Colorado State Supreme Court

2 West 14th Street

Denver, Colorado  80203

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

    ▲Court Use Only▲

STEVE D. GARTIN ,  Plaintiff                                   

v.

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY

COLORADO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL                                                     Defendants

 

Case Number: _____________

 

Division __________________      

 

CourtRoom:_______________

Plaintiff in Propria Persona:

     Steve D. Gartin

     P.O. Box 16700

     Golden, Colorado  80402

Email: sheriffsteve@justice.com

Original Action in the Nature of a

Writ of Quo Warranto,

Order to Show Cause (Ex-Parte)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Comes Now, Steve Douglas, Gartin, Child of הּוֹהּיּ (YHVH), a sovereign Inhabitant of the California Republic, currently domiciled in Colorado; First Secured Party of the “strawman defendant” in the above captioned matter and “attorney-in-fact” firmly established pursuant to U.C.C. Private Security Agreement #SDG09112000-SA, registered, and uncontested, with the Secretary of STATE U.C.C. Division, appearing by special visit, not general appearance, in propria persona (pro-se); who is of legal age, sound mind, speaks the truth and has first hand knowledge of the facts contained herein; affirms and attests that the following information is true, correct, complete, not misleading and is made under the penalty of perjury, knowingly, willingly and without threat or coercion hereby states for the record:

 

(1)        Petitioner seeks to test the validity of the prosecution by COLORADO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE in Jefferson County Case #00CR3371 wherein Petitioner is First Secured Party to the Strawman Defendant, where any governmental body or officer or any lower judicial body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion, and there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy otherwise provided by law.

 

(2)        Petitioner believes, and therefore alleges that the COLORADO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE appears to be acting in excess of its statutory authority and beyond the scope of its constitutionally granted powers in prosecuting cases #00CR3371, #00CR3372 & 00CR3373 without any authorization from either the Governor or the Legislature, and seeks a definitive answer from the Honorable Supreme Court due to the fact that this issue has been formally presented to the Honorable Leland P. Anderson in the form of a First Amendment Petition for Redress of Grievance in the Nature of a Motion to Dismiss for Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Honorable District Court has failed, neglected or refused to rule[1] on this question. Petitioner’s constitutionally secured right to be free from malicious, vindictive and retaliatory prosecution has been abrogated by government actors and Petitioner is currently unlawfully imprisoned in overcrowded and draconian conditions in Jefferson County Detention Facility on excessive bond as a direct result thereof, and no plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available because no final judgment has been made from which an appeal can be taken.

 

(3)        Petitioner seeks relief[2] from unlawful prosecution by District Attorney David J. Thomas and COLORADO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL Kenneth Salazar in the form of a dismissal, with prejudice, for cause and for outrageous government conduct, deprivation of the right to speedy trial, grand jury misconduct, fatal failure of the indictment to properly charge an offense and other just and proper reasons.

 

(4)        Petitioner brings this action to the Jefferson County District Attorney simultaneously with the Colorado State Supreme Court pursuant to C.A.R. 21 (2) with full expectation that the District Attorney’s Office will decline to prosecute[3] this matter. 

 

            Experience indicates that David J. Thomas, Esquire, Dennis Hall, Esquire and other agents of the First Judicial District Attorney’s Office appear to be colluding, in an on-going, unconcealed and open conspiracy with Kenneth Salazar, Esquire, Maurice Knaizer, Esquire, Marleen M. Langfield, Esquire and other agents of the COLORADO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE as well as other government agencies, including, but not limited to, Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department, the Multi-Jurisdictional Domestic Terrorism TaskForce, State of Colorado First Judicial District, and the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION to defy all proper and lawful operation of Constitutional separation of powers and to usurp legislative and judicial powers not constitutionally granted[4] to their respective offices. 

 

            Over the years, Petitioner has brought several serious complaints to the District Attorney’s Office and has consistently been denied any and all relief or assistance.

 

The issues:

I.  Prosecutorial Powers – Unlawful Prosecution?......................................................................................... 3

II. Police Powers – Unlawful Arrest, Search & Seizure?............................................................................... 6

III:  Pre-Trial Incarceration........................................................................................................................... 7

IV:  The Remedy......................................................................................................................................... 8

 

I.  Prosecutorial Powers – Unlawful Prosecution?

C.R.S. 24-31-101 defines the Powers and duties of attorney general:

(1) (a)  The attorney general[5] of the state shall be the legal counsel and advisor of each department, division, board, bureau and agency of the state government other than the legislative branch.  He shall attend in person at the seat of government during the session of the general assembly and term of the supreme court and shall appear for the state and prosecute and defend all actions and proceeding, civil and criminal, in which the state is a party or is interested when required to do so by the governor, and he shall prosecute and defend for the state all causes in the appellate courts in which the state is a party or interested.

