists have proven quite resourceful; merely passing statues after the fact may not be enough. They discovered that bogus checks and bogus liens are effective and disruptive anti-government tactics. Presumably they will discover additional, equally disruptive tactics in the future. Moreover, the more dedicated of the common law believers have shown themselves willing to lose their property and to risk imprisonment as a necessary price for their beliefs. If the legally constituted authorities become more successful in dealing with common law tactics, it is possible that thwarted activists may resort to increased violence in an effort to meet their followers' expectations as well as to strike blows. Nevertheless, it is important that the government-federal, state and local-enforce the laws and put pressure on the bogus courts, for a key strategy must be to separate the committed leaders and members of the movement from the large body of the primarily curious, and other less committed followers and supporters, who might thereby be deterred from engaging in illegal activity. Enforcement resources must be concentrated on the comparatively small number of high-risk members who pose the greatest threats.

The most important need of all, however, is for increased awareness. Not only must public officials in areas with heavy common law activity be aware of the potential for violent confrontation or even domestic terrorism, but they must understand how to deal with the day to day activities of such extremists. County clerks and recorders must deal with their filings. Police officers must pull them over for traffic violations. Judges must face their courtroom antics, while prosecutors must learn how effectively to build cases against them. All these people and more besides must deal with the possibility of bogus liens or other retaliatory measures. Moreover, public officials in areas that have not yet seen an influx of common law activity must be aware of the warning signs of common law activity. Knowledge is a weapon that can be brought to bear to combat the rhetoric of the Posse adherents, decrease their membership, guard against their threats or acts, and punish them for any illegal activities they might commit.

PART II

Tactics in the Courtroom

This section contains tactics commonly used in the courtroom, during all types of proceedings. While most responses to any or all of these tactics fall squarely within judicial discretion (i.e., using the contempt power, facilitating agreement with the party), some responses to the tactics herein and in the following sections clearly implicate civil rights and must be taken with caution. These responses include any that deal with the party's speech, their rights to trial counsel and fair hearings, and the like. We should point out that courts generally have three avenues open to them: continuing the proceeding over objection, use of the contempt power to threaten or punish those who are disruptive, and accommodation or acquiescence to a party's request. As such, the universe of potential responses is not large. However, and in response to each individual tactic, creative and efficient solutions are urged.

Those responses which the court feels are soundly within its discretion might nonetheless have serious ramifications upon the court's ability to fulfill its mission -especially for those courts charged with implementing the Trial Court Performance Standards (TCPS) or some similar system for improving the court's performance. To that end, the court should become familiar with the TCPS, the text included herein, and consider alternatives that have a lesser impact on the court's ability to properly carry out its mission.

The sections on each tactic and response differ in that some are followed by a section titled "Additional Authority." This section exists where there is a rich body of law on point or closely related. In other sections, where the particular point is not as developed, additional authority is provided by way of annotation and gives reference to a starting point from which to search.

Subpart 2.1 - Challenging Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A. The Gold-Fringed Flag Issue

The members of antigovernment groups and common law courts frequently challenge the state courts' jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases they are involved in by declaring that the gold fringe typically found on decorative flags transforms the court into a court of Admiralty jurisdiction. The bases underlying this belief are not entirely coherent, and adherents of different movements cite disparate, though related, reasons for this. A common theory is that in 1933, as the United States abandoned the gold standard, our country became "bankrupt." As a result, elected leaders have hidden this information from the public and worked to conceal it since. In 1938 there was allegedly a secret meeting of the nation's top attorneys, judges and United States Attorneys, in which they were told that the courts were operating in Admiralty jurisdiction - and they have been ever since.

Another variation on this theme is that ships traditionally fly the flag of their native country. Because of that, it is supposedly well known that whenever an individual is confronted with a proceeding before a particular flag, he or she is on notice that the laws of the country the flag represents are to govern that particular proceeding. In 1925, the United States Attorney General issued an Opinion in which he offered: "The placing of a fringe on the national flag, the dimensions of the flag and the arrangement of the stars in the union are matters of detail not controlled by statute, but are within the discretion of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy."[24] In 1959, President Eisenhower issued Executive Order No. 10834, in which he stated that, "A military flag is a flag that resembles the regular flag of the United States, except that it has a yellow fringe border on three sides." Consistent with the common conspiratorial angle from which the antigovernment groups often approach matters, those words have been interpreted to mean that whenever a court is displaying the gold-fringed flag that court has suspended "constitutional" law and is operating under military court martial authority - wherein individual rights are supposedly suspended.

With these beliefs, or some variation thereon, firmly in mind, members of antigovernment groups frequently refuse to acknowledge the jurisdiction of whatever court they happen to be in when this flag is present. Because they also believe that to object without caveat may subject them to the court's jurisdiction, they will file documents such as "notices of special appearance" and the like, in order to proffer an objection without submitting to the court's jurisdiction. Like many other tactics, this is one that can potentially use much of the court's valuable time and, if the court refuses to acknowledge the objection, to costly and time consuming appeals.

B. Typical Responses to the Flag Objection

Courts are generally left with three avenues when faced with this objection: 1) to note the objection and move on; 2) to become combative - even to the extreme of using the court's contempt power to sanction the participant; and 3) to understand that it may be faced with this problem repeatedly and take precautionary measures to alleviate it -namely, to replace their flag.

1. Noting the Objection - There is little controversy surrounding the option of noting the participant's objection and moving forward. In 1997, a United States Federal District Court spoke at length about this issue. There, a "freeman" brought a federal civil rights claim against a state court judge, claiming that the judge acted without jurisdiction because of the fringe on its flag. The federal court responded:

"The plaintiffs claims against the [defendants] must be dismissed because his factual predicate is incorrect as a matter of law... in flag manufacture, a fringe is not considered to be a part of the flag, and is without heraldic significance... even if the plaintiff could prove that [a yellow fringe] converted the state court's United States flag to a maritime flag of war, the Court cannot fathom how the display of a maritime war flag could limit the state court's jurisdiction."[25]

Pursuant to the reasoning of this case, it appears well settled that there is no actual claim relating to the fringe on a flag and a court's jurisdiction. Be advised, however, that simply because there is no cognizable claim, courts cannot expect that litigants will not pursue an appeal or a federal civil rights claim against the judge whose court utilizes the gold-fringed flag.

2. The Contempt Power - a court may, of course, use its traditional contempt power to bring litigants in line with the expected norms of courtroom behavior. As with option 1, above, be forewarned that the likely result of the use of that power will be publicity, appellate review and further lack of cooperation from litigants.

3. Acquiescence - Another, and becoming more frequent, response is to acquiesce to the objection posed by the participant. This typically happens in one of two ways. First, the court has dealt with and is aware of the tactics of antigovernment groups, and takes proactive measures by simply replacing its flags with less ornate United States flags. This may be a permanent measure, or merely one that is taken before these individuals appear in the courtroom. Second, and where the court is unaware of this tactic but suddenly faced with the objection, the court simply acquiesces and replaces the flag. A suggestion from Judge Bonnie Sudderth of Texas: "flags are relatively inexpensive items. Replace the fringed flag with a less fancy version and this argument disappears with it."[26]

C. Additional Authority

The following cases present additional discussion pertaining to the flag issue:

Federal Courts

Vella v. McCammon, 671 F.Supp. 1128, 1129 (S.D. Tex. 1987)(holding that the flag argument has no arguable basis in law or fact).

Schneider v. Schlaefer, 975 F. Supp. 1160,1162 (E. D. Wis. 1997)(calling the difference between flags "purely cosmetic").

Sadlier v. Payne, 974 F. Supp. 1411 (D. Utah 1997)(noting that any

arguments made under the "flag code," 36 U.S.C. § 176(g) fail because the code does not proscribe conduct and is merely advisory in nature).

State Courts

Commonwealth v. Appel, 652 A.2d 341, 343 (Pa.Super. 1994)(calling the flag argument a "preposterous claim").

State v. Whelan, 961 P.2d 1051 (Ariz.App.Div.2 1997)(not a holding on point, but exemplary of the tactics members use in court). City ofBelton v. Horton, 947 S.W.2d 104 (Mo.App.W.D. 1997) (calling argument "mere abstract statements").

Subpart 2.2 - Challenging Personal Jurisdiction

A. The "Sovereign" vs. the "Corporate" Citizen

Though the precise contours of their philosophy differ among the various groups, almost all antigovernment movements adhere to a theory of a "sovereign" citizen. Essentially, they believe that our nation is made up of two types of people: those who are sovereign citizens by virtue of Article IV of the Constitution, and those who are "corporate" or "14^th Amendment" citizens by virtue of the ratification of the 14^th Amendment. The arguments put forth by these groups are generally incoherent, legally, and vary greatly among different groups and different speakers within those groups. They all rely on snippets of 19^th Century court opinions taken out of context, definitions from obsolete legal dictionaries and treatises, and misplaced interpretations of original intent. One of the more cogent - in the sense that it is readily followed - arguments is that there were no United States citizens prior to the ratification of the 14^th Amendment. All Americans were merely citizens of their own state and owed no allegiance to the federal government. As a result of that amendment, however, Congress created a new type of citizen - one who now enjoyed privileges conferred by the federal government and in turn answered to that government.

One of the ramifications of this belief is the dependent belief that, unless one specifically renounces his federal citizenship,[27] he is not the type of citizen originally contemplated by the Constitution. And, in their view, the Constitution requires all federal office holders to be the original or sovereign type of citizen, a state citizen rather than a United States citizen. As a result, all federal officers are holding office illegally and their laws and rules are thus constitutionally suspect. If the complaint, then, is that the federal government is suspect and thus so is its hold over these believers, it is unclear exactly why the state courts are correspondingly without authority. The explanations for that diverge widely. Essentially, members of these movements believe that they are able to renounce their federal citizenship by "quieting title" and by repudiating any possible "contractual" link to the government - such things as licenses, paying taxes, etc. They appear to just bootstrap their claims against the states onto the federal argument, and when they quiet title and become sovereign, all government's jurisdiction over them dissolves - except for the common law court to whose authority they have acquiesced.

Followers of these beliefs will typically attempt two types of argument in the state courts. Both go to the court's lack of jurisdiction, but for different reasons. The first is that they are sovereign and thus not answerable to state courts. They often support this contention by attempting to avail themselves of the "non resident alien" status described in Title 8 of the United States Code.[28] This argument will be made in conjunction with some variation of the discussion above. The second tactic will be to proclaim that they simply are not a "person" for purposes of whatever statute they are being charged or sued under - almost always a losing argument that is nonetheless very popular with tax protest groups.

B. Typical Responses to the Personal Jurisdiction Issue

Courts' responses to both of the usual arguments have been swift and decisive. These arguments have repeatedly lost at the appellate level. At the trial level, the court may respond in one of several ways, much like the flag issue in the preceding section.

1. Note the Objection and Move On - This appears to be the approach that most courts follow. As with any confrontation with members of these movements, arguments are interminable. Suffice to say that our system and its rules have established that: a) these people are not "sovereign" in any special sense,[29] and b) they are certainly "persons" within the meaning of whatever statute is at issue - especially provisions of the United States Tax Code. Most courts that have dealt frequently with these movements have heard these arguments before and merely note an objection and move on over that objection. Note, however, that courts may wish to determine as a matter of policy how to handle these objections in light of the fact that an overruled objection will most likely lead to an appeal - frivolous or not. Certainly, courts do not wish to encourage frivolous appeals, and it is likely that the penal apparatus for filing such appeals can and does discourage them on this ground.

2. Use of the Contempt Power - It is not entirely clear whether courts are using the contempt power in response to these personal jurisdiction arguments. It is quite evident that contempt is frequently used in accordance with the tactics these groups present, for they are often disagreeable, disruptive and disorderly. When stuck on this point in court, the court may feel compelled to use contempt to bring the party in line with acceptable behavior and decorum. However, a few caveats. First, it is not entirely clear that the court can censure an individual merely for uttering the objection based upon their view of the court's jurisdiction. The remedy for that failing is simply that they lose the argument as a matter of law. To censure them for the content of their speech, without more, is provocative and likely to lead to further argument and even retaliatory civil rights suits. There are a few ways in which the contempt power can be used in response to this tactic, however. First, where the argument over jurisdiction involves the party becoming disruptive or disorderly, as does happen, it is clear that contempt after warning is an acceptable response. Second, where the party lodges an objection that is noted by the court and asked to move on, but continues to argue the point, contempt is likely an acceptable response. In this instance, the censure is a result of the party's unacceptable behavior, rather than the content of his or her speech.

3. Engaging the Party in Argument - Judge Sudderth tells of a Texas judge who apparently bought the party's sovereignty argument and granted sovereign status to several litigants. The judge was rebuked by a conduct commission and subsequently resigned.[30] That is perhaps the extreme example of the danger of engaging in this argument with the litigants who come into your courtroom. Some judges, however, apparently cannot resist the urge to either "put these people in their place" or to emerge victorious in debate. Be forewarned that engaging them on these dogmatic issues may lead to several negative consequences. First, there exists the possibility that engagement will lead to the appearance of personal animus or prejudice, particularly any engagement beyond noting an objection and moving forward. Second, engaging in rhetorical debate with members of these groups amounts to granting to them the affirmation they seek and affirming that their points merit debate in a court of law. Third, engagement takes time and resources, and to spend these on debate plays right into one of the purposes behind the tactic to begin with.

C. Additional Authority

The following cases present additional discussion pertaining to "sovereignty":

Federal Courts

· Young v. Internal Revenue Service, 596 F.Supp. 141 (N.D.Ind. 1984) (tax protester - district court calls sovereignty claim "preposterous").

· United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 (9^th Cir. 1986) (tax protester case - calling argument "frivolous"),

· United States v. Sloan, 939 F.2d 499, 500-501 (7^th Cir. 1991) (tax protester case - noting that "strange" argument had repeatedly been rejected in the courts).

· United States v. Gerads, 999 F.2d 1255, 1256 (8^th Cir. 1993) (tax protester case - rejecting contention that defendants are "Free Citizens of the Republic of Minnesota" and thus not subject to federal income taxation).

· Valldejuli v. Social Security Administration, 75 A.F.T.R2d 95-607

· (N.D.Fla. 1994)(social security number protester - district court finds sovereign argument "meritless").

State Courts

· Uphoff v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue, 411 N.W.2d 428 (Wis. App.1987) (noting that appellant's "sovereign status" provides her no immunity from tax laws). This is an unpublished opinion. The fact that the court uses the term "appellant's sovereign status" is dangerous, for it is just the type of language these groups grasp and spin in order to legitimize their beliefs. The statement might have been better phrased "appellant's, claim of sovereign status.

· State v. French, 883 P.2d 644, 653 (Haw. App. 1994) (using Black's Law Dictionary to define "person" as "a human being," and denying petitioner's challenge to traffic law).

Subpart 2.3 - Demanding Use of "The Common Law"

A. Demanding a Strict Interpretation of "Common Law"

Central to much, but not all, antigovernment doctrine is the belief that the "common law" is all that rightfully governs sovereign individuals. That much is quite clear. What is not so easy to discern is precisely what "common law" means to members of these groups. Typically, arguments contain an imprecise mixture of principles embodied in the Magna Carta, the English common law (as reported in Blackstone's Commentaries), the Declaration of Independence, the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights. One of the tactics, or typical demands, of the antigovernment groups is to require that the court only apply this "common law." Where the court fails to do so, the members often effectively terminate the proceeding - becoming disruptive, entirely uncooperative, and usually either filibustering or refusing to speak at all.

As with other areas of antigovernment or sovereign citizen doctrine, the specific arguments vary among the particular groups and among the speakers within those groups. A common theory is that the American Common Law is the "unwritten set of laws that get their binding force from age-old usage and acceptance."[31] It is not clear that any particular groups share a common vision of what the "common law" is and exactly how it should be applied, for there does not seem to be a working hierarchy among documents or a general theory for reconciling apparent contradictions among the documents the movement relies on. It does appear clear that the notion of "common law" is as much about a belief in the inalienable sovereignty of the individual and a certain mindset as it is about a given set of usable rules by which to govern a society. In fact, one commentator has described the "common law" as "more than a system of rules to be observed or a set of formal institutions that demand recognition; it is a world in which people live."[32]

Given this understanding of the "common law," it is easy to imagine the importance adherents to these groups attach to it, and thus makes clear why they make this demand when in the state courts. Essentially, this demand is not so much a tactic as it is a way of doing business. Typically, the member will be in state court for some purpose. If it is a civil matter, he or she cannot be liable, because the court is corrupt and refuses to recognize the binding law of the Magna Carta, for example (though members have appeared in court as plaintiffs and had no problem using the state's legal system to his or her own ends). If this is a criminal matter, the member will again demand use of the common law, citing – and often shouting – pieces of wisdom taken out of context from one of the great historical documents.[33] Herein lies the "tactic": when the court refuses to recognize the member's objection or argument - as the court almost always will - the member will further object, completely disrupt the proceeding, will file an appeal based on the court's failure to adhere to the "proper law," and will sometimes bring a separate, outside suit against the judge for violating his or her civil rights.

In addition to the "common law" demand, members will often incorporate references to the Uniform Commercial code.[34] Adherents rely on a belief that, after the case of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins[35] our courts abandoned the use of what we think of as the common law - that judge-made law that plays an integral role, along with the statutory and administrative law that makes up our system. Rather than the accepted reading of Erie, that is, that there is no federal common law (but that common law in the states is left intact and federal courts apply state substantive law and federal procedural law), these groups believe that the case abolished the use of all common law. To them, this both leaves a gap in our system of laws and is evidence that the Supreme Court declared that "commercial" law is now supreme. For this, they have adopted liberal readings of the Uniform Commercial Code, and demand that tortured readings of its provisions be used as statutory law in the proceedings of which they are a part.

