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Colorado State Supreme
Court 2
West 14th Street Denver,
Colorado
80203 |
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STEVE
D. GARTIN , Plaintiff
v. FIRST
JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY COLORADO
STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Defendants |
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Case
Number: _____________ Division
__________________
CourtRoom:_______________ |
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Plaintiff
in Propria Persona: Steve D.
Gartin P.O. Box
16700 Golden,
Colorado 80402 Email:
sheriffsteve@justice.com |
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Original Action in the Nature of
a Writ of
Quo Warranto, Order to Show Cause
(Ex-Parte) |
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Comes
Now, Steve Douglas, Gartin, Child of הּוֹהּיּ
(YHVH), a sovereign
Inhabitant of the California Republic, currently domiciled in Colorado; First
Secured Party of the “strawman defendant” in the above captioned matter
and “attorney-in-fact” firmly established pursuant to U.C.C. Private
Security Agreement #SDG09112000-SA, registered, and uncontested, with the
Secretary of STATE U.C.C. Division, appearing by special visit, not general
appearance, in propria persona (pro-se); who is of legal age, sound mind,
speaks the truth and has first hand knowledge of the facts contained herein;
affirms and attests that the following information is true, correct, complete,
not misleading and is made under the penalty of perjury, knowingly, willingly
and without threat or coercion hereby states for the record:
(1) Petitioner seeks to test the validity of the prosecution by COLORADO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE in Jefferson County Case #00CR3371 wherein Petitioner is First Secured Party to the Strawman Defendant, where any governmental body or officer or any lower judicial body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion, and there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy otherwise provided by law.
(2)
Petitioner believes, and therefore alleges that the COLORADO STATE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE appears to be acting in excess of its statutory
authority and beyond the scope of its constitutionally granted powers in
prosecuting cases #00CR3371, #00CR3372 & 00CR3373 without any authorization
from either the Governor or the Legislature, and seeks a definitive answer from
the Honorable Supreme Court due to the fact that this issue has been formally
presented to the Honorable Leland P.
Anderson in the form of a First
Amendment Petition for Redress of Grievance in the Nature of a Motion to Dismiss
for Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Honorable District Court has failed, neglected or refused to rule[1]
on this question. Petitioner’s constitutionally secured right to be free from
malicious, vindictive and retaliatory prosecution has been abrogated by
government actors and Petitioner is currently unlawfully imprisoned in
overcrowded and draconian conditions in Jefferson County Detention Facility on
excessive bond as a direct result thereof, and no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy is available because no final judgment has been made from which an appeal
can be taken.
(3)
Petitioner seeks relief[2] from unlawful prosecution by District
Attorney David J. Thomas and COLORADO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL Kenneth Salazar in
the form of a dismissal, with prejudice, for cause and for outrageous government
conduct, deprivation of the right to speedy trial, grand jury misconduct, fatal
failure of the indictment to properly charge an offense and other just and
proper reasons.
(4) Petitioner brings this action to the Jefferson County District Attorney simultaneously with the Colorado State Supreme Court pursuant to C.A.R. 21 (2) with full expectation that the District Attorney’s Office will decline to prosecute[3] this matter.
Experience indicates that David J. Thomas, Esquire, Dennis Hall, Esquire and other agents of the First Judicial District Attorney’s Office appear to be colluding, in an on-going, unconcealed and open conspiracy with Kenneth Salazar, Esquire, Maurice Knaizer, Esquire, Marleen M. Langfield, Esquire and other agents of the COLORADO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE as well as other government agencies, including, but not limited to, Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department, the Multi-Jurisdictional Domestic Terrorism TaskForce, State of Colorado First Judicial District, and the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION to defy all proper and lawful operation of Constitutional separation of powers and to usurp legislative and judicial powers not constitutionally granted[4] to their respective offices.
Over the years, Petitioner has brought several serious complaints to the
District Attorney’s Office and has consistently been denied any and all relief
or assistance.
The issues:
I.
Prosecutorial Powers – Unlawful Prosecution?.........................................................................................
3
II. Police Powers – Unlawful Arrest, Search &
Seizure?...............................................................................
6
III:
Pre-Trial Incarceration...........................................................................................................................
7
IV: The
Remedy.........................................................................................................................................