B. Typical Responses to the Common Law Demand

1. Acquiescence - it has actually been suggested by some commentors that courts just acquiesce and agree to apply the laws as demanded by members of the movements. This is a dangerous, if not absurd, proposition. It may be that such commentors are actually suggesting that the courts sort of "play along" with these groups and their demands. Regardless of the way in which acquiescence is suggested, it is clear that no legitimate tribunal can either apply the "common law" as understood by these groups or "play along" with their demands. This is simply not an option.

2. Continue over objection - this is the likely response to the "common law" argument. It is, in fact, the only route a court can legitimately take - if it wishes to retain its credibility and legitimacy. Like all responses, this is likely to trigger two things: resistance in the litigant demanding use of the "common law," and an appeal later on. While courts will have to deal with the resistance of the litigants, using traditional devices such as contempt, removal and the like, courts should not fear the results of an appeal - "common law courts" and their attendant jurisprudence have been long-held to be legally non-existent.[36]

Subpart 2.4 - Significance of "The Bar"

A. Refusing to Enter the Bar

There is a general theory among these groups that the term "esquire" following an attorney's name is a "title of nobility," in violation of the United States Constitution. In Article I, Sections 9 and 10, the Constitution states that no title of nobility shall be granted by the United States and, furthermore, that no state shall grant titles of nobility. Because of this, several things occur. First, the states lose legitimacy in the eyes of these groups because they confer licenses upon attorneys — thus magically turning them into "esquires" and illegally granting titles of nobility. Second, and most important for purposes of this text, courts which have a bar - the area in front of the gallery - have a space that is reserved for attorneys only (supposedly). Therefore, the thinking goes, a member of these groups cannot "enter the bar" lest they either become an "esquire" or acknowledge the validity of the "title" - which consequence is more feared is not quite clear.

A second, and related, reason is often used to support the "titles of nobility" theory. In 1810, Congress proposed what would have been the 13^th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This amendment would have forbade any United States citizen from receiving a title of nobility and from holding public office if he or she did so. The proposed amendment was never ratified by the states, however. Twelve states did accept the proposed amendment - but thirteen of the then seventeen states were required for it to be adopted. The problem that arises is that, apparently, there were communications problems between the state and federal governments in 1810 and, as a result, the text of the "13^th Amendment" made an appearance in a particular Virginia law book.[37] Virginia was one of the states that did not accept the proposed amendment. A member of one of these groups made this "discovery" some time ago, and has subsequently argued (and taught to the masses) that this amendment was actually ratified. Because of this, all attorneys are violating the constitution - especially those who hold public office. This is just another way to validate the belief that attorneys — as we know them today - are, as a class, just bad, illegal and corrupt people. The members of these groups want nothing to do with that, and therefore refuse to "enter the bar" and choose not to "take the stand" to testify.

B. Typical Responses to the Bar Argument

1. Acquiescence - the result of this argument is that adherents will refuse to take the stand to testify. How to deal with this is a matter of judicial discretion, the answer to, which is guided by the court's values - i.e., whether the resulting fight is worth accommodating the litigant's demand. It is possible that a court could acquiesce and allow the litigant to be sworn outside of the bar and testify from his or her seat, for example. This is likely a matter of court procedure that can be changed to fit a given circumstance. While acquiescence relieves the initial burden of having to deal with the litigant's outburst, resistance, etc., it does hamper the appearance that the court treats litigants equally and that the court is committed to a consistent process. The authors hesitate to use a "slippery slope" argument, but must point out that, if courts are to begin Mk. accommodating members of these groups in every tedious demand such as this, where does such accommodation stop? Further, what does the court do when members of another group demand the same concession? It is suggested that courts take the ramifications of a decision to accommodate seriously when deliberating over how to approach this problem. Finally, consider the circumstances and the end result of a person's refusal to enter the bar. Where that person is a witness is one thing - and clearly a contemptible offense. Where the person is a party, however, is another. When that person essentially refuses to testify, they are harming their own cause and will likely be seen to have waived any objection.

2. Refuse to Accommodate/Contempt - It is clear that it is within the court's authority to use the contempt power when a litigant refuses to obey the court's lawful command. A few things bear noting, however. First, it is possible that the use of the contempt power against a person who refuses to enter the bar will be construed as a violation of the litigant's First Amendment right against the abridgment of his or her free speech. Though likely a claim without merit,[38] it could give rise to a federal civil rights action against the judge. Such a case is a non-winner, from the plaintiff's point of view, but does result in the successful harassment of the judge and forces the judge and likely the state to defend a lawsuit.

3. Creative Resolution - It appears that the chief concern for members of these groups is something that can often be alleviated through semantics. That is, the problem may not be that they enter the bar, but that they will be thought of as accepting a title of nobility and will be discredited before their peers for acquiescing and lending credence to a system they do not believe in. One way to alleviate this concern might be for the court to question the litigant as to why they do not wish to enter the bar, and then to "agree" to decree that, for the purposes of testifying, the litigant is not accepting a title of nobility. It is, to this author's point of view, a simple way of alleviating much of the problems attendant with dealing with these groups in your courts. It is not unlike being willing to remove the offending flag or otherwise accommodating these folks in an efficient and legally irrelevant way. It goes a long way toward gaining some measure of cooperation.

C. Additional Authority

1. The First Amendment Problem - Trial judges have enormous power to control the conduct of affairs in their courtroom. Any challenge to a judge's use of the contempt power will likely be based upon the premise that a judge's use of that power comes in violation of the First Amendment. Learned commentators suggest that this possible problem be viewed in the following manner: First, if viewed as a restriction or other harm based on the content of the individual's speech, the individual is likely to lose because of the necessity of content-based regulations in the courtroom. Second, the courtroom is considered a "non-forum" in which reasonable regulations designed to "permit the orderly conduct of business of the court are both inevitable and permissible."[39] Justice Stevens alluded to this problem and its solution in his concurrence in Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530, 545 (1980). There, he discussed the Supreme Court rules, which dictate the order in which parties may present their argument. He justified those content-based restrictions on just these grounds - that the court was a non-forum and that only certain types of expression relevant to the conduct of the judicial process are permitted. Inasmuch as a person might argue that their refusal to enter the bar is an expressive act, there is simply no room for that act in the efficient conduct of the judicial process.

2. Titles of Nobility - several courts have passed on the validity of the claim that "esquire" and other terms are titles of nobility:

· Woodson v. Davis, 887 F.2d 1082 (4^th Cir. 1989) ("Officer of the Court" is not a title of nobility).

· Hilgeford v. People's Bank, 113 F.R.D. 161 (N.D.Ind. 1986) (being a "lawyer" is not having a title of nobility).

· Frederick v. dark, 587 F.Supp. 789 (W.D.Wis. 1984) (being a "lawyer" is not having a title of nobility).

Part III: Disrupting the Operation of the Court

This section covers tactics that, while they may occur in the courtroom, may also occur outside of the courtroom, in the presence of clerks, guards and other court personnel. The most crucial step a court can take to prepare for these tactics is to be aware of their potentiality and prepare a plan in advance to either placate or dissuade the patron from acting or to alleviate the effects of the patron's actions.

As the author notes in the discussion of the Trial Court Performance Standards, the responses courts take must be well-considered beforehand, for the parties against which those responses are taken both have a right to the same process as others and represent an unusually active threat to the courts. Civil rights suits by members of these movements, against judges in their personal capacity, are not unheard of. The response a court takes against one of these members might well make the difference whether the judge or other court personnel end up burdened with defending, or at least answering to, a suit against their person. For this, the authors strongly suggest an understanding and appreciation for the goals and methodology espoused by the Trial Court Performance Standards.

Subpart 3.1 - Refusing to Speak / Identify Oneself

A. Refusal to Identify Oneself

Members of the anti-government movement will often attempt to avoid conferral of jurisdiction onto a court by refusing to identify themselves or denying that they are the person named in a warrant or summons. This refusal may come from any one of or even several of the following bases. Often, anti-government adherents will refuse to come forward simply to waste time, or out of a more general refusal to recognize or submit to the court's jurisdiction.

Some parts of the anti-government movement however, will refuse to come forward on the ground that their name is misspelled, or even because their name is in all capital letters. This particular objection comes from a number of "sources". Some believe that the spelling (or misspelling, or use of all capital letters) of their name is a sign of the movement toward "one world government." Others believe that all capital letters denotes a corporation, and that answering as a corporation subjects them to the illegitimate laws of the American judicial system. Some believe that all capital letters denotes "the Mark of the Beast,"[40] or that it is a denotation of a "war name." Finally, some members of the movement believe that they only "own" their first and middle names, and that their last name reveals their family. They use their middle name in place of a last name, or go by their first and middle name "from the family of their last name. Attached to this particular issue may be a desire to be referred to as "Sir" or "Sovereign," because of a belief that this title more effectively conveys their status as a "sovereign citizen." It is the belief of members of the movement that they can file a document renouncing their citizenship to become a nation subject only to their own local common-law, and not subject to the law of their state or the federal government.

Another ground for a follower's refusal to identify himself may be his refusal to recognize himself as a "person." This particular objection comes from what appears to be a somewhat mystical distinction between a "person" and a "human being" according to the anti-government movement's philosophy.

B. Typical Responses to Refusals to Identify

Obviously dealing with such antics tends to be frustrating and to waste time. For this reason it is very important that the court impose a schedule for filings and appearances, and when the defendant fails to appear or refuses to identify himself, the court should move on. Some courts have had success requiring such defendants to post bond to secure appearances. When the defendant is in the courtroom, but simply refuses to identify himself, the court can ask if anyone else in the court is able to identify him, or use a legal document for ID purposes. If no one in the court can identify the defendant, the judge can warn the defendant of the contempt power. Obviously, where the defendant refuses to recognize him or herself as a "person," the court can do little other than read the definition of "person" to the defendant, note the objection, and move on.

1. Scheduling — It is virtually unquestioned that courts have the authority to maintain control over their dockets, and to move forward where delay is impractical. Also, as noted repeatedly within this guide, it is one of the primary objections of members of the movement that the law treats them and those like them unfairly. In order to avoid fanning the flames, courts (and indeed government personnel in general) should set their rules and follow them scrupulously, thus reducing the fervor of this particular complaint. Where the court knows or suspects that followers (or anyone, for that matter) will appear before it in a given case and present such problems, the court can best deal with the situation by setting and adhering strictly to a schedule for pretrial and trial proceedings.

2. Alternative Identification - Where a defendant refuses to identify himself the obvious solution is to find some other way to identify him. The court can ask those present if the defendant is present and if any one can identify him, or a person suspected to be the defendant can be asked to present identification. It is important to keep in mind, however, that many adherents to the movement do not carry identification, especially drivers' licenses, because they refuse to recognize the government's authority to require such licensing.

Where a defendant refuses to recognize himself as a "person" the court can only read the definition of a "person," note the defendant's objection, and move on.

3. Bonds and Contempt— Where no one in court can identify the defendant and the defendant will not identify himself, the court can do little other than warn those in the courtroom of the contempt power (hoping that the defendant is present). It is at this point that adherence to the schedule becomes critical. The court must then issue a warrant to bring the defendant before it to show cause why he should not be held in contempt and go on with its docket. At least one court filed for such a warrant where the defendant was in the courtroom but refused to respond to his name.

Many courts deal with the problems of getting followers to appear by requiring that they first post a bond securing their appearance. Being required to appear and make this fact known or lose several thousand dollars provides an obvious and significant incentive to a defendant.

As always, where a government official deals with members of the antigovernment movement, it is important to recognize that virtually any response to them may result in lawsuits (often frivolous) being filed against the official in either legitimate state or federal courts or in the follower's own common-law court.

Subpart 3.2 - Silence/Filibuster

A. Party Chooses to Remain Silent or Party Chooses to 'Filibuster"

Members of the movement will engage in any of a number of tactics to stall, disrupt, or render literally impossible the operation of the courtroom. As part of a general refusal to subject himself to the court's jurisdiction the defendant may refuse to enter a plea. He may refuse to swear an oath on religious grounds before taking the stand, or he may even refuse to say anything at all. In some cases, a party may take the stand in his own defense, and then refuse to respond to questions asked by the other side on cross-examination.

Members of the movement are also known to take the exact opposite tack. They may talk incessantly, refusing to follow substantive or procedural law. A defendant may also respond to simple questions with questions of his own. In at least one case a member of a common-law court actually went so far as to convene his own court in the courtroom, asking the judge questions in response to his questions, ruling on arguments and motions, and generally conducting proceedings pursuant to his court's "rules."

B. Typical Responses to Silence/Filibuster

The obvious response to these problems is the use of the court's contempt power. The thorny problem with that response is that, at least with a criminal defendant, there may be serious 5^th amendment implications - a defendant simply may not be required to testify against himself where it may incriminate him. Where a criminal defendant refuses to respond to the court, the court may choose to enter a "not guilty" plea on the defendant's behalf. The court also has the option of ordering compliance with the court's rules and taking such actions as may be necessary to obtain such compliance.

1. Contempt Power - As always, the court has the power to find a party that refuses to comply with its rules and orders. While this power is secure, at least in the criminal context there are issues that must be addressed under the 5^th amendment. The most crucial place where use of the contempt power and attendant measures to ensure compliance is where the litigant is proceeding pro se in a criminal matter, and is thus his own attorney, as well. In this instance, the litigant's ability to make objections, question witnesses, and the like is seriously hampered. Here, the court must address very serious Sixth Amendment concerns.[41]

2. Entering a Plea on the Party's Behalf - Where the militiaman refuses to enter his own plea, the court should enter a plea of "not guilty" on the defendant's behalf. The defendant is clearly not prejudiced by such an action (assuming he is, in fact, present—otherwise there are substantial procedural due process problems), because he may later change his plea if necessary, and a "not guilty" plea affords him the benefit of a presumption of innocence. In other words, the other side must still prove its case in both a civil and a criminal action where the court assumes that the defendant denies the charges filed against him.

3. Ordering Silence/Compliance With Rules - In either the case where the defendant refuses to speak or the case where the defendant refuses to refrain from speaking, a court is clearly within its power to order, under pain of contempt, compliance with court rules and procedures. Where a defendant chooses to represent himself pro se, this issue becomes more complicated, except that jurisdictions generally allow a court to terminate a defendant's right to represent himself, where necessary. The court should make the requirements clear, and then punish with the contempt power in order to see that those requirements are met. In some cases, more drastic measures may be necessary in order to secure compliance with court rules (see below). In other circumstances a defendant may refuse, on religious grounds, to give an oath before testifying. An oath may be modified for religious witnesses. Generally the oath need only show that the witness intends to tell the truth and that he knows that failure to do so will subject him to a penalty for perjury.

C. Additional Authority

The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issues surrounding the unduly disruptive litigant. The following case is the first clear explication of the principles at stake:

1. Gagging Party - Illinois v Alien, 397 U. S. 337 (1970).

2. Removing Party From Proceedings - Illinois v Alien, 397 U. S. 337 (1970) ("a defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom").

3. Generally - see the following:

• Bostic v. State, 531 S .2d 1210 (Miss. 1988)

• People v. Davis, 851 P.2d 259 (Colo.App. 1993)

4. But See - the following cases limit the court's authority:

· Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712 (9^th Cir. 1989) (court must pursue less restrictive alternatives before pursuing physical restraints).

· Jones v. Meyer, 899 F.2d 883 (9^th Cir. 1990) (allowing the use of shackles only when justified by need to maintain security, and after seeking less restrictive alternatives).

· Elledge v. Dagger, 823 F.2d 1429 (11^th Cir. 1987) (violation of due process to shackle defendant at hearing without affording opportunity to contest necessity of the shackling). For further discussion of the gagging/shackling response, please see the Bellowes article cited at Note 42, above.

Subpart 3.3 - Demanding "Counsel of Choice"

A. Party Requests to be Represented by a Non-Lawyer

Because members of the movement reject the legitimacy of the judicial system in this country, it should not be surprising that they also reject the concept of a "bar" of lawyers who do most litigation. In fact, the movement generally suggests that, because the bar is not a state organization, membership in the bar does not confer a "license," but instead confers only membership in an exclusive club. According to members of the movement, proceedings in court are meetings of this private club, presided over by a member of the club, and such proceedings have no jurisdiction over them.

As a result, and in addition to other tactics, members of these movements often seek to be represented by "one of their own," when appearing in court. That is, to be represented by another member of the movement, versed in their interpretation of the law and willing to argue it. Where denied this opportunity the member may attempt to proceed pro se, or may accept representation by a court-appointed attorney with the expectation that this attorney will follow their instructions and make the arguments they wish to make (which includes their "interpretations" of the law). In many cases, either the attorney representing the member will move to be relieved of the case or the member himself will become frustrated with the attorney's refusal to advance his arguments and will seek to remove or replace counsel.

Members of the movement may also seek to be represented by "counsel of their choice." While this argument will often include their desire to be represented by a non-lawyer adherent to their views, it may also be an argument that the court should pay any lawyer they select (not court-appointed). As well, members may attempt to delay the proceedings by selecting an attorney who either cannot or will not represent the defendant.

B. Responding to Requests to be Represented by a Non-Lawyer

It is quite clear that the court cannot itself lapse into lawlessness and violate state law by allowing a non-lawyer to practice law for another in the state courts. The court may rely upon several justifications for such a restriction, including the following:

1. Barratry - All states have barratry laws forbidding the unauthorized practice of law by non-attorneys.[42]

2. Waiver of Right to Counsel - Courts must exercise extreme caution in presuming that an individual has waived his or her right to counsel.[43]

3. Pro Se Litigants - the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a criminal defendant the right to counsel in most cases. The United States Supreme Court has elaborated on this right, to say that "the Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused" and that "the right to self-representation - to make one's own defense personally - is thus necessarily implied by the structure of the amendment."[44] As a result, it is quite clear that the defendant himself or herself may proceed pro ye. Though we include this reminder here, the pro se defendant does not actually present the barratry problem because they do not fit the definition of the unlicensed practice of law.