8
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C.R.S. 24-31-101 defines the Powers and
duties of attorney general:
(1)
(a) The attorney general[5]
of the state shall be the legal counsel and advisor of each department,
division, board, bureau and agency of the state government other than the
legislative branch. He shall attend
in person at the seat of government during the session of the general assembly
and term of the supreme court and shall appear for the state and prosecute and
defend all actions and proceeding, civil and criminal, in which the state is a
party or is interested when required to do so by the governor, and he shall
prosecute and defend for the state all causes in the appellate courts in which
the state is a party or interested.
The
General Assembly has provided no authorization to the COLORADO STATE
ATTORNEY GENERAL to prosecute case #00CR3371. The lower court’s record is void of any
such authorization.
The Governor[6] has provided no authorization to the COLORADO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL to prosecute case #00CR3371. The record reflects that the governor has not required the Colorado State Attorney General to prosecute this matter.
The
STATE is not a party to this matter, holds no title to any of the private
property at issue, and is not “interested” in the adjudication of any aspect of
this civil matter between private People, which has been moot since 13 July,
2000. COLORADO STATE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S OFFICE has made no showing[7]
what-so-ever to attempt to validate this ostensible
“prosecution.”
Marleen
M. Langfield, Esquire presents as a Senior Deputy State Attorney General[8],
according to her official title, and a member of the “Special Prosecutions
Unit.” Marleen M. Langfield,
Esquire is encaptioned as the “attorney of record” in
this matter. Ms. Langfield is not
authorized[9]
by the Governor or Legislature to prosecute this matter.
The
Colorado State Attorney General has not submitted a petition for the
impaneling of the Statewide Grand Jury[10]
wherein probable cause is established and good cause is shown why
the county grand jury could not effectively handle the case.
Marleen M. Langfield, Esquire appears to be acting expressly without, and in excess of, her official capacity by prosecuting this matter in District Court.[11] No evidence of any authorized “agreement”[12] with the Jefferson County District Attorney, David J. Thomas, Esquire exists, nor would such an “agreement” without express authorization by the Governor clear the foul taint of an unlawful and illicit usurpation of power.[13]
There
is a specific reason and purpose behind the separation of powers embedded
in the Colorado Constitution, and the conspiracy of the STATE
ATTORNEY GENERAL and the JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, by collusion and
agreement, to circumvent, abrogate and evade the law of the land by “agreement”
constitutes yet one more act in
furtherance of this well-documented and continuing lawless conspiracy to
usurp and twist the power of the law to the purposes of special interests.
The
Defense has consistently and persistently inquired why, with only two of seventeen alleged
violations occurring in Jefferson County, the prosecution of this matter has
not been conducted in Denver, where the majority (eleven) of the alleged violations
occurred. The cite below may shed
some small light upon why this prosecution is being conducted, outside of
statutory authority, in Jefferson County instead of Denver
County.
Assistant
Attorney general could not also serve for one case as deputy district attorney
by special appointment of district attorney whose district had population over
25,000. People ex re. Brown
v. District Court In and For First Judicial District, 1978, 585 P.2d 593,
196 Colo. 359.
This Accused, Charles Clements (00CR3372) and
Eric Mitchell (00CR3373) have all been subjected to draconian overcrowded
maximum-security prison conditions in the Jefferson County Detention Facility,
Inc., and a pattern of deliberate and callous deprivation of constitutionally
secured rights to due process of law have been intentionally imposed in order to
gain an unfair advantage in this prosecution by alienating and terrorizing
defense witnesses and artificially creating hostile positions between
witnesses. The facts speak for
themselves and even a casual inspection will find the record is replete with
factual documentation supporting this assertion.
The Defense believes that the Grand Jury Transcript documents prima facie unlawful bias, favor and prejudice toward the Prosecution[14], by purposeful manipulation of “special statewide grand jury impaneling,” which in this matter has exceeded its lawful authority and expressed a flagrant and blatant disregard for its ethical responsibilities.
The State Attorney General’s powers and responsibility are well defined by statute[15], to-wit:
C.R.S. §20-1-102 Note 8. Attorney
general
& Absent command from governor or general assembly, Attorney General was not authorized to prosecute criminal actions. People ex rel. Tooley v. District Court In and For Second Judicial District, 1976, 549 P.2d 774, 190 Colo. 486.
§13 District Attorneys – election – term –
salary – qualifications.