Subpart 3.4 - Verbal Threats Against the Court

A. Party Makes Verbal Threats Against the Court

Some members of the Anti-Government movement can be scary people. They range from truly non-violent tax protesters and simple farmers or racially intolerant members of the KKK and the Aryan Nations to gun-toting secessionists who both preach and practice violence in order to attain their goals. Threats by the movement, though clearly not always carried out, should be dealt with swiftly and severely. The alleged connection to the bombing of the Oklahoma City federal building, the sieges at Ruby Ridge and in Waco and the issuance by common-law courts of billions of dollars in false liens and many "death sentences" should make at least two things clear - these people are serious, and they have the potential to be dangerous.

Although it is not as common (yet) as one might expect, members of the movement have been known to issue threats to court clerks and administrators, not to mention judges and jurors. They have been known to "pack the courtroom" in order to intimidate those conducting a hearing or trial. Obviously, the defendant may not be the only militiaman present, and he may not be the only one who is perceived as threatening or making threats.

B. Responding to Threats Made by Members of the Movement

1. Calm/Warning - It is of the utmost importance that both the court and court personnel remain calm and courteous when threats are made. Although it may be difficult to keep this in mind when one feels threatened, overreacting or becoming rude or adversarial plays into the hands of the anti-government movement's adherents. A court should have an established procedure for dealing with such threats, and should adhere to the procedure religiously. At the same time, the court should make clear to the militiaman that such threats will not be tolerated, and that statutes exist for punishing those who attempt to intimidate those involved in courtroom proceedings. Where warranted, additional security is an option, and under sufficient circumstances the courtroom may be closed to spectators.

2. Contempt - No one would argue that where a person in a courtroom openly threatens a member of the court staff, contempt lies. The use of the contempt power should be used with some restraint, as a finding of contempt will almost inevitably delay proceedings and add additional fuel to the flame.

3. Report Threats - Threats made against court personnel should be reported to the police as soon as possible, and they should be investigated. While there may be times that a threat is either imagined (having large numbers of people who clearly think that your authority is illegitimate is sufficiently unnerving that small innocuous statements or actions may seem threatening), the very real possibility that such threat may be carried out should be sufficient to justify at least some investigation. Also, there are statutes that may be brought to bear in such circumstances, both general assault statutes and specific intimidation of court personnel statutes, as well as conspiracy statutes where a number of movement members are involved.

4. Reassure Jurors, Take Extra Safety Precautions - Because members of the movement often proceed pro se, it may be impossible to keep from them a list of the jurors. Because of this, the jury may find themselves being threatened. It becomes important here to provide sufficient security such that jurors can feel safe. In addition, the court should make it clear to the party that tampering with the jury through contact, threats to them, their families, or otherwise, will result in severe sanctions, perhaps including criminal prosecution. The court might also use the option of sequestration to ensure that jurors feel and remain safe and unmolested.

Members of the movement may very well be dangerous. Threats should not be taken lightly, they should be investigated and dealt with in the swiftest fashion.

Subpart 3.5 - Hunger Strikes

A. Party Begins a Hunger Strike

Many members of the Anti-Government movement view themselves as being at war against a hostile, occupational government. These people refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the law enforcement officers who arrest them, the courts and judges that decide their fate, and the institutions in which they are incarcerated not only after a conviction, but also before and during trial. Where such a member of the movement is held in prison, he considers himself to be a prisoner of war.

In an attempt to gain public sympathy and support (in addition to the desire some of the more extreme groups have to achieve martyrdom), it is not unheard of for incarcerated members of the movement to refuse food and water, to engage in a "hunger strike." Because of the dangers this poses, the state courts are placed in a precarious situation - to force feed the party clearly implicates any of a number of constitutional and civil rights, but to allow them to go without food and water not only threatens their health and welfare, it also attracts unnecessary and unwanted attention to them and their cause.

B. Responding to a Hunger Strike

1. Safeguarding the Party's Well Being - Without a doubt, the courts' response must be to safeguard the party's well being above all. This may even extend so far as to force feed an individual.[45] However, any response must be given serious consideration by the court and the executive branch, due to the likelihood of litigation to arise over the choice the government makes.[46] As with the general tone of this guide, the authors again suggest that the court first take all reasonable steps to accommodate the individual before this becomes an issue.

2. Minimize Negative Publicity - As suggested above, martyrdom is a goal of many of the more extremist groups the courts will encounter. As a result, courts should consider this issue before it occurs and have contingencies in place - including establishing a spokesperson for the court, policies governing the use of force feeding, and the like. In order to both deter this particular activity in the future as well as to minimize the ability of the movements to propagandize these occurrences, the court should be prepared to act as reasonably but firmly as possible.

Subpart 3.6 - Attempts to Disqualify the Judge

A. Judicial Disqualification

As we have explained throughout this guide, members of antigovernment groups, militias and common law courts very frequently attempt to disrupt state court proceedings to which they or their comrades are a party. Our research has shown that they try to delay the course of proceedings, frustrate judges and judiciary staff and otherwise delay proceedings almost as a matter of course. A very effective, and to the court, potentially dangerous, method of accomplishing these ends is to file complaints against a judge.

These parties can file complaints which fall into one of two categories: either the litigant conjures some personal grievance and sues the judge, thus making him an "interested" party, or the person follows the typical complaint route and files whatever kind of general grievance or motion state process allows. Note that the first category, adversarial complaints against the judge, could fall into one of two classes - the complaint could be filed pursuant to a legitimate cause of action (though one without basis in fact) in a state court, or it could be pursuant to an unfamiliar cause of action and filed in a common law court. Obviously, complaints filed in common law courts have no real bearing on the state process, but they are, however, grounds for continued and more severe action in the common law courts. Complaints filed in state courts, however, present a different story. These complaints are legitimate until ruled otherwise, so a judge must proceed with caution.

The second category of complaint is the typical motion for recusal or disqualification. Presuming the member is familiar with or has retained counsel that is familiar with state law, it is likely that they will pursue the typical state remedy in the proper manner. These motions succeed in varying degrees, with the rate of success depending on the state. At this time, approximately fifteen states allow parties to peremptorily challenge judges and ask for their removal.[47] Proceedings involving members of antigovernment groups have seen peremptory actions in many of the states that allow these challenges. On the other hand, the majority of states require a showing of cause for removal or disqualification. Rest assured that members of these groups will find cause sufficient to bring a motion under the appropriate statute.

B. Typical Responses to Judicial Disqualification or Recusal

The judicial responses differ according to the laws of the particular state. These responses depend, in large part, upon statutory provisions governing disqualification and recusal, as well as state codes of judicial conduct, constitutional requirements and common law developments. In addition to the particular responses addressed below, it is imperative that judges do not "take personally" these challenges. They are often merely a part of groups' tactics and are meant to harm the process, not the judge. As with all suggested or typical responses, courtesy is urged - for slights against the members will be counterproductive and harm the integrity and efficiency of your court.

1. Responses to Typical Motions for Recusal/Disqualification

a. States That Allow Peremptory Challenges - In these states, there is often a combination of rules that govern the procedure surrounding a challenge.[48] Judges should ensure that members follow the proper procedures and that all documents are in order. This is, of course, a matter of integrity of the judiciary - to require proper procedure in all cases - but in the antigovemment context it is also a matter of deterrence. It may be understood that the members will use these challenges in a frivolous way, but without any evidence of frivolity. Therefore, they should be made to strictly comply with the procedural requirements.

b. States Which Allow Removal For Cause - Here, an entirely different type of response controls. Unlike the constitutional or-statutory peremptory, these challenges do not imply a right in the party seeking them unless the party makes the proper showing of cause. Again, the first and foremost response must be to retain judicial bearing and courtesy. Unlike the category above, however, judges have more control here, mainly because parties who bring this type of action bear the ultimate burden of showing cause. The courts should treat motions from members of the antigovernment groups like those from any other movement, and require strict adherence to the procedure and burdens the law imposes.[49]

2. Responses to Civil Actions Filed Against Presiding Judge - This tactic is discussed throughout, for members of these movements seem to repeatedly use the courts to redress their grievances - real or imagined. The response to this tactic depends on what type of action is filed. For actions filed in the common law courts themselves, judges should be aware that, while the action threatens no legal liability, the penalty may be a bogus lien, involuntary bankruptcy or other censure of the offending judge. For any action taken by a member against a judge, the first step should be to notify court security and the authority in the executive branch. The judge should also consult legal counsel in order to determine the complaint's validity and strategize individual responses. Again, we stress that this should not become personal - the attack is against authority and the system, generally not against the individual judge.

Subpart 3.7 - Forms of Pleadings

A. Party Files "Odd" Documents/Uses Antiquated Pleading Forms

Members of the movement adhere to what they consider to be the "common-law." The common law in their terms is not necessarily the sort of judge-made law that the legal community typically would consider to be common law, but instead is a hodgepodge of Biblical quotes and doctrines, misplaced quotes from cases, leftover concepts from early legal doctrines, self-serving readings of the Constitution and other sources of law, definitions from long out of date legal dictionaries, and Blackstone's conception of "natural rights." As a result of this misshapen body of law, adherents to the movement often file what amount to massive and frivolous or irrelevant pleadings, motions or other documents. They will attempt to argue bias and "illegality" on the part of each part of the trial process, the judge, the prosecutor, the jury, even the bailiff. They may file actions against the judge or the prosecutor in order to have them disqualified. It is also common for them to file a motion for sovereign immunity on the grounds that they are a foreign nation, or to file a motion to dismiss based on the fact that they are not subject to the court's jurisdiction on bases varying from the UCC to violations of various constitutional rights (many members of the movement have tried to have traffic citations dismissed on the grounds that they violate the constitutional right to travel, for instance).

In addition to filing documents that are simply irrelevant or contextually inapposite many adherents to the movement file documents that seem antiquated or even outdated, or use legal language and Latin that is just uncommon if not unused today. Many, in "resurrecting" the common law, apparently feel that the modes of pleading and the legal terminology used gives their filings greater legitimacy. Some even refuse to recognize most of the changes made in the law since the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, under the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment impermissibly reapportioned the balance of local/state/federal power.[50] They will argue the Bible, cite the Magna Carta, file writs of Quo Warranto to have the judge or prosecutor removed, or attempt any of a number of other motions or filings to make proceedings slow, to disrupt them, or to render them entirely impossible.

The truly insidious problem with this tactic is that it is not uncommon to find, buried within the morass of useless drivel, a pleading, motion, or argument that is not only tenable, but even valid, and perhaps even a winner. Members of the movement often hope to get a "hook" by filing a huge document with one valid motion or pleading in it, expecting the judge to be too frustrated or busy to find it. Also, in filing what appear to be antiquated types of motions and pleadings, followers may very well know at least one part of the law better than those who regularly practice it legitimately: a number of states specifically reserve all causes previously existing at common law, and virtually any state may have simply failed to preclude a cause that did exist under common law. In essence, the adherents may have found a way to use the law against itself.

B. Responding to Unusual Documents

Members of the movement are American Citizens, regardless of their views of the American legal system. Because of this, they have the same rights that anyone else has to their day in court. This, in conjunction with case law that seems to require courts to construe pleadings (especially those filed by pro se litigants) broadly in order to effectuate the purposes for which they were intended, makes it clear that courts should deal very carefully with odd pleadings filed by members of the movement. While it is beyond doubt that the court has the authority to throw out worthless or incomprehensible pleadings, or at least to require that they be amended, such actions should be taken with the recognition that they are likely to fan the flames, and may even result in both lawsuits in legitimate courts and lawsuits in the movement's own common-law courts.

1. Explain Court Rules and Adhere to Them - As always when dealing with the movement, it is important that the court set forth and adhere strictly to the "rules of engagement." The court should make clear what is expected/required of the parties, and make clear the standards and time restrictions for pleadings and motions, as well as the option of amending or correcting defects in pleadings. Where the rules or schedule are violated the court should make a ruling or issue a sanction (or both) and move on.

2. Make Clear Rulings - The court should not hesitate to reject motions, pleadings, or arguments that have no basis in law or fact. Where the court chooses to do so, it should make the basis for this ruling perfectly clear. This serves at least two purposes: first, it makes it easy for higher courts to uphold the court's judgment against the party, and second, it takes away the argument by the movement that the court's action was lawless and arbitrary. It is important, especially where dealing with members of the movement, that clear rulings are given in all contexts, admissibility, validity, denying or upholding motions, etc.

3. Thoroughly Consider Documents and Arguments - Nothing is more frustrating than getting a massive stack of documents, most of which are irrelevant and all of which are nearly incomprehensible. Still it is important that the court take note of and consider carefully the documents filed by the parties. Again, it is a common tactic for the movement to file documents with one valid document or even one valid argument hidden inside, in order to create reversible error and tie up the court system. Also, because causes of action must be construed so as to effectuate their intent, a motion that is invalid or antiquated may be similar enough to a valid motion that the court should either substitute for the party or offer the party the opportunity to amend. Finally, in some places, what looks like an invalid mode of pleading may actually be statutorily preserved—it may in fact be valid. It is best to deal with members of the movement as fairly as the system allows, so as to take away their ability to point to flaws in seeking support.

4. Give Opportunity to Cure Defects in Pleadings - Virtually all systems of procedure allow for amendment of pleadings; the federal system, for example, is extremely permissive in allowing amendments. The court should allow the party to amend its documents to make them valid where it looks like this is possible. Furthermore, the court should attempt to follow case law in construing the arguments so as to effectuate their intent, at least where this intent has some basis in law and fact. Members of the movement should not be denied the opportunities to amend that non-members are given, this is exactly what some followers point to in support of their conspiracy theories.

Subpart 3.8 - Refusal to Sign Documents

A. Party Refuses to Sign Documents

Members of the anti-government movement, in addition to refusing to submit to the court's jurisdiction, may also refuse to sign documents, orders, pleadings, etc. that they receive in connection with a case. Alternatively, they are known to sign such documents (and their driver's licenses) with "UCC 3-501 without recourse" (or some other statement and citation, usually to the UCC) in the signature line. In either case, legal proceedings often require such signatures to continue, and failure to obtain such signatures can waste significant amounts of time for both the court and the parties involved.

B. Responding to a Party's Refusal to Sign Documents

In many cases, a party's refusal to sign a document can bring a legal proceeding to a halt. Where handled improperly, the way a court deals with such a refusal can provide the error needed to get a holding reversed, and can give the anti-government movement ammunition to point to in its criticism of the American Judicial System. Because of this a court should go to great lengths to not only treat the party fairly, but also to make certain that the record reflects such efforts.

1. Consequences - As always, the court should make the rules and the penalties for their violations clear to the parties, and when the rules are not adhered to, the court should issue a ruling or sanction and move on. Where a party refuses to sign documents, there is no exception to this general rule.

2. Acquiescence - Generally, where a party signs a noncommercial document with "UCC___ without recourse" or "rights reserved" it is clear that this has no legal effect. Those terms are simply not legally operative in such contexts. In some cases, where to do so would not affect the rights or privileges of the parties in any way, the court may simply allow the party to submit the signed document with the UCC "qualification." Provided that it can be shown that the consequences of such action have been explained to the party and he clearly understands the ramifications, it may very well be easier to allow such legally irrelevant addition to the signature than to provide the militiaman with the opportunity to spout his doctrine and enter his politics into the proceedings.

3. Contempt/Bonds - The contempt power certainly reaches those incidences where a member of the movement refuses to receive a document, or where he refuses to sign a valid legal order. Again, the reasoning behind the ruling should be made clear, and the party should be made aware of the consequences of his actions beforehand. Some courts have had success using cash bonds where members of the movement have refused to sign promises to appear at future hearings. This technique might be adaptable to requiring members of the movement to follow through with discovery orders, requests to appear, etc.

PART IV: Tactics Outside of the Courtroom

This Section describes tactics that commonly occur outside of the courtroom but are either directed at members of the court or involve using the court and its process. There are several key considerations in responding to these tactics. First, while the individuals are generally not involved in an in-court proceeding when these tactics are used, courts must be aware that their responses still represent state action and thus are constrained by constitutional and civil rights considerations. Second, the courts must be aware of the danger of escalation. Where these tactics often harass and annoy, they are slowly being legislated against in the states. The important point is that, rather than making such harassment "personal," and escalating the situation, court personnel should be encouraged to pass information and evidence on to the proper investigative authorities. Such authorities are the proper party to handle dangerous or harassing tactics, and their involvement is likely to alleviate the possibility of physical harm, violence and the like.

Subpart 4.1 - Interactions with the Clerk

A. Appearance at Office/Window/Counter of Court Clerk

Members of the anti-government movement pride themselves on their knowledge (however flawed it often may be) of the conventional court system, and on the ease with which they can enter the system by filing documents or suits. Because of this, it is not uncommon to see members of the movement enter court clerks' offices and request filing of liens (which are often false), suits, motions, pleadings, etc. Clearly, the police and judges are not the only ones who must be prepared to deal with members of the anti-government movement. In fact, it is county and court clerks who are often the first to deal with them. It is important that clerks be aware of their existence and that they be prepared to handle the unique problems and issues they often pose.

While members of the movement pose just as great a threat to clerks as they do to the police and law enforcement officials, it is often the case that they are simply trying to force the government to do what it says it will, or to perhaps feel as if they have exercised some authority over the state. Chuck Ericksen of the National Center for State Courts tells stories of a group of followers who would come to the clerk's office in Washington state to ask for an obscure document that the clerk was supposed to have available upon request. Apparently these people would come every year to ask for this document, and would become combative and belligerent when the clerk failed to produce it. Finally, the clerk put the document out in a basket, and provided it when asked. Once they had gotten the document the followers were courteous and polite, and left without incident. The problem now is dealt with by making such forms available online, thus making certain that state statutes requiring the documents to be available are observed, as well as reducing the potential for discordant confrontations between clerks and members of the movement.

One of the biggest problems posed by the movement is its persistent filing of false liens, frivolous suits, involuntary bankruptcies against public officials and the "reification" of documents issued by a common-law court (which has no real authority to issue binding orders) by having it certified or sealed by the clerk of a real court. The clerk's office is obviously in the best position to deal with such problems; by recognizing when a document is false or frivolous, or by notifying those higher up of action by the movement, a clerk can prevent incredible hardship later on for those who must attempt to clear their credit or who must deal with the mountains of useless claims the movement proffers.

B. Clerk Responses to Members of the Movement

1. Train Personnel to Identify Members of the Movement and the Types of Documents They File - Obviously it is only in the rarest of circumstances that you can look at an individual and immediately peg him as a member of the anti-government movement. Clerks should be taught to be wary when any customer comes to them and acts unruly, belligerent, or abusive. They should be aware of the unusual requests they are likely to make, the unusual practices they may engage in (e.g. Signing documents with "UCC without recourse"), and the refusal to accept common standards. Such people are the ones who are unlikely to produce valid ID, who refuse to sign when required, and who will not give a standard postal address. They may also sign their names First Middle, Last (e.g. John Smith, Doe), appear in the clerk's office frequently, or even tell the clerk outright that they are a "patriot" or "Freeman," or refer to their common law court or militia. Members of the movement may also attempt to file strange looking (bogus or false) liens, notices of involuntary bankruptcy against public officials. It is also fairly common for members of the movement to file documents that either do not exist under current law or are irrelevant to the case in which they attempt to file them. Clerks should be trained to look out for documents issued by "Our one Supreme Court of____" or signed by judges who do not sit in that jurisdiction. The easiest way to deal with falsely filed documents is to prevent them from being filed in the first place.

2. Have Written Policies - Not unlike in the court context, in the context of clerks dealing with members of the movement it is important that there be clear rules, and that these rules be made known to the party and adhered to strictly. Clerk's offices should have written policies, perhaps even posting them (both on the wall in the office and on the Internet), so that they cannot be challenged to the clerk when he follows them. Written policies give the clerk something to hide behind ("It's not my rule, but it is the rule.") and they also help to make sure that clerks know what they are supposed to be able to do for and provide to customers.

3. Personnel Should Remain Calm and Courteous - It is not always easy to deal with members of the movement. They may be obnoxious, belligerent, or even threatening. Still, for court personnel to get flustered and shut them out gives their argument merit, in addition to simply being a failure by the clerk to do his duty. Where policies so permit, clerks should refuse to serve those who are belligerent, and they should report any threats to law enforcement, but otherwise they should treat members of the movement like anyone else.

4. Be Ready, Willing and Able to Explain Policies - It is not in the best interests of the system or the clerk himself for the clerk to engage in doctrinal or philosophical debate with a member of the movement. At the same time, not unlike other customers, followers may genuinely not understand or simply be interested in the policies of the court and the clerk. The clerk's office should be ready, willing and able to provide members of the movement, or anyone else, with information about the policies and procedures the clerk oversees.

5. Notify up the Chain of Command - It is important that the right hand know what the left is doing. Where members of the movement begin to appear in clerk's offices, their appearance before law enforcement officers and the courts cannot be too far behind. Their appearance may also signal the coming of an onslaught of false liens and frivolous litigation, among other things. Where clerks have reason to suspect that a "cell" of the anti-government movement is operating in an area, there can be nothing but benefit obtained by making other branches of the government aware of their presence. Members of the movement should not be treated differently from anyone else, but the ways in which they act differently from everyone else can pose such significant problems for the law that it is important that all branches be prepared to deal with it when contact is imminent.

Subpart 4.2 - Actions Against Court Personnel

A. Service of Process/Personal Suits Against Court Personnel

Members of the movement take pride in their ability to make use of the law, both traditional state and federal courts and their own common-law courts. Because of this, it is not uncommon for court personnel to be served with process in both "common-law lawsuits" and lawsuits filed in traditional courts. Examples of such common law documents as Notices to Appear, Common-law Indictments, Orders and Judgments from common-law courts, and warrants issued by such courts have been noted. As well, because members of the movement make use of the conventional court system to validate their false liens, court personnel may find their credit impaired by perfected liens, or that an involuntary bankruptcy has been filed against them.

Court personnel may also find themselves served with process for "real" suits such as actions for violations of federal or constitutional rights under 42 U. S. C. § 1983, § 1985, or § 1986. Suits under state tort law are also filed in traditional courts, as well as the occasional attempt to file a common-law cause in such traditional courts. Finally, as noted above, where a member of the movement has obtained a lien against an official in a common-law court (and often has had it officially sealed, inadvertently, by the clerk of a traditional court) he will often attempt to file an involuntary bankruptcy against the official. Federal Bankruptcy law may allow a creditor of more than $10,775 to file for involuntary bankruptcy against a debtor.[51] Because these bogus liens are often for hundreds of thousands or even millions (and occasionally billions) of dollars, members of the movement often attempt and occasionally succeed in getting such bankruptcy filed.

B. Responses to Service of Process/Personal Suits

1. Avoid Confrontation - It is important that court personnel remain calm and non-confrontational when served with process by a member of the movement.

Because the service may very well be for a "real" case (though often not a legitimate case), such service should be taken seriously. Still, given the possibility of violence by members of the movement, personnel so served should be careful to avoid escalating the situation by confronting members of the movement. Furthermore, because at least some of the process served will deal with cases before "fake courts," and because most of the rest will be frivolous or illegitimate suits, service of process by such groups should be taken with a grain of salt.

2. Notify up Chain of Command - As always, when court personnel encounter members of these movements, the chain of command should be notified. This is so not only because those above on the chain may also find themselves served, but also it allows for a unified strategy in meeting the suits brought against officials. In some cases, for example, it might be of benefit to consolidate the cases filed in "real" courts. That is, the evidence of joint action in filing cases against officials in common law courts may provide the necessary evidence to show a conspiracy for purposes of prosecuting those who file such "suits" to intimidate.

3. Retain Counsel, if Needed - Where court personnel are served with process it is usually advisable that they retain counsel or at least consult some form of attorney. In many places courts will cover legal expenses for those court personnel who are sued for actions occurring in the course of their duties. In any event, it may be of critical importance for such personnel to find out if the case they have been served with is a "real" case, or a common-law case that can be dealt with without litigation, if not ignored entirely.

4. Retaliate - Where "real" suits are clearly frivolous and/or are intended to intimidate or otherwise adversely affect personnel,[52] it may be prudent to file for abuse of process and seek sanctions against the plaintiff. This provides a deterrent both to the individual and the movement in general. There may also be the option of a civil suit against the member of the movement, and perhaps, in some cases, the option of a prosecution for threatening or attempting to intimidate a public official.

C. Additional Authority

1. Personal Liability for Civil Rights Suits - though the law may be in a state of flux regarding state liability and the states' amenity to suits brought under federal law,[53] the possibility exists that judges and court personnel might be named individually in civil rights suits, such as those brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Generally, to be liable, a person must be acting under color of state law in abrogating an individual's federal constitutional or certain statutory rights.

a. Who is a "person" - see, generally, Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) (state officials, sued in personal capacity, are "persons" for purposes of § 1983, including suits for retrospective relief such as money damages).

b. Under color of state law - this generally encompasses the actions of officials and individuals whose conduct amounts to state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has developed four types of tests to find state action:

i. Symbiotic relationship - see, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Burton has been significantly narrowed, and may only exist under extremely similar facts.

ii. Public function - see, e.g. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Ill S.Ct. 2077 (1991); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).

iii. Close nexus - see, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988).

iv. Joint Participation - see, e.g., Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).

c. Immunities -judges and those performing judicial functions generally enjoy absolute immunity. See, e.g.. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). This may include attorneys, witnesses and jurors involved in the judicial process. See, e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1986). Likewise, those performing prosecutorial functions are protected under this doctrine. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1986).

i. Qualified Immunity - where absolute immunity is not available, qualified immunity often exists for officials performing discretionary duties where the contours of the right in question are not sufficiently defined. For an introduction to this doctrine, see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511(1985).

Subpart 4.3 - Threats Against Court Personnel

A. Threats Against Court Personnel (see also Section in, Subpart 3.4)

It is not unheard of for members of the movement to encounter court personnel, specifically clerks, in their activities of filing suits and liens against public officials and defending themselves from citations or lawsuits. Given the fact that members of the movement have views that often put them in direct opposition to the law and the courts, it should not be surprising that there have been incidences of threats against such officials. Although violence is not common (see section on Violence), there is certainly the potential for such violence, and threats by members of the movement have been known to occur. Threats should be taken seriously, and should be brought to attention of law enforcement as well as reported up the chain of command.

Sometimes members of the movement will make vague, threatening statements, other times there may be a literal threat of violence. Also, such threats may be made to known court personnel not only in the courthouse or clerk's office, but anywhere where the movement encounters such officials (e.g. post office, grocery store). It is not inconceivable that threatening letters or emails may be sent, or even that legal documents filed may themselves involve or constitute such threats. B. Clerk/Personnel Responses

1. Have a System in Place - Courts and court systems should have a system in place for dealing with threats against court personnel and clerks. Such personnel should know the system, be aware of who to contact, and know what constitutes a "threat" within the definition of that system. ALL threats should be reported up the chain of command and to local law enforcement. The threat of violence, a la the Oklahoma City bombing, is real enough that all such threats should be investigated.

2. Ensure Personnel are Trained - Court personnel should be trained to recognize the specific actions and arguments that members of the movement make. Generally, this includes what the liens they file look like, their "UCC __ without recourse" argument, the types of actions they file against public officials, etc. Court personnel should also have some idea of what constitutes a "threat" and what, generally, the law can do about such threats.

3. Do Not Engage the Party - As always when dealing with extremists, the court personnel should be careful not to make a potentially bad situation worse. While it is difficult to stay calm in the face of threats, it is important that personnel avoid engaging in a debate or argument with members of the movement. Calmness and courtesy are the most likely responses to cause de-escalation of a tense situation, and this is no less likely here. Following threats, court personnel should engage the system, report the threat to higher ups and to law enforcement, and deal with the situation as calmly as possible.

4. ALWAYS Inform Law Enforcement or Court Security - Again, given the significant potential for violence by members of the movement, it is important that threats against court personnel be dealt with swiftly and severely. Such response discourages not only the specific individual from further threats, but also the movement in general from doing so. Most jurisdictions will have some sort of statute dealing specifically with attempts to intimidate court personnel, and all will have some sort of general assault statute. Reporting threats to the police also has the benefit of making other branches aware of the operation of the movement in the area.

Subpart 4.4 - Violent Actions

A. Members of the Movement Become Violent

Fortunately, violence by members of the movement against court personnel is not a common occurrence. It is, however, a distinct possibility, particularly given the increasing membership in the movement and the gradual diversification of the membership makeup among various racial, ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds. Furthermore, many strains of the movement openly advocate violence to achieve their goals, many have huge sums of money, and at least a few are known to stockpile weapons. Finally, incidents including bombings of federal buildings, sieges in large private "compounds," rallies, parades, common-law court death sentences, and even shootouts with law enforcement make the possibility of violence by members of the movement a clear possibility.

B. Clerk Responses

1. Training/Support for Personnel - Conceptually, there is no real reason to view violence by members of the movement any differently than violence by anyone else. In this case it is only important that court personnel are aware that this particular part of the population has significant potential to engage in violence. They should be taught the signs to recognize members of the movement (see section on Appearance Before Court Personnel. Generally, the types of documents they file, the arguments they make, the "UCC without recourse" attached to their signature, etc.). A specific procedure should be created for dealing with incidences of violence. Personnel should be aware of the chain of command and should know for certain who they should contact in the event of an act of violence.

2. Preventive Measures - It is not at all clear how such violence can be prevented, other than making sure that clerks and other personnel avoid contact with members of the movement. Making the presence of security obvious enough that it can be felt and known may prevent violence against court personnel. Ensuring that personnel remain calm and courteous with members of the movement, and that they are able to provide what they are required to provide might also reduce the possibility of violence.

3. Involve Law Enforcement IMMEDIATELY - Where there is violence or likelihood of violence, law enforcement should be brought to bear as soon as possible. Most states (and the federal government, for that matter) have statutes specifically targeting threats or intimidation against court personnel, all have statutes for assault, assault and battery, assault with a deadly weapon, and conspiracy. Those who perpetrate violence against court personnel should be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, not only to ensure that they are punished, but also to make clear to other members of the movement that such activities will have far-reaching consequences.

Part V: Trial Court Performance Standards[54]

The Trial Court Performance Standards ("TCPS"), are the culmination of a long process, involving leading trial judges, court managers and scholars, in which a common language for describing, classifying and measuring the performance of courts is put forth. The TCPS are broken down into five performance areas, as follows:

1. Access to Justice - Trial courts should be open and accessible. Location, physical structure, procedures, and the responsiveness of personnel affect accessibility. Accordingly, the five standards grouped under Access to Justice[55] require a trial court to eliminate unnecessary barriers to its services. Such barriers can be geographic, economic and procedural. They can be caused by deficiencies in both language and knowledge of individuals participating in court proceedings. Additionally, psychological barriers can be created by mysterious, remote, unduly complicated and intimidating court procedures.

2. Expedition and Timeliness - Courts are entrusted with many duties and responsibilities that affect individuals and organizations involved with the judicial system, including litigants, jurors, attorneys, witnesses, criminal justice agencies, social service agencies, and members of the public. The repercussions from untimely court actions in any of these involvements can have serious consequences for the persons directly concerned, the court, allied agencies, and the community at large. A trial court should meet its responsibilities to everyone affected by its actions and activities in a timely and expeditious manner - one that does not cause delay. Unnecessary delay causes injustice and hardship. It is a primary cause of diminished public trust and confidence in the court.

Defining delay requires distinguishing between the amount of time that is and is not acceptable for case processing. National and statewide authorities have articulated time standards for case disposition. These standards call for case processing time to be measured beginning with arrest or issuance of a summons in a criminal case, or from the date of filing in a civil case.

3. Equality, Fairness and Integrity - Trial courts should provide due process and equal protection of the law to all who have business before them, as guaranteed by the U.S. and state constitutions. Equality and fairness demand equal justice under the law. These fundamental constitutional principles have particular significance for groups who may have suffered bias or prejudice based on race, religion, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, color, age, handicap or political affiliation.

Integrity should characterize the nature and substance of trial court procedures and decisions, and the consequences of those decisions. The decisions and actions of a trial court should adhere to the duties and obligations imposed by the court by relevant law as well as administrative rules, policies, and ethical and professional standards. What the trial court does and how it does it should be governed by a court's legal and administrative obligations; similarly, what occurs as a result of the court's decisions should be consistent with those decisions.

Integrity refers not only to the lawfulness of court actions (e.g. compliance with constitutional rights to bail, legal representation, a jury trial, and a record of a legal proceeding) but also to the results or consequences of its orders. A trial court's performance is diminished when, for example, its mechanisms and procedures for enforcing its child support orders are ineffective or nonexistent. Performance also is diminished when summonses and orders for payment of fines or restitution are routinely ignored. The court authority and its orders should guide the actions of those under its jurisdiction both before and after a case is resolved.

4. Independence and Accountability - The judiciary must assert and maintain its distinctiveness as a separate branch of government. Within the organizational structure of the judicial branch of government, trial courts must establish their legal and organizational boundaries, monitor and control their operations, and account publicly for their performance. Independence and accountability permit government by law, access to justice, and the timely resolution of disputes with equality, fairness and integrity; and they engender public trust and confidence. Courts must both control their proper functions and demonstrate respect for their coequal partners in government.

Because judicial independence protects individuals from the arbitrary use of government power and ensures the rule of law, it defines court management and legitimates its claim for respect. A trial court possessing institutional independence and accountability protects judges from unwarranted pressures. It operates in accordance with its assigned responsibilities and jurisdiction within the state judicial system. Independence is not likely to be achieved if the trial court is unwilling or unable to manage itself. Accordingly, the trial court must establish and support effective leadership, operate effectively within the state court system, develop plans of action, obtain resources necessary to implement those plans, measure its performance accurately, and account publicly for its performance.

5. Public Trust and Confidence - Compliance with the law depends, to some degree, on public respect for the court. Ideally, public trust and confidence in trial courts should stem from the direct experience of citizens with the courts. The maxim "Justice should not only be done, but should be seen to be done!" is as true today as in the past. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that public perceptions reflect actual court performance.

Several constituencies are served by trial courts, and all should have trust and confidence in the courts. These constituencies vary by the type and extent of their contact with the courts. At the most general level is the local community, or the "general public" - the vast majority of citizens and taxpayers who seldom experience the court directly. A second constituency served by trial courts is a community's opinion leaders (e.g., the local newspaper editor, reporters assigned to cover the court, the police chief, local and state executives and legislators, representatives of government organizations with power or influence over the courts, researchers and members of court watch committees). A third constituency includes citizens who appear before the court as attorneys, litigants, jurors or witnesses, or who attend proceedings as a representative, a family friend, or a victim of someone before the court. This group has direct knowledge of the routine activities of a court. The last constituency consists of judicial officers, other employees of the court system, and lawyers - both within and outside the jurisdiction of the trial court - who may have an "inside" perspective on how well the court is performing. The trust and confidence of all these constituencies are essential to trial courts.