& In each judicial district there shall be a district attorney[16] elected by the electors thereof, whose term of office shall be four years. District attorneys shall receive such salaries and perform such duties as provided by law. No person shall be eligible to the office of district attorney who shall not, at the time of his election possess all the qualifications of district court judges as provided in this article. All district attorneys holding office on the effective date of this amendment shall continue in office for the remainder of the respective terms for which they were elected or appointed.
& 1.) Every district attorney, before entering upon the duties of his office, shall take and subscribe an oath to support the constitution of the United States and the organic law of the state and that he will faithfully discharge the duties[17] of his office.
§16-5-202
Constitutional and statutory provisions relating to office of district attorney, though vesting district attorney[18] with authority to initiate criminal prosecutions for crimes committed within geographical boundaries of judicial district served by district attorney, do not vest a district attorney with authority to initiate a criminal prosecution for crimes committed outside his judicial district. People v. Taylor, 1987, 732 P.2d 1172.
& The powers of the government of this state are divided[19] into three distinct departments, - the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.
______________________________________________
The three above noted prosecutions were instituted based upon an unlawful “Felony Traffic Stop” by COLORADO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE Investigator Gary Clyman and cohorts Donald L. Estep and Ed Loar commanding the Lakewood S.W.A.T. Team. By “unlawful” Petitioner means:
1. No valid warrant existed
2. No exigent circumstance existed
3. No crime had been committed
4. No probable cause existed for either a warrant or arrest
5. C.S.A.G. Investigator Clyman had NO authorization from Governor
Three innocent People were subjected to unlawful custodial interrogation by C.S.A.G. Investigator Clyman[20], while in hand-cuffs and by threat of heavily armed quasi-military agents with Ninja Masks and Nazi StormTrooper uniforms surrounding them, with high-capacity automatic weapons pointed and ready.
The private conveyance of an innocent bystander was unlawfully searched and a private, registered collection of Heirloom Number One Spyderco Folding Police Model folding knives was also unlawfully confiscated[21] that is irreplaceable and valued far in excess of $10,000. Petitioner requests the immediate return of that Collection as part of the relief requested.
The
Accused was unlawfully incarcerated
by Investigator Clyman, without authority.
No valid warrant existed, no exigent circumstances existed and no crime
had been committed in the presence of the arresting agents.
Colorado State Attorney General Investigator Gary Clyman was acting in excess of his official capacity on 19 September 2000 when he deployed the Lakewood S.W.A.T. Team in full battle array against three private citizens in a private conveyance in order to purportedly serve a void unsigned misdemeanor warrant.
Mr. Clyman, then continuing to exceed his statutory authority,
conducted custodial interrogation of the unlawfully arrested People and
subsequently offered a false document, containing materially false information
to a public official, to-wit: Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant on unlawfully obtained information to
Judge Jack Berryhill, a Jefferson County Judge, at 1:06 A.M. in order to
unlawfully obtain a Search Warrant for a Denver County business location, founded on false and misleading
information. Mr. Clyman was
acting without authorization by the Governor and in excess of his scope of
employment.
Private property, belonging to “uninterested parties” was unlawfully searched and seized upon a
defective warrant, by government agents Donald L. Estep, Gary Clyman and
Curtis Maleri.
Petitioner was unlawfully incarcerated from 19 September, 2000 until 23 September, 2000 relative to case 00CR2419 {Dismissed 4-30-2001} resulting from the above noted unlawful arrest. Petitioner was again unlawfully arrested in California, on 13 March, 2001 and has been unlawfully incarcerated continuously to present – approximately 300 days in maximum-security overcrowded, draconian prison conditions. {See Exhibit #1}
Petitioner has repeatedly requested by formal filing and oral petition in open court for pertinent Discovery of both the Grand Jury and other critical issues and has not yet received full Discovery from the COLORADO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE. As a direct result of on-going Rule 16 Violations by the “Prosecution,” Petitioner has not yet perfected the pre-arraignment challenge of the grand jury process.
Petitioner has repeatedly petitioned the District Court to SET A TRIAL DATE CERTAIN absent the entry of a plea so that the Defense would not be unlawfully required to waive the right to challenge an improperly convened grand jury and the resultant defective indictment. Such relief has been denied.
Petitioner
has repeatedly demanded, and been denied, a Speedy Trial.
The
authority of the state, represented by the Attorney General, to invoke the
remedy by quo warranto is quite extensive, but the right of an individual to the
remedy is limited to the single case named in this section. State ex rel. Boyle
v. Hall, 53 M 595, 165 P 757 (1917).