Relationship Between Responses and the TCPS

The TCPS suggest five areas in which courts must strive for excellence in order to best serve those who come before them. Each of the potential responses discussed in Sections II - IV above implicates at least one of these areas in some way.

1. Access to Justice - The first basic tenet of the TCPS is that trial courts should be open and accessible. The corollary to this is that a court should strive to eliminate all barriers to its services that are not necessary for safety and efficient operations. Coincident with that is the mandate that court personnel should attempt to understand the litigants that their court services. This is not to say that courts should sacrifice detached impartiality in rendering legal judgments. Rather, it goes toward the attitude court personnel have toward consumers of their service. Barriers can transcend the physical and extend to the ideological. The members of the groups to which this guide speaks are not somehow unintelligent or malicious or evil. Rather, they are often vulnerable people who have become disaffected for some reason and are looking for answers that our system does not seem to provide for them. If our courts understand that they hold these beliefs, and work to accommodate them within the safe and efficient operation of the courts, we can assure that our courts do remain open - while dousing some of the fuel which fires the fervent beliefs antigovernment groups hold. This goal is most clearly understood in the context of TCPS Standard 1.3 - Effective Participation. Though these tactics are not explicitly contemplated by the TCPS, it is clearly within their spirit to do so now. While use of the contempt power, for example, is clearly necessary in some circumstances, in others it amounts to little more than access to justice denied. Conversely, noting the objection of a litigant and moving on, or working to accommodate their reasonable demands, are more in line with truly providing access for these people. While noting the objection initially alleviates any implication that justice has been denied, it ultimately strains judicial resources by providing - in some instances - grounds for appeal. Though odious to some, in particular cases such as the fringed flag objection, the course of action most consistent with this aspect of the TCPS might just be accommodation.

2. Expedition and Timeliness - The underlying goal of this section of the TCPS is that all trial court functions should be performed within a proper, suitable and reasonable time. While, again, the tactics discussed here are not explicitly discussed in the TCPS, it is clear that TCPS Standards 2.1.1 - 2.1.4 are implicated by issues arising in and related to the courtroom or trial process. Each of these is concerned with the time it takes for cases to reach disposition, the ratio between case dispositions and filings, and the age of impending caseloads. If courts engage members of these antigovernment groups in their protests and refuse to accommodate certain of their demands - such as not flying the fringed flag - cases will age as appeals are docketed and arguments are heard. For these reasons, it is entirely consistent with TCPS Performance Area 2 for courts to forego use of the contempt power, unless absolutely necessary, and to instead attempt to facilitate cooperation between the parties and the court.

3. Equality, Fairness and Integrity - This performance area is concerned with a court's consistency in the way that it applies rules and conventions and assesses penalties against the parties who come before it. In this area, perhaps the biggest danger that courts face is the danger that judges begin to take dealing with the antigovernment groups personally. That is, it might become a personal challenge for a judge to deal with a heavy hand and not allow the views of these groups or their arguments to be expressed. Certainly, when a court acquiesces or compromises with an unruly party, the court is minimizing the chance that it will be seen to be heavy-handed or unfair. In contrast, the judge who is quick to invoke the contempt power and fine or lock up someone with whom the judge disagrees and who also has been a disruptive or contentious party, the judge and the court risk losing their presumptive impartiality. This may occur in the eyes of those who see the judge quickly resort to contempt, perhaps sooner than the judge would have with a different type of patron. As well, it will certainly appear to the members of the movement that the judge will truck no disturbance or refusal to conform.

It is not an easy place for the trial judge, for almost no matter what he or she does, the members of these groups are likely to remain dissatisfied. Even the appearance of a personal challenge begins to destroy the court's actual integrity and the public's perception of that integrity. For this reason, we advocate for judges to resolve disputes over matters which afford different avenues in ways that uphold both the perception of fairness and the actual existence of fairness. In response to the in-court tactics, this is probably an equally good approach as that of noting the party's objection and moving on. Both show that this is a fair judge and one who does not allow his or her own preconceived opinions to dictate his or her rulings in the court.

4. Independence and Accountability - Performance Area 4 encompasses several heuristic measurements designed to assess how courts maintain comity and deal with the people they serve and events they are confronted by. Responses to the tactics of the antigovernment movement may possibly implicate at least two of the specific standards within this Performance Area. Standard 4.4.3 measures a court's community outreach efforts. While the standard itself is meant in the context of traditional community outreach, the spirit of that standard values all court-community relations. For this, we believe that responses to these tactics that evince less of an authoritative or, especially, prejudiced attitude toward members of these movements and more of a willingness to work with litigants are the more desirable route. Necessarily, courts' responses will have to be different, according to the particular tactic at hand. For example, there is probably more leeway available to work with and around a "subject matter jurisdiction" argument based on a gold-fringed flag than there is to work around a "personal jurisdiction argument" based in a litigant's beliefs about citizenship. The flag is a physical object that may be removed, even if just for that particular hearing. The citizenship argument, however, invites interminable discussions about the nature of citizenship and the like - whether the court intends to go there or not. In cases such as this, it is entirely reasonable for a judge to note the party's objection and move forward -such a response does not indicate animosity toward the party, preconceived ideas about the party, or prejudice against the party, but rather evinces the judge's fairness and respect for our rules of procedure.

We do not wish to suggest here that courts should placate members of these groups for the sole sake of placating them. Nor do we suggest that the existence of this class of litigants should force courts to change sound court policy or procedure. However, existing policies and procedures are predicated upon serving a particular, already identified community having a generally common set of beliefs and expectations. The presence of these antigovernment groups suggests that, at times, courts now deal with a different community. For this reason, we believe that their presence signifies changed circumstances of which courts must be both aware and willing to acknowledge. Finally, Performance Standard 4.4, Public Education, contains several factors concerning the way courts disseminate information to the public. The tactics used by the antigovernment groups implicate this standard in a certain way. The way a court conducts itself, the rulings it makes, and the interaction with the media all tell a story about how our institutions are responding to these groups. This is not to say that a court should become a vendor in the marketplace and take a public stance against the antigovernment political theory. However, courts must be always mindful of their effect on the public opinion and choose responses which suggest a respect for the political beliefs of all of our citizens but reflect a firm commitment to upholding the law that both governs and protects us all.

5. Public Trust and Confidence - This Performance Area is about the way that the general public perceives the court and the job it is doing. Responses that agitate or antagonize the antigovernment groups cut two ways. On one hand, such responses can lead to negative publicity, or propaganda, put forth by the movement. On the other, they can reassure what will soon become an informed public that those who threaten the system are being dealt with fairly but firmly. It may very well be that the arguments surrounding things like personal sovereignty, the fringe on flags, harassment of court personnel, and the like represent battles worth fighting. These arguments go to the very core of these groups' beliefs, and courts should take a strong stance to inform that they are incorrect as a matter of law - but nonetheless welcome back into the societal fold upon their behavior conforming to the law.

Appendix A: Resource Guide

1. Legislative Responses

This section focuses on those statutes that have been passed in response to the rising "militia" or "extremist" activity in the United States or which can be used to curtail unlawful behavior engaged in by such groups. In the wake of the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, the media has focused much attention on the activity of such groups, raising public awareness. The vast majority of state legislatures, however, have yet to target militia groups specifically in passing legislation. Apparently states consider the laws already "on the books" to be adequate to deal with the militia threat.

The current laws deal primarily with three areas: nonconsensual common-law liens (statutes against barratry and simulating legal process), intimidation (use or threat of force or violence) against public officials, and paramilitary training. As noted elsewhere, nonconsensual common-law liens are a favorite tool of militia groups. Essentially, a lien based on a judgment from a common law "court" proceeding is filed against the property of a public official. The property is then attached based on the "debt." These liens appear for all practical purposes to be true legal documents, and are often filed with a "real" court in order to give them some binding effect, effectively ruining the official's credit. The filing of such liens is a primary tool for harassing and intimidating public officials, and may violate not only laws specifically prohibiting nonconsensual common-law liens, but also laws against simulating legal process, barratry, and specialized laws prohibiting "libel or slander of legal title."

The state of Montana has passed the "Montana Anti-Intimidation Act of 1996" to deal specifically with the problem of militia groups filing false liens as a means of intimidation. Although Montana had laws to deal with such acts before, targeting the groups specifically makes a strong point.

Three states, Florida, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, have passed laws specifically prohibiting paramilitary training. At the time of writing no prosecutions have been brought under these laws, perhaps because of serious Constitutional issues under the 1^st amendment right to freedom of assembly and the 2^nd amendment right to keep and bear arms. The statutes might also be construed as unconstitutionally vague because of a failure to adequately define paramilitary training or to distinguish such conduct from, for example, survival training or even perhaps mere camping.

Finally, in cases such as State v Dawson, 272 N.C. 535, 159 S. E. 2d 1 (1968) courts have applied limits to the constitutional rights invoked by militia groups in defense of their activities (there "brandishing an unusual weapon" was found outside of 2^nd amendment protection and "unlawful assembly" was found outside of 1^st amendment protection).

1.1 Sample State Statutes

The purpose of this section is not to provide an exhaustive list of specific state responses to militia movement activity, but to give a general idea of the types of responses that states have taken.

1.1.1 - Simulating legal process (Examples)

Oregon Revised Statutes § 162.355

(A) A person commits the crime of simulating legal process if the person knowingly issues or delivers to another person any document that in form and substance falsely simulates civil or criminal process.

(B) As used in this section:

(1) "Civil or criminal process" means a document or order, including, but not limited to, a summons, lien, complaint, warrant, injunction, writ, notice, pleading or subpoena, that is issued by a court or that is filed or recorded for the purpose of:

(a) Exercising jurisdiction;

(b) Representing a claim against a person or property;

(c) Directing a person to appear before a court or tribunal; or

(d) Directing a person to perform or refrain from performing a specified act.

(2) "Person" has the meaning given that term in ORS 161.015, except that in relation to a defendant, "person" means a human being, a public or private corporation, an unincorporated association or a partnership.

(C) Simulating legal process is a Class C felony. [1971 c.743 s.210; 1997 c.395 s.l]

South Carolina Code of Laws § 16-17-735

Persons impersonating officials or law enforcement officers; persons falsely asserting authority of law; offenses; punishment.

(A) It is unlawful for a person to impersonate a state or local official or employee or a law enforcement officer in connection with a sham legal process. A person acting or purporting to act in an official capacity or taking advantage of such actual or purported capacity commits a misdemeanor if, knowing that his conduct is illegal, he:

(1) subjects another to arrest, detention, search, seizure, mistreatment, dispossession, assessment, lien, or other infringement of personal or property rights; or

(2) denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity.

A person violating the provisions of this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than two thousand five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

(B) It is unlawful for a person falsely to assert authority of state law in connection with a sham legal process. A person violating the provisions of this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than two thousand five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

(C) It is unlawful for a person to act without authority under state law as a Supreme Court Justice, a court of appeals judge, a circuit court judge, a master-in-equity, a family court judge, a probate court judge, a magistrate, a clerk of court or register of deeds, a commissioned notary public, or other authorized official in determining a controversy, adjudicating the rights or interests of others, or signing a document as though authorized by state law. A person violating the provisions of this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than two thousand five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

(D) It is unlawful for a person falsely to assert authority of law, in an attempt to intimidate or hinder a state or local official or employee or law enforcement officer in the discharge of official duties, by means of threats, harassment, physical abuse, or use of a sham legal process. A person violating this subsection is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than ten thousand dollars or imprisoned not less than one year and not more than three years, or both. (E) For purposes of this section:

(1) "Law enforcement officer" is as defined in Section 16-9-310.

(2) "State or local official or employee" means an appointed or elected official or an employee of a state agency, board, commission, department, in a branch of state government, institution of higher education, other school district, political subdivision, or other unit of government of this State.

(3) "Sham legal process" means the issuance, display, delivery, distribution, reliance on as lawful authority, or other use of an instrument that is not lawfully issued, whether or not the instrument is produced for inspection or actually exists, which purports to:

(a) be a summons, subpoena, judgment, lien, arrest warrant, search warrant, or other order of a court of this State, a law enforcement officer, or a legislative, executive, or administrative agency established by state law;

(b) assert jurisdiction or authority over or determine or adjudicate the legal or equitable status, rights, duties, powers, or privileges of a person or property; or

(c) require or authorize the search, seizure, indictment, arrest, trial, or sentencing of a person or property.

(4) "Lawfully issued" means adopted, issued, or rendered in accordance with the applicable statutes, rules, regulations, and ordinances of the United States, a state, an agency, or a political subdivision of a state.

1.1.2 - Barratry

[NB: All states have some law prohibiting the unlicensed practice of law]

Georgia Code § 16-10-95.

(A) A person commits the offense of barratry when he knowingly and willfully commits any of the following acts:

(1) Excites and stirs up groundless actions in the courts or quarrels in administrative proceedings;

(2) Institutes or causes to be instituted a legal proceeding without obtaining proper authorization; or

(3) Solicits or encourages the institution of a judicial or administrative proceeding or offers assistance therein before being consulted by a complainant in relation thereto.

(B) A person convicted of the offense of barratry shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000.00 or by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years, or both.

1.1.3 - Paramilitary Training

Fl. Statute § 790.29 Paramilitary training; teaching or participation prohibited.

(A) This act shall be known and may be cited as the "State Antiparamilitary Training Act."

(B) As used in this section, the term "civil disorder" means a public disturbance involving acts of violence by an assemblage of three or more persons, which disturbance causes an immediate danger of, or results in, damage or injury to the property or person of any other individual within the United States.

(C)

(1) Whoever teaches or demonstrates to any other person the use, application, or making of any firearm, destructive device, or technique capable of causing injury or death to persons, knowing or having reason to know or intending that the same will be unlawfully employed for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder within the United States, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(2) Whoever assembles with one or more persons for the purpose of training with, practicing with, or being instructed in the use of any firearm, destructive device, or technique capable of causing injury or death to persons, intending to unlawfully employ the same for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder within the United States, is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(D) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit any act of a law enforcement officer which is performed in connection with the lawful performance of his or her official duties or to prohibit the training or teaching of the use of weapons to be used for hunting, recreation, competition, self-defense or the protection of one's person or property, or other lawful use.

History. -s. 1, ch. 82-5; s. 164, ch. 83-216; s. 1220, ch. 97-102.

Rhode Island General Laws § 11-55-1 Definitions. - For the purposes of this chapter:

(A) The term "civil disorder" means any public disturbance involving acts of violence by assemblages of three (3) or more persons, which causes an immediate danger of, or results in, damage or injury to the property or person of any other individual.

(B) The term "explosive or incendiary device" means:

(1) dynamite and all other forms of high explosives;

(2) any explosive bomb, grenade, missile, or similar device; and

(3) any incendiary bomb or grenade, fire bomb, or similar device, including any device which:

(a) consists of or includes a breakable container including a flammable liquid or compound, and a wick composed of any material which, when ignited, is capable of igniting such flammable liquid or compound; and

(b) can be carried or thrown by one individual acting alone.

(C) The term "firearm" means any weapon which is designed to, or may readily be converted to, expel any projectile by the action of an explosive; or the frame or receiver of any such weapon.

(D) The term "law enforcement officer" means any officer or employee of the United States, any state, or any political subdivision of a state acting in his or her official capacity; and the term shall specifically include, but shall not be limited to, members of the National Guard, as defined in 10 U.S.C. § 101(9), the naval militia, the independent chartered military organizations set forth in § 30-1-4 and the department of environmental management in the operation of a firearm training course under its auspices.

Rhode Island General Laws § 11-55-2 Paramilitary training prohibited.

(A) Any person who teaches or demonstrates to any other person the use, application, or making of any firearm, explosive or incendiary device, or technique capable of causing injury or death to persons, knowing or having reason to know or intending that it will be unlawfully employed for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder; or any person who assembles with one or more persons for the purpose of training with, practicing with, or being instructed in the use of any firearm, explosive, or incendiary device, or technique capable of causing injury or death to persons, intending to employ it unlawfully for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder shall be guilty of a felony.

(B) Nothing contained in this section shall make unlawful any act of any law enforcement officer which is performed in the lawful performance of his or her official duties.

Rhode Island General Laws § 11-55-3 Penalty for violation.

Any person who violates any of the provisions of this chapter shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned for not more than five (5) years or be fined not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.

Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes § 5515. Prohibiting of paramilitary training.

(A) Definitions.-As used in this section the following words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection:

"Civil disorder."

Any public disturbance involving acts of violence by assemblages of three or more persons, which causes an immediate danger of or results in damage or injury to the property or person of any other individual. "Explosive or incendiary device."

Includes:

dynamite and all other forms of high explosives;

any explosive bomb, grenade, missile or similar device; and

any incendiary bomb or grenade, fire bomb or similar device, including any device which:

(1) consists of or includes a breakable container including a flammable liquid or compound and a wick composed of any material which, when ignited, is capable of igniting such flammable liquid or compound; and

(2) can be carried or thrown by one individual acting alone.

"Firearm."

Any weapon which is designed to or may readily be converted to expel any projectile by the action of an explosive; or the frame or receiver of any such weapon.

"Law enforcement officer."

Any officer or employee of the United States, any state, any political subdivision of a state or the District of Columbia and such term shall specifically include, but shall not be limited to, members of the National Guard, as defined in 10 U.S.C. 101(9), members of the organized militia of any state or territory of the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or the District of Columbia, not included within the definition of National Guard as defined by 10 U.S.C. 101(9) and members of the armed forces of the United States.

(B) Prohibited training.-

Whoever teaches or demonstrates to any other person the use, application or making of any firearm, explosive or incendiary device or technique capable of causing injury or death to persons, knowing or having reason to know or intending that same will be unlawfully employed for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.

Whoever assembles with one or more persons for the purpose of training with, practicing with or being instructed in the use of any firearm, explosive or incendiary device or technique capable of causing injury or death to persons, said person intending to employ unlawfully the same for use in or in furtherance of a civil disorder commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.

(C) Exemptions.-Nothing contained in this section shall make unlawful any act of any law enforcement officer which is performed in the lawful performance of his official duties.

(D) Excluded activities.-Nothing contained in this section shall make unlawful any activity of the Game Commission, Fish and Boat Commission, or any law enforcement agency, or any hunting club, rifle club, rifle range, pistol range, shooting range or other program or individual instruction intended to teach the safe handling or use of firearms, archery equipment or other weapons or techniques employed in connection with lawful sports or other lawful activities.

1.1.4 - Threats to Public Officials

California Penal Code § 71.

(A) Every person who, with intent to cause, attempts to cause, or causes, any officer or employee of any public or private educational institution or any public officer or employee to do, or refrain from doing, any act in the performance of his duties, by means of a threat, directly communicated to such person, to inflict an unlawful injury upon any person or property, and it reasonably appears to the recipient of the threat that such threat could be carried out, is guilty of a public offense punishable as follows:

(1) Upon a first conviction, such person is punishable by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by imprisonment in the state prison, or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

(2) If such person has been previously convicted of a violation of this section, such previous conviction shall be charged in the accusatory pleading, and if such previous conviction is found to be true by the jury, upon a jury trial, or by the court, upon a court trial, or is admitted by the defendant, he is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison. As used in this section, "directly communicated" includes, but is not limited to, a communication to the recipient of the threat by telephone, telegraph, or letter.

California Penal Code § 76

(A) Every person who knowingly and willingly threatens the life of, or threatens serious bodily harm to, any elected public official, county public defender, county clerk, exempt appointee of the Governor, judge, or Deputy Commissioner of the Board of Prison Terms, or the staff or immediate family of any elected public official, county public defender, county clerk, exempt appointee of the Governor, judge, or Deputy Commissioner of the Board of Prison Terms, with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat, and the apparent ability to carry out that threat by any means, is guilty of a public offense, punishable as follows:

(1) Upon a first conviction, the offense is punishable by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by imprisonment in the state prison, or in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment.

(2) If the person has been convicted previously of violating this section, the previous conviction shall be charged in the accusatory pleading, and if the previous conviction is found to be true by the jury upon a jury trial, or by the court upon a court trial, or is admitted by the defendant, the offense is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison.

(B)

(1) Any law enforcement agency which has knowledge of a violation of this section shall immediately report that information to the California Department of Justice.

(2) In addition to the reporting requirement imposed by paragraph(l), if a violation of this section occurs that involves a constitutional officer of the state, a Member of the Legislature, or a member of the judiciary, the law enforcement agency which has knowledge of the violation shall immediately report that information to the Department of the California Highway Patrol.

(C) For purposes of this section, the following definitions shall apply:

(1) "Apparent ability to carry out that threat" includes the ability to fulfill the threat at some future date when the person making the threat is an incarcerated prisoner with a stated release date.

(2) "Serious bodily harm" includes serious physical injury or serious traumatic condition.

(3) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, or child, or anyone who has regularly resided in the household for the past six months.

(4) "Staff of a judge" means court officers and employees.

(5) "Threat" means a verbal or written threat or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a combination of verbal or written statements and conduct made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her immediate family.

(D) As for threats against staff, the threat must relate directly to the official duties of the staff of the elected public official, county public defender, county clerk, exempt appointee of the Governor, judge, or Deputy Commissioner of the Board of Prison Terms in order to constitute a public offense under this section. (E) A threat must relate directly to the official duties of a Deputy Commissioner of the Board of Prison Terms in order to constitute a public offense under this section.

Delaware Code Annotated § 1240. Threats to public officials.

(A) Every person who intentionally threatens the life of or threatens serious physical injury to any elected public official, prosecutor, public defender, appointee of the Governor to a full-time position, county administrator for Kent or Sussex County or the New Castle County chief administrative officer, or member of the judiciary, with the specific intent that the statement is to be taken as a threat and the apparent ability to carry out that threat by any means is guilty of making a threat to a public official. Threat to a public official is a class G felony.

(B) For purposes of this section, the following definitions shall apply:

(1) "Apparent ability to carry out that threat" includes the ability to fulfill the threat at some future date.

(2) "Threat" means a verbal or written threat or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a combination of verbal or written statements and conduct made with the intent and the apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her immediate family; provided, however, that the threat must relate directly to the official duties of the elected public official, prosecutor, public defender, appointee of the Governor to a full-time position or member of the judiciary in order to constitute a threat to a public official under this section.

(3) For the purposes of this section, the words "member of the judiciary" means a judge or justice of the following courts:

Supreme Court, Chancery Court, Superior Court, Court of Common Pleas,

Family Court or Justice of the Peace Court.

(70 Del. Laws, c. 551, § 1; 71 Del. Laws, c. 176, § 13)

1.1.5 - Exceptions to Duty to Record

Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 317.13

[General Assembly: 121. Bill Number: Sub. House Bill 644 Effective Date: 11/06/96 ]

(A) Except as otherwise provided in division (B) of this section, the county recorder shall record in the proper record, in legible handwriting, typewriting, or printing, or by any authorized photographic or electronic process, all deeds, mortgages, plats, or other instruments of writing that are required or authorized by the Revised Code to be recorded and that are presented to the recorder for that purpose. The recorder shall record the instruments in regular succession, according to the priority of presentation, and shall enter the file number at the beginning of the record. On the record of each instrument, the recorder shall record the date and precise time the instrument was presented for record. All records made, prior to July 28, 1949, by means authorized by this section or by section 009.01 of the Revised Code shall be deemed properly made.

(B) The county recorder may refuse to record an instrument of writing presented to the recorder for recording if the instrument is not required or authorized by the Revised Code to be recorded or the recorder has reasonable cause to believe the instrument is materially false or fraudulent. This division does not create a duty upon a recorder to inspect, evaluate, or investigate an instrument of writing that is presented for recording.

(C) If a person presents an instrument of writing to the county recorder for recording and the recorder, pursuant to division (B) of this section, refuses to record the instrument, the person may commence an action in or apply for an order from the court of common pleas in the county that the recorder serves to require the recorder to record the instrument. If the court determines that the instrument is required or authorized by the Revised Code to be recorded and is not materially false or fraudulent, it shall order the recorder to record the instrument.

Missouri Revised Statutes § 428.110 [Fraudulent Conveyances and Liens Section 428.110 Filing officer may reject lien, exceptions-filing officer to accept notice of invalid lien, when]

(A) Any filing officer may reject for filing or recording any nonconsensual common law lien. This section shall not be construed to permit rejection of a document that is shown to be authorized by contract, lease or statute or imposed by a state or federal court of competent jurisdiction or filed by a licensed attorney, a financial institution including, but not limited to, any commercial bank, savings and loan association or credit union or a Missouri state licensed mortgage company or mortgage broker.

(B) If a nonconsensual common law lien has been accepted for filing, the filing officer shall accept for filing a sworn notice of invalid lien on a form provided by the filing officer signed and submitted by the person against whom such lien was filed or such person's attorney. The form shall be captioned "Notice of Invalid Lien" and shall state the name and address of the person on whose behalf such notice is filed, the name and address of the lien claimant and a clear reference to the document or documents the person believes constitute a nonconsensual common law lien. A copy of the notice of invalid lien shall be mailed by the filing officer to the lien claimant at the lien claimant's last known address within one business day. No filing officer, county or the state shall be liable for the acceptance for filing of a nonconsensual common law lien, nor for the acceptance for filing of a sworn notice of invalid lien pursuant to this subsection.

1.1.6 - Preventing Nonconsensual Liens Against Public Officials

Alaska Statutes § 34.35.950. [Nonconsensual common law liens]

(A) A nonconsensual common law lien is invalid unless the lien is authorized by an order of a court of competent jurisdiction recognized under state or federal law.

(B) A person may not submit a nonconsensual common law lien under AS 40.17 to the recorder in order to record the lien unless the lien is accompanied by a specific order authorizing the recording of the lien issued by a court of competent jurisdiction recognized under state or federal law. When a nonconsensual common law lien is submitted for recording under this subsection, the court order accompanying the lien shall be recorded with the lien.

(C) A person may not submit a nonconsensual common law lien under a law authorizing the filing of a lien against personal property in order to file the lien unless the lien is accompanied by a specific order authorizing the filing of the lien issued by a court of competent jurisdiction recognized under state or federal law. When a nonconsensual common law lien is submitted for filing under this subsection, the court order accompanying the lien shall be filed with the lien.

(D) In this section,

(1) "filed" means the acceptance of a document by a department or person having responsibility for the receipt and filing of documents that may be filed and that are presented for filing in the place of filing designated by law, whether or not under applicable law the department or person is directed to file the document;

(2) "nonconsensual common law lien" means a lien on real or personal property that

(a) is not provided for by a specific state or federal statute;

(b) does not depend on the consent of the owner of the property affected for its existence; and

(c) is not an equitable, constructive, or other lien imposed by a court recognized under state or federal law;

(3) "record" means the acceptance of a document by the recorder that the recorder has determined is recordable under AS 40.17 and that is presented for recording in the place of recording designated for the recording district where affected property is located whether or not the place of recording is in that district and whether or not under applicable law the recorder is directed to record the document;

(4) "recorder" means the commissioner of natural resources or the person designated by the commissioner of natural resources to perform the duties set out in AS 40.17.

Revised Code of Washington § 60.70.010

Intent-Definitions.

(A) It is the intent of this chapter to limit the circumstances in which nonconsensual common law liens shall be recognized in this state.

(B) For the purposes of this chapter:

(1) "Lien" means an encumbrance on property as security for the payment of a debt;

(2) "Nonconsensual common law lien" is a lien that:

(a) Is not provided for by a specific statute;

(b) Does not depend upon the consent of the owner of the property affected for its existence; and

(c) Is not a court-imposed equitable or constructive lien;

(3) "State or local official or employee" means an appointed or elected official or any employee of a state agency, board, commission, department in any branch of state government, or institution of higher education; or of a school district, political subdivision, or unit of local government of this state; and

(4) "Federal official or employee" means an employee of the government and federal agency as defined for purposes of the federal tort claims act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2671. (C) Nothing in this chapter is intended to affect:

(1) Any lien provided for by statute;

(2) Any consensual liens now or hereafter recognized under the common law of this state; or

(3) The ability of courts to impose equitable or constructive liens. [1995 c 19 § 1; 1986 c 181 § 1.]

Revised Code of Washington § 60.70.020

Real property common law liens unenforceable-Personal property common law liens limited.

Nonconsensual common law liens against real property shall not be recognized or enforceable. Nonconsensual common law liens claimed against any personal property shall not be recognized or enforceable if, at any time the lien is claimed, the claimant fails to retain actual lawfully acquired possession or exclusive control of the property. [1986 c 181 §2.]

Revised Code of Washington § 60.70.030

No duty to accept filing of common law lien-Filing of a notice of invalid lien.

(A) No person has a duty to accept for filing or recording any claim of lien unless the lien is authorized by statute or imposed by a court having jurisdiction over property affected by the lien, nor does any person have a duty to reject for filing or recording any claim of lien, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section.

(B) No person shall be obligated to accept for filing any claim of lien against a federal, state, or local official or employee based on the performance or nonperformance of that official's or employee's duties unless accompanied by a specific order from a court of competent jurisdiction authorizing the filing of such lien.

(C) If a claim of lien as described in subsection (2) of this section has been accepted for filing, the recording officer shall accept for filing a notice of invalid lien signed and submitted by the assistant United States attorney representing the federal agency of which the individual is an official or employee; the assistant attorney general representing the state agency, board, commission, department, or institution of higher education of which the individual is an official or employee; or the attorney representing the school district, political subdivision, or unit of local government of this state of which the individual is an official or employee. A copy of the notice of invalid lien shall be mailed by the attorney to the person who filed the claim of lien at his or her last known address. No recording officer or county shall be liable for the acceptance for filing of a claim of lien as described in subsection (2) of this section, nor for the acceptance for filing of a notice of invalid lien pursuant to this subsection. [1995 c 19 §4; 1986 c 181 §3.]

Revised Code of Washington § 60.70.040

No duty to disclose record of common law lien.

No person has a duty to disclose an instrument of record or file that attempts to give notice of a common law lien. This section does not relieve any person of any duty which otherwise may exist to disclose a claim of lien authorized by statute or imposed by order of a court having jurisdiction over property affected by the lien. [1986 c 181 §4.]

Revised Code of Washington § 60.70.050

Immunity from liability for failure to accept filing or disclose common law lien.

A person is not liable for damages arising from a refusal to record or file or a failure to disclose any claim of a common law lien of record. [1986 c 181 §5.]

Revised Code of Washington § 60.70.060

Petition for order directing common law lien claimant to appear before court-Service of process-Filing fee-Costs and attorneys' fees.

(A) Any person whose real or personal property is subject to a recorded claim of common law lien who believes the claim of lien is invalid, may petition the superior court of the county in which the claim of lien has been recorded for an order, which may be granted ex parte, directing the lien claimant to appear before the court at a time no earlier than six nor later than twenty-one days following the date of service of the petition and order on the lien claimant, and show cause, if any, why the claim of lien should not be stricken and other relief provided for by this section should not be granted. The petition shall state the grounds upon which relief is requested, and shall be supported by the affidavit of the petitioner or his or her attorney setting forth a concise statement of the facts upon which the motion is based. The order shall be served upon the lien claimant by personal service, or, where the court determines that service by mail is likely to give actual notice, the court may order that service be made by any person over eighteen years of age, who is competent to be a witness, other than a party, by mailing copies of the petition and order to the lien claimant at his or her last known address or any other address determined by the court to be appropriate. Two copies shall be mailed, postage prepaid, one by ordinary first class mail and the other by a form of mail requiring a signed receipt showing when and to whom it was delivered. The envelopes must bear the return address of the sender.

(B) The order shall clearly state that if the lien claimant fails to appear at the time and place noted, the claim of lien shall be stricken and released and that the lien claimant shall be ordered to pay the costs incurred by the petitioner, including reasonable attorneys' fees.

(C) The clerk of the court shall assign a cause number to the petition and obtain from the petitioner a filing fee of thirty-five dollars.

(D) If, following a hearing on the matter, the court determines that the claim of lien is invalid, the court shall issue an order striking and releasing the claim of lien and awarding costs and reasonable attorneys' fees to the petitioner to be paid by the lien claimant. If the court determines that the claim of lien is valid, the court shall issue an order so stating and may award costs and reasonable attorneys' fees to the lien claimant to be paid by the petitioner. [1995 c 19 § 2.]

Revised Code of Washington § 60.70.070

Claim of lien against a federal, state, or local official or employee-Performance of duties-Validity.

Any claim of lien against a federal, state, or local official or employee based on the performance or nonperformance of that official's or employee's duties shall be invalid unless accompanied by a specific order from a court of competent jurisdiction authorizing the filing of such lien or unless a specific statute authorizes the filing of such lien. [1995 c 19 § 3.]

Helpful Websites

American Civil Liberties Union- www.aclu.org

Anti-Defamation League- www.adl.org

Findlaw (legal research site)- www.findlaw.com

Hatewatch- www.hatewatch.org

Militia watchdog- www.militia-watchdog.org

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People- www.naacp.org

National Association of Attorneys General- www.naag.org

National Center for State Courts- www.ncsc.dni.us

Ontario Consultants on Religious Tolerance- www.religioustolerance.org

Southern Poverty Law Center- www.splcenter.org

3. Listserv

Listserv for Court Management

In December 1995, the National Center for State Courts' Information Service Director initiated a listserv-a free, on-line forum-on which subscribers might post questions and exchange information related to the operation of courts. As of this date, May 1999, this listserv, appropriately called "Court2Court," had approximately 426 subscribers, including judges, clerks, and court administrators from state and federal courts; NCSC staff; consultants; academicians; and even some internationals. Subscribing to the court2court listserv is a two-step process:

1) Send an e-mail message to cwright@ncsc.dni.us. This message should contain your contact information, including your name, organization affiliation, mailing address, and telephone/fax number.

2) Send an e-mail message to court2court@ncsc.dni.us. This message should contain only the word "subscribe" in the body of the message. There should be no subject, nor any other text. This message causes the listserv machine to actually add you to court2court.

Once you've been added to the list, you'll receive a confirmation message.

Once you receive this message, you can post to the listserv by sending a message to court2court@ncsc.dni.us.

Appendix B: Movement Sources

1. Movement web pages

Note: This is a short list of representative sites relevant to the movement. Given the nature of both the medium and the movement, the addresses change all the time, and entire sites may move from server to server. Many of these links may be broken by the time the reader looks for them, but a search at any of the major search engines (www.yahoo.com, www.excite.com. www.infoseek.com, etc.) will reveal a plethora of similar sites. Also, a number of the sites in appendix D will have lists of such sites readily available and categorized, not unlike these pages, only hotlinked, so as to be more convenient to use. Anyone interested in or threatened by the movement should regularly canvass the web, so as to see the movement's new developments.