Common-law writ. The writ of quo warranto was originally
a prerogative writ of the crown against one who usurped any office, franchise,
or liberty of the crown and was also used in the case of nonuse or long neglect
of a franchise or misuse or abuse thereof.
At common law it served the function of testing title to public and
corporate offices. Burnes v. District Court, 144 Colo.259, 356 P.2d 245
(1960).
Rule
substituted for common law and code.
Former
provisions of the Code of Civil procedure were a substitute for the original
common law quo warranto remedy and retained the purpose and scope of that which
it supplanted. These code
provisions were superseded by this rule.
People ex rel. Mijares v. Kniss, 144 Colo 551, 357 P.2d 352
(1960)
The
various procedural changes do not affect the basic purposes for which the writ
of quo warranto was originally designed.
People ex rel. Mijares v. Kniss, 144 Colo 551, 357 P.2d 352
(1960)
The
traditional concept of quo warranto relief is prevailing under this rule.
Subsection (a)(3) does not enlarge or abridge substantive rights. This section is not a statute and does
not, and cannot, have the force and effect of a statute, and cannot enlarge or
abridge substantive rights. Enos v. District Court, 124 Colo. 335, 238 P.2d 861
(1951).
Black's
Law Dictionary 6th Edition
Color
of law - The appearance of semblance, without the substance, of legal right.
Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because
wrongdoer is clothed with authority of state, is action taken under "color of
state law." Atkins v. Lanning, D.C.Okl., 415 F.Supp. 186, 188
Petitioner believes, and therefore alleges that the COLORADO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE is acting without express authority from the Governor or the Legislature and in excess of constitutional or statutory authority and has caused Petitioner grievous and irreparable damages.
Petitioner therefore seeks a Writ of Quo Warranto to issue and an Order for immediate release of Petitioner from pre-trial incarceration pursuant to Dismissal, with prejudice of all proceedings, - OR – Release on Personal Recognizance Bond pending trial.
Humbly submitted in good faith,
________________________________________ Friday, November 23,
2001
Steve D. Gartin – In Propria Persona – Sui Juris
Attachment #1: Overcrowding for profit
Certificate
of Service
This
is a True Copy of Writ of Quo Warranto to the Supreme Court
for the STATE OF COLORADO Court VIA U.S. Mail deposited in the Jefferson
County Jail Mail with sufficient postage attached and addressed
to:
Clerk of the Court Mac V.
Stanford
Colorado State Supreme
Court
2 East 14th Street –
4th Floor
Denver, Colorado 80203
The Honorable Leland Paul
Anderson
STATE OF COLORADO–First Judicial
District
100 Jefferson County Parkway
Golden, Colorado 80401
Colorado State Attorney General
Kenneth Salazar
1525 Sherman Street – 5th
Floor
Golden, Colorado 80401
Daniel Edwards, Esquire
1733 High Street
Denver, Colorado 80218
David J. Thomas, Esquire
500 Jefferson County
Parkway
Golden, Colorado 80401
[1]
Trial courts have jurisdiction to determine Federal Constitutional
questions, and it is their duty to do so by virtue of paragraph 2 of
article VI of the United States Constitution, which provides that the
constitution of the United States and all laws made in pursuance thereof shall
be the supreme law of the land and the judges of every state shall be bound
thereby and by §8 of Article XII of the Colorado Constitution requiring officers
to take an oath to support the constitution of the united States and of the
state of Colorado, notwithstanding the provisions of the 1913 amendment to this
section which provided that the
supreme court should have exclusive jurisdiction to determine such
matters. People v. Western
Union Tel. Co. 70 Colo. 90, 198 P.146 (1921).
And any attempt to take away this jurisdiction is null and void. When a federal constitutional question is raised in any of the trial courts of Colorado the right is given and the duty is imposed upon those courts, by that instrument itself, to adjudicate and determine it. That right so given can neither be taken away nor that duty abrogated by the state of Colorado, by constitutional provision or otherwise, and any attempt to do so is null and void. Such pretended constitutional inhibition is no part of the constitution of the state of Colorado, and the judge’s oath binding him to the support and enforcement of that instrument has no relation to such void provisions. People v. Western Union Tel. Co. 70 Colo. 90, 198 P.146 (1921).