1.1 Patriots

The Patriot Knowledge Base

http://www.mo-net.com/-rklewis/pkbcontents.html

Patriot's Place

http://www.apex.net/users/rooster/

The Patriot Page

http://azwest.net/user/slim/

The Freedom Page

http://freedompage.home.mindspring.com/

The Patriot

http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/6627/

American Patriot Network

www.civil-liberties.com/

National Organization for Non-Enumeration

www.noneusa.org

"Knobby"

www.knobbv.home.texas.net

Cascadian.com

www.cascadian.com/CRC

1.2 Militias

Militia of Montana

http://www.nidlink.com/~bobhard/mom.html

Central Ohio Unorganized Militia

http://www.infinet.com/~pandar/

Louisiana Unorganized Militia

http://www.orion-cs.com/freedomforum/

7^th Missouri Militia

http://www.mo-net.com/~mlindste/7momilit.html

Arizona Constitutional Militia

www.constitution.org/mil/az/mil usaz.htm

Central Michigan Regional Militia 15^th Brigade Kent County

http://mmc.cns.net

Georgia Constitutional Militia

www.constitution.org/mil/ga/mil usga.htm

Information on militias

www.well.com/user/srhodes/militia.html

Texas Militia Papers

www.constitution.org/mil/tmp.htm

1.3 Tax Protestors

Tax truth 4 you

www.taxtruth4u.com/

Curtis and Curtis Anti IRS defense

http://www.chase3000.com/pw/guyc/

Bill Conklin's Anti-IRS.com

www.anti-irs.com/

IRS defense

kato.theramp.net/royaVindex.html

Perfect Tax Avoidance Through Knowledge of the Tax Law

home.erols.com/scambos/taxes.htm

Taxgate.com

www.taxgate.com/

Scriptures for America

www.christianidentity.org/home.htm

Posse Comitatus

www.posse-comitatus.org/

Appendix C: Movement Documents

Appendix C: Movement Documents

Following are documents taken directly from members of the movement. All documents included are included either with specific permission from the authors or as being in the public domain as a result of having been filed in court. Interestingly, when approached for permission, members of the movement were highly receptive to freely granting such permission, often suggesting that the researchers "read the constitution" and "teach those judges what real law is."

The documents included have been edited as little as possible in order to preserve as much as possible their true flavor. In some spaces formatting and serious spelling or grammatical errors may have been corrected. The reader should not hesitate to search the world-wide-web for more examples of the same, and readers should not doubt that new documents will appear as new ideas and strains of the movement erupt.

1. Tactics

Have You Been Hornswoggled?[56]⁵⁶

Which Flag is Which? By Richard McDonald

The people of the United States actually have two national flags: one for our military government and another for the civil. Each one has fifty stars in its canton, and thirteen red and white stripes, but there are several important differences.

Although most Americans think of the Stars and Stripes (above left) as their only flag, it is actually for military affairs only. The other one, meant by its maker for wider use, (peacetime) has vertical stripes with blue stars on a white field (above right). You can see this design, which bears civil jurisdiction, in the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs flags, but their service insignias replace the fifty stars.

I first learned of the separate, civil flag when I was reading Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter, published in 1850. The introduction, titled "The Custom House," includes this description:

From the loftiest point of its roof, during precisely three and a half hours of each forenoon, floats or droops, in breeze or calm, the banner of the republic; but with the thirteen stripes turned vertically, instead of horizontally, and thus indicating that a civil, and not a military post of Uncle Sam's government, is here established.

It took me two years of digging before I found a picture that matched what he was describing: my second clue was an original Illuminated History of North America (1860). If this runs against your beliefs, look up these two references.

History book publishers contribute to the public's miseducation by always picturing the flag in military settings, creating the impression that the one with horizontal stripes is the only one there is. They don't actually lie; they just tell half the truth. For example, the "first American flag" they show Betsy Ross sewing at George Washington's request was for the Revolution — of course it was military.

The U.S. government hasn't flown the civil flag since the Civil War, as that war is still going on. Peace has never been declared, nor have hostilities against the people ended. The government is still operation under quasi-military rule-

You movie buffs may recall this: In the old Westerns, "Old Glory" has her stripes running sideways and a military yellow fringe. Most of these films are historically accurate about that; their stories usually took place in the territories still under military law and not yet states. Before WWn, no U.S. flag, civil or military, flew within the forty-eight states (except in federal settings); only state flags did. Since then, the U.S. government seems to have decided the supposedly sovereign states are its territories, too, so it asserts its military power over them under the "law of the flag."

Today the U.S. Military flag appears alongside, or in place of, the state flags in nearly all locations within the states. All of the state courts and even the municipal ones now openly display it. This should have raised serious questions from many citizens long ago, but we've been educated to listen and believe what we are told, not to ask questions, or think or search for the truth.

NOTES

1. homswoggled: deceived. The term comes from the traditional image of cuckolded husbands wearing horns.óEditor

2. canton: The rectangular section in the upper comer of a flag, next to the staff.

3. The Scarlet Letter: An Authoritative Text, edited by Sculley Bradley, W. W. Norton, New York, 1978, pp. 7-8.

4. There is also a picture of the Coast Guard flag in Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, G. & C. Merriam Company, Springfield, Mass., 1966.

5. For more about the law of the flag, see "A Fiction-at-Law ...," in the printed version of Perceptions Magazine May/June 1995, Issue 9, page 11.

About the author: Richard McDonald is a California Citizen domiciled in The California state Republic. He does legal research and has his own site on the web. State Citizen's Service Center.

Gold-Fringed Flag Returned to Court[57]

Last September, County Commissioners in Ferry County, Washington removed a gold-fringed flag from the courtroom because Commissioner Jim Hall said he was shown government documents proving that fringed flags are inappropriate. Commissioner Hall, who assured everyone that he doesn't subscribe to constitutionalist views, said the flag was removed to appease "anti-government constitutionalists," according to an article in Spokane's Spokesman Review.

After several months of fruitless negotiation, presiding Superior Court Judge, Larry Kristianson, threatened legal action against Hall, saying he could order the flag replaced and have Hall jailed if he got in the way. To avoid a confrontation that could have been "politically explosive" it was agreed that the judge would buy a new fringed replacement flag with his own money if the commissioners would promise to leave it alone. "No person is authorized to come into the court and take accouterments of the court without the court's permission," he said. [SOURCE: American's Bulletin, March '96]

Right Way L.A.W. Suggests: Quit Contracting for Traffic Tickets[58]

You probably never thought of traffic tickets in terms of contracts to purchase certain goods and services. But according to Right Way L.A.W. reported in AntiShyster, they are part of a commercial contract. If you don't agree with the contract, it is absolutely essential to object to traffic citations in a timely fashion (within 10 days) using a "Refusal for Cause."

When a law enforcement officer writes a ticket (s)he is actually issuing a commercial instrument called a "citation," and the recipient of said "ticket" automatically becomes party to a commercial contract. The commercial instrument is actually a "confirmatory writing," an instrument defined in UCC 2-201 that defines a "product being purchased," which in this case is, fines and court costs. Right Way L.A.W. explains that anyone using International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt credit (Federal Reserve Notes) as a medium of exchange, is subject to the Uniform Commercial Code.

UCC 2-201 is called the "Statute of Frauds." It deals with the legality of contracts and says contracts for the sale of goods for $500 or more are not enforceable unless there is some "writing" indicating that a contract for goods has been signed between the parties. UCC 2-201, Subparend (2) says that if one of the parties objects to the terms of the confirmatory writing, their objection must be registered within 10 days after receipt or the contract stands. Don't wait for your court date to register an objection. It'll be too late under the UCC.

At this point, you may think that refusal to sign the citation would prevent entering into a contract. Not so! If you sign the citation, the action falls under UCC 2-201. If you don't sign, it still falls under UCC 2-201 because the 10 day period to object to the "writing" automatically goes into effect, according to commercial law. It is a maxim of law that law applies in spite of ignorance of it. Therefore, it is presumed that everyone who fails to object during the 10 day period agrees to all the terms of the contract. You're guilty by default.

Commentary: It's important to respond to every citation, notice to appear or other paper action of the government, so as to not support their presumptions and agree to the terms of their contracts by acquiescence and neglect. [SOURCE: AntiShyster, Vol 5, No.4; Reviewed by Esther Holmes].

The Federal System[59]⁵⁹

Three jurisdictions exist in the federal system used in this country. Each jurisdiction has separate and distinct responsibilities under the original constitutions.

A. The Federal Government (the United States).

1. Create laws to perfect the union created by the State governments to control commerce between states, national problems, etc.

2. Provide for the common defense of the Federal government, the state governments and the free states.

3. Promote the general welfare of all bodies and peoples by generating federal law to do this.

4. Create a body of law to control the employees of the Federal government (these were citizens of the United States).

B. The State Governments (the several states).

1. Create laws to control the defense of the territory in which they are authorized to make laws.

2. Promote the general welfare of the area in which they govern in which the Federal government does not control by generating civil law to accomplish this.

3. Create a body of law to accomplish this.

C. The Common Law States (the free states).

1. Create laws to control the security of the free state by organizing and managing the militia.

2. Promote the private welfare, establish privileges, generating private law for this purpose.

3. Create a body of law to control the people of the free states.

4. Assume all responsibilities of government not specifically given to state and federal governments. (Such as education, rules for militia membership, etc.)

D. The effects of the 14th Amendment.

1. A body politic was created called "Citizens of the United States" in which any person could become a member by submitting to the jurisdiction of the United States (the Federal government).

2. These citizens became "residents" of the state governments for issues in that particular jurisdictional boundary.

3. A right now existed for the Federal and State governments to create a body of laws to control the people of this newly created "civil law" state.

Under the original constitution it was presumed that United States citizens where mostly those individuals who chose to participate in government service, their families and others who were free but not members of one of the common law jurisdictions.

Affidavit[60]

Declaration of Truth

_____________________ state )

) S.S.

____________________ county )

I, _______________________, the Undersigned, do hereby affirm the following, pursuant to James 5:12, "But above all things my brethren, swear not, neither by heaven, neither by the earth, neither by any other oath, but let your yea be yea, and your nay, nay; lest ye fall into condemnation."

First:

That I am ________________________; that I am over the age of twenty-one years, and am competent to testify to My first-hand knowledge of the facts herein, and that the statements herein made by Me are true of My own first-hand knowledge, unless otherwise stated herein. Yea.

Second:

Type a single fact here. Remember to not speculate, or go into long winded explanations. Keep your facts simple. Write in the first-person (I saw, I heard, I did, etc.)

Third:

Write as many paragraphs as it takes to make your point. Remember to stay on point, and keep it simple.

Lastly:

That I have made these statements for the purpose of giving notice to the public of the facts stated herein, and not for the purpose of waiving any Right or Immunity. I do hereby reserve all rights given Me by the One True God.

Witnesses:

__________________________________

_________________________________________

affiant

On this ___________ day of the _____________ month, in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen hundred ninety-six, in the Two hundred twentieth year of Our Independence, the foregoing document was affirmed before me, a Notary Public, by ___________________, in and for the county and state above written, and He did affirm to me that He is literate, and competent to make This Affidavit without the assistance of a Notary, therefore, no benefit was received therefrom.

_____________________________

Notary Public

My commission expires: ____________________________

Notary for __________________________________ county,

____________________________________________ republic

Prepared by:___________________________________

Mail/Post location: _____________________________________

From: R. J. Tavel, J.D.

Subject: LPU: HOW TO HANDLE A ROADBLOCK

Date: Tuesday, March 25, 1997 10:50AM

How to handle a Roadblock the Libertarian Way:

Please fasten your seat belt and keep your head and hands inside the ride at all times!

1) Wait for the Officer to ask you a question. Then say, "Sir, can you please tell me if my answer to that question is voluntary or mandatory?

2) If Officer says, "Voluntary." Then you say, "I choose not to volunteer."

3) If Officer says, "Mandatory." Then you ask, "Sir, what will you do to me if I do not answer?"

4) If Officer responses, "We'll kick the **** out of you." Then you say, "Show me the law, statute, case, or whatever it is that makes it mandatory and then I answer." or perhaps you may say, "I refuse to answer on the grounds that I may incriminate myself." or possibly you may say, "My answer is XXX under threat of bodily harm, police brutality, etc... Depending upon the situation, these answers are a matter of personal taste, providing you have the time to waste and can take the punishment.

5) If Officer responses, "You won't get out of here till you do answer the question." Then you ask for meaningful assistance of counsel to help you understand the question. After all, don't all lawyers tell you that only THEY can understand the law and legal procedure? Hope you’re not in a hurry at this point. All roadblocks are a fishing expedition waiting to harpoon every vehicle that motors within their reach and as we all know fishing expeditions take a lot of time. So, be patient or become a patient.

6) If the Officer skirts the questioning issues and wants you to consent to a search, then you say, "No, get a search warrant and then I'll comply." Never volunteer anything and keep insisting on your right to legal counsel. You no more have to answer questions for a police officer than you do a complete stranger off the streets. The secret power behind the roadblock is that every driver is duped into consenting to be searched. Many folks don't challenge an invasion of privacy because they have nothing to hide, but you still have a right to challenge that invasion, even if you don't have anything to hide. Never consent to a search without a warrant, just say "No" to protect your rights.

7) If the Officer then asks you to exit your vehicle and handcuffs you at this point. Ask him if he is placing you under arrest and on what grounds? Very likely he's not placing you under arrest, he's only handcuffing you to make it safe for him to question you further and illegally search you and your vehicle, since you've refused. The point here is that the police must tell you if they're placing you under arrest and if so what for. And once again, do not answer any questions. Demand to get meaningful assistance of counsel and counsel of choice, since it is your right to have these at every important stage of police contact, including the arrest itself if that be the case.

8) Remember all the things you read about Mirandizing you first? Well, forget it! As long as they can get you to admit to anything or consent to anything, they can use it against you, regardless of whether or not you've been mirandized. Silence is golden.

9) As far as the actual mirandizing goes, if you're one of the lucky ones who actually gets informed of their rights, then when the Officer asks you if you understand your rights, you just say, "No sir, I need legal counsel to help me understand." Be a big dummy and exercise that right to have legal counsel present and/or that right to remain silent until so provided. Sometimes you have to act ignorant to play smart.

10) Overall, you need to have a good strong attitude. Use your head, control your emotions and most of all keep your mouth shut (except to assert your rights). Don't grovel, don't complain and don't ask for anything outside of your rights, because this gives them great satisfaction and will go in their report. Remember your goal is to get them to admit anything, perjure themselves, not follow the rules, suffer as much frustration and anxiety as possible and lose in front of their friends and the press. Their goal is to INTIMIDATE you and get you to offer consent, incriminate yourself, admit to everything, skip procedural details, and wavier all your rights.

Alas, the above information should help you obtain a heap of procedural errors to line up for "arguing technicalities" or appeals in the event you end up in waist chains or leg irons. In the event you just end up being harassed, you should have a fairly strong civil case for violations of your alleged constitutional rights.

When it comes to driving and personal privacy, roadblocks are the most dangerous things on the streets.

dwjohnstun@aol.com

"Freedom begins when you tell Mrs. Grundy to go fly a kite." —Lazaurus Long

LPUtah

LPUtah — This message sent via listserver "lputah@qsicorp.com "

LPUtah — All messages are the sole responsibility of the sender.

LPUtah — Support: Jim El well, email: elwell@inconnect.com

LPUtah

Sarah Thompson, M.D.

The Righter

PO Box 1185

Sandy, UT 84091-1185

http://www.therighter.com

NOTE NEW ADDRESS!!

THE CODE PROJECT: A New School of Law

Introduction

A group of individuals have joined together to create a common law jurisdiction as defined in this information and reference material. The purpose is to create a self governing body of individuals which would be a true republic as described by Plato, modified by our Anglo-Saxon ancestors and mandated by the Constitution. The rules of this society are that the laws are made by litigation. The preexisting laws and principles can be found in the reference material. Other editions of the same works will not be useful as specific reference is made to page numbers, chapters, etc. The information enclosed is the beginning laws in this reformed republic. This information is provided so that students may start learning these laws to decide if they want to participate in this type of society.

The rules will limit the ability to join or ask questions until a student has the knowledge existing in these book.

1. Ongoing litigation is creating new summaries.

2. Litigation, contributions and questions on these principles are causing ongoing

modifications.

You may choose to learn common law by these methods:

1. Start learning the reference material and the enclosed summaries on your own and file a domicile proceeding. (This usually requires book purchases.)

2. Use the study course. (No books needed to start this.)

3. This system replaces all others existing effective January 15, 1998.

It is recommended that you obtain a 3 ring binder to keep these summaries in. New

address:

The Code Project

Non Domestic Mail

Suite 32

3527 Ambassador Caffery

Lafayette, La. USA 70503

Remember the information is a rough draft and subject to modification based on the results of ongoing litigation. Updates, new summaries and other material will only be sent if a self-addressed stamped envelope is furnished. Responses to questions and generally not intelligible and will probably seem confusing unless a study of this material is made and specific questions are directed to these references. The presumption is that a student is wasting time by not studying first.

Foreword

The goal of these summaries and this study material is to restart a common law society such as ones existing in this country in the last century. The method used is this:

1. A jurisdiction was formed in 1993.

2. The laws of the courts on common pleas existing before the civil war were adopted.

3. The members who submit to this system of justice are learning how to enforce these laws in government courts.

4. The old laws are now being modified by litigation and summaries to fit the needs of our present society.

The recreated jurisdiction will be a society of self-governing people. The base law will be the old common law rather than government law. 100 years of public law making has created a society that is contrary to our basic nature as a Christian nation. This process will allow this group of people to reject that which is unsatisfactory and retain laws favorable to our inherent nature.