[2]
Purpose of relief. Traditionally, quo warranto was directed
against one charged with usurping an office, to inquire by what authority he
claims to hold such office, in order to adjudge his right thereto. Its purpose was to protect the interest
of the public and not to protect or promote private rights. People ex rel. Mijares v. Kniss, 144 Colo 551, 357 P.2d 352 (1960)
[3] Refusal of district attorney to bring action is sufficient to authorize action by private parties. It was alleged and proven that the district attorney upon request made by relators and their attorneys and upon complaint being submitted to him, refused to prosecute the proceedings, and under the circumstances in this case such refusal was sufficient to authorize the court to permit the prosecution upon the relation of such private parties without the aid or sanction of the district attorney. Canon City Labor Club v. People ex rel. Jamieson, 21 Colo.App.37, 121 P.120 (1912).
[4]
Constitution of Colorado Article III – Distribution of
Powers
The powers
of the government of this state are divided into three distinct
departments, - the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or
collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to
one of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either
of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or
permitted.
Each to
perform its duties but to refrain from asserting power belonging to another
department. It is incumbent
upon each department to assert and exercise all its powers whenever public
necessity requires it to do so; otherwise, it is recreant to the trust reposed
in it by the People. It is
equally incumbent upon it to refrain from asserting a power that does not belong
to it, for this is equally a violation of the People’s confidence. Indeed, the distinction goes so far as
to require each department to refrain from in any way impeding the exercise of
the proper functions belonging to either of the other departments. City & County of Denver v. Lynch 92
Colo. 102, 18 P.2d 907 (1932); Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo., 35, 384 P.2d 738
(1963).
[5]
Attorney general does not have powers beyond those granted by general
assembly. Gillies v. Schmidt, 38 Colo.App.233, 556 P.2d 82
(1976).
[6]
No authority to prosecute criminal actions absent governor’s
command. In the absence of a
command from the governor, the attorney general is not authorized to
prosecute criminal actions.
People ex rel. Tooley v. District Court 190
Colo. 486, 549 P.2d 774 (1976).
[7] Impaneling of statewide grand jury was proper where district court chief judge found that attorney general had made a showing of good cause, matter could not be effectively handled by county grand jury, and it was in the public interest to convene statewide grand jury. People v. Cerrone, 867 P.2d 143 (Colo.App.1993) aff’d on other grounds, 900 P.2d 45 (Colo.1995)
[8] Attorney general prosecuting case is exercising district attorney’s powers. When the governor requires the attorney general to prosecute a criminal case in which the state is a party, he becomes to all intents and purposes the district attorney, and may in his own name and official capacity exercise all the powers of that officer. People v. Gibson, 54 Colo. 231, 125 P.531 (1912); People ex rel. Witcher v. District Court, 190 Colo.483, 549 P.2d 778 (1976).
[9]
Error: Authority to Prosecute: When thereunto required by the governor,
under section 6168 Rev.St., the attorney general may
subscribe, present and prosecute an information against a public offender, with
the same powers as the district attorney of the proper district. People v. Gibson, 1912, 125 P. 531, 53 Colo. 231.
[10]
Powers of attorney general are not enlarged by grand jury act. The statutory powers granted to the
attorney general under this section are not enlarged by the statewide
grand jury act, §13-73-101 et seq.
People ex rel. Tooley v. District Court 190
[11]
While
cooperation of Attorney General and district attorneys in joint law enforcement
efforts is to be encouraged, it is beyond authority of court to empower
assistant attorney general to perform in duties assigned by statute to district
attorney. People ex rel. Brown
v. District Court In and For Second Judicial Dist., 1976, 549 P.2d 774, 190
Colo. 486.
[12]
Assistant
Attorney general could not also serve for one case as deputy district attorney
by special appointment of district attorney whose district had population over
25,000. People ex re. Brown
v. District Court In and For First Judicial District, 1978, 585 P.2d 593,
196 Colo. 359.
[13]
Where by statute authority is given to a particular officer, its exercise by any
other officer is forbidden by implication.
Atchinson, T. & S.F.R.R. v. People, 5
Colo.60 (1879).
[14] In hearing defendant’s motion challenging sufficiency of evidence to show probable cause to indict, trial court must consider both sufficiency of evidence and whether prosecutorial misconduct infected validity of indictment by interfering with grand jury’s ability to weigh evidence independently in calm and di