This study should take about a year depending on the individual effort and ability. It works like this:

1. An individual who is working with this information will file a proceeding in Federal Court.

2. The response or results of the government court action is reviewed by the writers.

3. The summaries are then adjusted to prevent others from making the same mistakes.

4. The new information is then made available to those who desire to participate in the ongoing process.

The material is generally adjusted to prevent others from making the same mistakes in this manner:

1. Individuals are required to leam the common law from the books in the study guide before proceeding.

2. Common law judgments issue in accordance to these summaries, prior litigations and the books.

3. Successful litigation becomes part of the code.

The ability of new students to follow and understand this process is determined by requiring them to engage in litigation to become common law citizens. Litigators who can read, understand and use code are allowed to proceed. Individuals who can't are prevented and engaging in litigation or becoming citizens without the help of someone who is a citizen. The principal being adopted is that the members will not teach law to those who won't use these reference sources and/or these books.

The summaries are principles of common law, which control the subsequent actions of the justices who issue common law orders to enforce. The summaries represent very little new law but are simply a restatement (or gathering) of existing common law and principles as found in the study materials.

The summaries are simply an update of Blackstone's and Bouvier's to the law to this country and this particular jurisdiction. This is the primary information:

1. They are in order of the study courses and may be rough drafts.

2. Each is written and modified freely as required.

3. A written question may result in a summary.

4. Members (citizens) or law students are authorized to submit summaries without restrictions.

5. As common law rights and court cases are discovered the summaries are amended to conform with the best information available to the writers.

6. An ongoing court case, review by others, newly discovered books and joining with other jurisdictions may cause modification.

7. A summary may result from common rights established by individuals attempting to live by common law.

8. The wording may be updated from prior common law but the law or circumstances force change out of necessity.

9. The civil code (read government law) is construed to be in conformance to common law and the summaries are modified as civil code rights are found and litigated.

10. Modem technology causes minor changes.

Do not perceive that you will learn common law from this source. You will only be shown where the common law can be found. When you understand the process of how to change or modify these summaries you may start a citizenship action. The primary principles of English common law are found in Blackstone's Commentaries. Some of the laws of the United States of America and word definitions are found in Bouvier's.

Changing United States Citizenship

Corporations legally avoid United States income tax laws each and every day by changing domicile. This is done by lawyers creating a "paper corporation" in a place like the Cayman Islands. The paper corporation is then registered with that jurisdiction and the assets of the United States corporations "legally move" to the Cayman Islands while the plants and headquarters (the physical presence) remain in this country.

This process is called acquiring a foreign domicile. Foreign domicile simply means "legal home" that is not the United States. This legal right also exist for individuals who are now considered United States citizens. The following problems exist when the average individual attempts this:

1. It takes a trained lawyer who charges a very large fee to accomplish abrogation of US citizenship.

2. It requires a person trained in this type of litigation to resolve the resulting problems in the event of legal disputes.

3. Individuals may lose certain advantages that exist in an organized society (such as availability to public schooling, welfare, etc.).

To overcome these problems a group of people have joined together to recreate a "foreign jurisdiction" that existed before the United States was formed. This nation was called the United States of America. This foreign jurisdiction overcomes the problems of changing domicile in this manner:

1. It trains individuals in the manner of legally changing domicile under United States law.

2. It provides a legal system that creates documents to support this move or change of domicile.

3. It trains the individuals how to litigate these issues in United States courts.

4. It creates an organized society with laws to retain the advantages lost by abrogation of US citizenship.

The move to a common law domicile requires the individual to make the following decisions:

1. You must agree to abide by the laws of an organized society already existing that has different laws.

2. You must either become trained in law or join under the protection of someone who is trained since this society does not have enough lawyers at this time.

3. This implies you must be willing to spend a certain amount of time and money acquiring a legal knowledge of to help someone with your litigation.

The money amount is small compared to what you are required to pay under income tax laws. The time element is considerable but worth it when you consider that under United States tax laws you are probably paying over 35% of everything you make to support the society to which you are now a member.

The problem with starting a jurisdiction is that it requires a very large set of laws to litigate virtually anything. This was overcome by adopting the laws of the old jurisdiction. These old laws were called the "common law".

Article 4 of the Constitution mandates the government to give full faith and credit to every jurisdiction that exists. The founding members of the jurisdiction simply recreated the old common law state that was brought over from England to this country. This is the nation that formed our present government. This is the jurisdiction that is referred to in Amendment VII. to the Constitution of the United States. The legal right to perform the act of recreating (or creating) a common law state is written in Amendment IX.:

"The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."

The legal reasoning is based on these points of law:

1. The common law jurisdiction was the method used by the settlers of this country to resolve disputes prior to the formation of the governments.

2. The people always retained the right to go to common law and resolve disputes (this is Article 1, Section 9, Clause 2 and Amendment VII.) even after governments and civil courts were formed.

3. The government was never given the specific right to form or organize common law jurisdictions. (Governments were only authorized to enforce common law judgments.)

The effect of these laws is that the people of this country have a right to be self governing if they simply learn how to live under these preexisting laws. This allows various societies to coexist (such as Indians and US citizens) provided that a "jurisdiction" (or state) exists in which differences may be litigated. This means if you want to live in a "foreign state" under "foreign laws" you must first learn the laws and then join the jurisdiction under which this can be done.

The laws of this recreated jurisdiction are based on these concepts of self government:

1. The primary laws are the Ten Commandments.

2. The judicial actions of the people living under and interpreting the Ten Commandments were called jury trials. (This is the jury trial protected in Amendment VII. - not a government jury trial.)

3. The body of law (the accumulated jury decisions) are the rules of laws of the state and is called "common law".

4. The government entity created by this common law society was called the United States.

5. The document controlling and limiting the power of this government body is called the Constitution.

Recreating a "common law" jural society that preexisted the government makes the people of that nation self governing.

The beginning laws of this recreated jurisdiction are currently evolving based on the fact that litigation is ongoing to re-establish this society. Individuals who have changed domicile under United States law are doing this litigation.

The college courses derived from this litigation will give you an explanation of how this type of law system works in conjunction with government court actions based on the litigation that is now ongoing. The books are being used to teach enforcement of common law judgments to those individuals who have the desire to be a member of a self governing society.

You may order the courses which will provide you with more information. This information is available based on the following principles:

1. The writers have undertaken this project for the purpose of teaching common law litigation.

2. You only need to read the enclosed materials before determining if you want more information.

3. They are copied originals in an 8 1/2 x 11 format.

4. Some of the material is under litigation and is modified as a result of ongoing court actions.

5. A list of study materials will be in the first mailing which will provide you with all of the information you will need to do your own research.

6. The first packet will give you enough information to determine if you wish to participate in this type of society and start learning its laws.

Think about this pledge and the fact that the government has banned it from the "public school" system:

"I pledge allegiance the flag of the United States of America and the Republic for which it stands. One nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."

That is the republic which has been reformed. See Bouvier's law dictionary for the legal description and court cases about this nation.

You may request the first lesson from:

The College of Common Law

Non Domestic Mail

3527 Ambassador Caffery Box 32

Lafayette, La. USA 70503

Send a 9 x 12 self addressed stamped envelope. The postage cost is $1.20. A copy of the

first lesson shall be sent in the envelope you furnish if it is not with this packet.

The internet address for more information is:

www.mindspring.com/~bjrepro

Background - Effective January 22, 1999

Republic of Texas

AFFIDAVIT OF CITIZENSHIP INFORMATION AND DECLARATION

Full Name

Height:_______ Weight:_______ Hair Color:_______ Eye Color:_________

Sex:_________

Date of Birth:_______________ Address:___________________________________ city of

Domicile:________________________________________________

county of Domicile:________________________________________ district of

Domicile:________________________________________________

I, _______________________________________, hereby affirm the following facts are true,

Correct and complete, according to my personal first hand knowledge.

1.1 was born in city_____________________________,county____________________________

state/republic_________________________________,country____________________________

on date_________________________________.

2.1 currently reside in ____________________________________, County, Texas.

3.1 have no disabilities which would prevent me from making this affidavit.

4.1 am a sovereign, freeman character, who does and desires to operate and conduct my affairs

under the Common Law in the Republic of Texas.

5.1 have never knowingly, intentionally or voluntarily, become a citizen of any de facto nation or

corporate entity, and hereby revoke all powers of attorney with any State, nation or corporate

entity, towit, I hereby renounce any such citizenship.

6.1 am not wanted for or under indictment for any crime in Texas or abroad under the Common Law.

7. This Affidavit is not made under threat, duress or coercion and without deception for purposes of evasion.

8. This affidavit is made pursuant to the General Provisions, Section 6 of the Constitution for the Republic of Texas, as amended August 29,1994.

9. If any part of this Affidavit is found to be fraudulent, it will be null and void and I will be

subject to prosecution under all applicable law.

10.1 hereby attest that I will support and defend the Constitution and Laws of the Republic of Texas.

Date: _____________________ Citizen signature:_________________________________

Witnessed at Law by:

signature:_____________________________________

signature:_____________________________________

-FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY-

Affidavit received and recorded:___________________________ Name of recording

official:_________________________________

Property Identification Number:___________________________ Signature of recording

official:_________________________________

MEMO ON SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER[61]

When you review Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment v. Margaret M. Heckler, 613 F. Supp. 558 and the subsequent appellate proceedings, you'll be entertained to know that as early as the late seventies, government employees, not to mention private citizens, were surrendering out the social security program. The Congress wrote a statute to force them in, claiming an interest in the public welfare, but the government lost. Hundreds of thousands of public employees during the mid 1980s successfully liberated themselves out of this fraudulent scheme.

Social security is a government benefit administered by the United States within its territories. It began with FDR's "New Deal," the political platform upon which he was elected to office only a few years after the stock market crash of 1929. In true form of government creating a need for itself, FDR and his banker cronies from Great Britain engineered the crash of '29 and you'll find this proved adequately in the Appendix to the Congressional Record of 1940.

"It was told to me by a heavyweight American financier before the crash came

that the crash was coming, that it would be permitted to run to the danger point,

and that when the danger point was passed it would be reversed by measures

carefully prepared in advance to meet the situation.",

Appendix to the Congressional Record, 1940

After the Social Security Act of 1935, the governors of each state of the union were extorted into participating in this scheme under threat of an enormous tax imposed by the United States. Their submission allowed them to defer this burden onto the citizens as we see it in operation today, that was the "Deal." They may withdraw at any time but they'd lose their subscription to monopoly money. Federal Reserve Notes.

I have a letter from my congressman which admits that he can find no law requiring anyone to either use or apply for a social security number as a condition of contract in America. It took me seven months to get this confession and he even lied to me on one occasion, but recanted when he learned that I knew better. Part 301.6109-l(c) of the Code of Federal Regulations states that if someone is going to pay you money, then he must ask you for a social security number. If you refuse, he is required by regulation to tell you that you must give him one and that it's required by law. Obviously, it's not required by law but he is required to tell you that. In other words, the regulation requires him to lie. After you refuse to disclose a number for the second time, his next obligation is to attach an affidavit to any statements he's required to file using your number stating that he's fulfilled his requirement to ask you for a social security number.

In other words, when it comes to disclosing a social security number, no one, absolutely no one, can require you to do it just so he can meet his own filing requirements. Please review Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344. The social security tax is a mandatory tax placed only on the receipt of wages. If you're not earning wages, you have no social security tax liability.

I have held three jobs in the past four years without having to submit any social security number or sign any federal forms and without paying one federal income tax on my pay. I currently have a checking account, insurance, three drivers licenses, a passport, one credit card, various telephone services, mail service, and an apartment lease, all with no social security number. I've never had to file a lawsuit to enforce my right to contract without a social security number.

A client recently brought a case to me where the IRS wanted to penalize him thousands of dollars for several tax returns in which he claimed his children as dependents while they had no social security numbers. They still have no numbers and I encouraged him to keep it that way and educate his children about this fraud. This is what we found:

Prior to August 20^th, 1996, Section 6109(e) of the Code required disclosure of social security numbers for dependents claimed on tax returns; however, it was repealed on August 20^th, 1996 (Pub. L. 104-188, Title I, § 1615(a)(2)(A), Aug. 20, 1996, 110 Stat. 1853)

Prior to December 19, 1989, there was a $5 penalty for failing to supply the TIN of a dependent claimed on a tax return. This appeared under Section 6676(e) until it was repealed on December 19^th, 1989:

"Penalty for failure to supply TIN of dependent

If any person required under section 6109(e) to include the TIN of any dependent on his return fails to include such number on such return (or includes an incorrect number), such person shall, unless it is shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect, pay a penalty of $5 for each such failure."

Repealed. Pub. L. 101-239, Title VII, § 7711(b)(l), Dec. 19, 1989, 103 Stat. 2393

The Problems Resolution Officer is having a fit because she's going to have to abate the penalties because there's no law to enforce them!

Here is the current statute relating to deductions for dependents having no SSN: 26 USC § 151

"(e) Identifying information required

No exemption shall be allowed under this section with respect to any individual unless the TIN of such individual is included on the return claiming the exemption."

As of January 6^th, 1997, there was no monetary penalty for not using an SSN for your children when claiming them as dependents on a tax return. The penalty statute of $5 was repealed in December of 1989 and the "6109 (e) requirement" was repealed in August of 1996. In essence, the time between 1989 and 1996 in which the "requirement" was a statute, was not enforceable because the penalty statute was not in force. It seems now that the only "penalty" is not being able to claim your children as dependents. I would encourage everyone doing this to refuse to get your children a number just to claim them, as it would be equivalent to selling them to the government, or putting a price on their heads. There's a good chance you shouldn't be signing a Form W-4 or filing a tax return anyway.

2. Briefs/Filings

Earlier sections of this book dealt with the interaction between members of the movement and those involved in the day-to-day operation of courts. One cannot effectively appreciate the friction that exists in that juncture without seeing the types of things those members of the movement actually try to DO in the courtroom (constitutional driver's license anyone?). Following are a few examples, not only of things done in "real" courts, but also things that members of the movement do in their common law courts and then try to have ratified officially by filing them in a "real" court.

County of______________________________

OFFICE OF THE CLERIC

____________________________________, Michigan

COMMON LAW VEHICULAR JUDICIAL NOTICE CONSTITUTIONAL DRIVERS LICENSE

THE UNDERSIGNED Common Law Citizen___________________________: hereby Certifies, by Rights

Secured under provisions of the Constitution of the United States of America, the Constitution of the several states. Common Law, Nature and Laws of Natures GOD, that these Rights are retained in FEE SIMPLE ABSOLUTE, and held and protected with special regard to Rights designated and/or set forth as follows: ALSO NOTE Rights and Property are ONE AND THE SAME THING-by the Honorable Justice LOUIS BRANDIS U.S. SUPREME COURT. NOTICE AND ADVISORY OF RIGHTS CLAIMED INVIOLATE:

1) The Right to TRAVEL FREELY, UNENCUMBERED, and UNFETTERED is guaranteed as a RIGHT and not a mere privilege. That the Right to TRAVEL is such a BASIC RIGHT it does NOT even need to be mentioned for it is SELF-evident by Common Sense that the Right to TRAVEL is a BASIC CONCOMMITANT of a FREE Society to come and go from length and breath FREELY UNENCUMBERED and UNFETTERED distinguishes the characteristic required for a FREE PEOPLE TO EXIST IN FACT. Please See SHAPIRO vs. THOMSON, 394 U. S. 618 . Further, the Right to TRAVEL by private conveyance for private purposes upon the Common way can NOT BE INFRINGED. No license or permission is required for TRAVEL when such TRAVEL IS NOT for the purpose of (COMMERCIAL] PROFIT OR GAIN on the open highways operating under license IN COMMERCE. The above named Common Law Citizen listed IS NOT OPERATING IN COMMERCE and as such is thereby EXEMPTED FROM THE REQUIREMENT OF A LICENSE AS SUCH. Further, the ____________________________ state, is FORBIDDEN BY LAW from converting a BASIC RIGHT into a PRIVILEGE and requiring a LICENSE and or a FEE CHARGED for the exercise of the BASIC RIGHT. Please SEE MURDOCK vs. PENNSYLVANIA, 319 U.S. 105, and if________________________, state does ERRONIOUSLY convert BASIC RIGHTS into PRIVILEGES and require a License or FEE a Citizen may IGNORE THE LICENSE OR FEE WITH TOTAL IMMUNITY FOR SUCH EXERCISE OF A BASIC RIGHT. Please see Schuttlesworth vs. BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA, 373 U.S. 262. Now if a Citizen exercises a BASIC RIGHT and a Law of ANY state is to the contrary of such exercise of that BASIC RIGHT, the said supposed Law of ANY state is a FICTION OF LAW and 100% TOTALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL and NO COURTS ARE BOUND TO UPHOLD IT AND NO Citizen is REQUIRED TO OBEY SUCH UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW OR LICENSE REQUIREMENT. Please see MARBURY vs. MADISON, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), which has never been overturned in over 194 years, see Shephard's Citations. Now further, if a Citizen relies in good faith on the advice of Counsel and or on the Decisions of the UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT that Citizen has a PERFECT DEFENSE to the element of WILLFULNESS and since the burden of proof of said WILLFULNESS is on the Prosecution to prove beyond a REASONABLE DOUBT, said task or burden being totally impossible to specifically perform there is NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR WHICH RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED BY A COURT OF LAW. Please see U.S. vs. Bishop 412 U.S. 346 . OBVIOUSLY THERE IS NO LAWFUL CHARGE AGAINST EXERCISING A BASIC Right to TRAVEL for a regular Common Law Citizen NOT IN COMMERCE on the common way Public HIGHWAY. THAT IS THE LAW!!! The above named Citizen IS IMMUNE FROM ANY CHARGE TO THE CONTRARY AND ANY PARTY MAKING SUCH CHARGE SHOULD BE DULY WARNED OF THE TORT OF TRESPASS!!! YOU ARE TRESPASSING ON THIS Common Law Citizen!!!

2) The original and Judicial jurisdiction of t