 

The General Assembly has provided no authorization to the COLORADO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL to prosecute case #00CR3371.  The lower court’s record is void of any such authorization.

 

The Governor[6] has provided no authorization to the COLORADO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL to prosecute case #00CR3371.  The record reflects that the governor has not required the Colorado State Attorney General to prosecute this matter.

 

The STATE is not a party to this matter, holds no title to any of the private property at issue, and is not “interested” in the adjudication of any aspect of this civil matter between private People, which has been moot since 13 July, 2000.  COLORADO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE has made no showing[7] what-so-ever to attempt to validate this ostensible “prosecution.”

 

Marleen M. Langfield, Esquire presents as a Senior Deputy State Attorney General[8], according to her official title, and a member of the “Special Prosecutions Unit.”  Marleen M. Langfield, Esquire is encaptioned as the “attorney of record” in this matter.  Ms. Langfield is not authorized[9] by the Governor or Legislature to prosecute this matter.

 

The Colorado State Attorney General has not submitted a petition for the impaneling of the Statewide Grand Jury[10] wherein probable cause is established and good cause is shown why the county grand jury could not effectively handle the case.

 

Marleen M. Langfield, Esquire appears to be acting expressly without, and in excess of, her official capacity by prosecuting this matter in District Court.[11]  No evidence of any authorized “agreement”[12] with the Jefferson County District Attorney, David J. Thomas, Esquire exists, nor would such an “agreement” without express authorization by the Governor clear the foul taint of an unlawful and illicit usurpation of power.[13] 

 

There is a specific reason and purpose behind the separation of powers embedded in the Colorado Constitution, and the conspiracy of the STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL and the JEFFERSON COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, by collusion and agreement, to circumvent, abrogate and evade the law of the land by “agreement” constitutes yet one more act in furtherance of this well-documented and continuing lawless conspiracy to usurp and twist the power of the law to the purposes of special interests. 

 

The Defense has consistently and persistently inquired why, with only two of seventeen alleged violations occurring in Jefferson County, the prosecution of this matter has not been conducted in Denver, where the majority (eleven) of the alleged violations occurred.  The cite below may shed some small light upon why this prosecution is being conducted, outside of statutory authority, in Jefferson County instead of Denver County.

Assistant Attorney general could not also serve for one case as deputy district attorney by special appointment of district attorney whose district had population over 25,000.  People ex re. Brown v. District Court In and For First Judicial District, 1978, 585 P.2d 593, 196 Colo. 359.

 

This Accused, Charles Clements (00CR3372) and Eric Mitchell (00CR3373) have all been subjected to draconian overcrowded maximum-security prison conditions in the Jefferson County Detention Facility, Inc., and a pattern of deliberate and callous deprivation of constitutionally secured rights to due process of law have been intentionally imposed in order to gain an unfair advantage in this prosecution by alienating and terrorizing defense witnesses and artificially creating hostile positions between witnesses.  The facts speak for themselves and even a casual inspection will find the record is replete with factual documentation supporting this assertion.

 

The Defense believes that the Grand Jury Transcript documents prima facie unlawful bias, favor and prejudice toward the Prosecution[14], by purposeful manipulation of “special statewide grand jury impaneling,” which in this matter has exceeded its lawful authority and expressed a flagrant and blatant disregard for its ethical responsibilities. 

 

The State Attorney General’s powers and responsibility are well defined by statute[15], to-wit: 

C.R.S. §20-1-102 Note 8. Attorney general

 

&         Absent command from governor or general assembly, Attorney General was not authorized to prosecute criminal actions.  People ex rel. Tooley v. District Court In and For Second Judicial District, 1976, 549 P.2d 774, 190 Colo. 486.

 

§13 District Attorneys – election – term – salary – qualifications.

&         In each judicial district there shall be a district attorney[16] elected by the electors thereof, whose term of office shall be four years.  District attorneys shall receive such salaries and perform such duties as provided by law.  No person shall be eligible to the office of district attorney who shall not, at the time of his election possess all the qualifications of district court judges as provided in this article.  All district attorneys holding office on the effective date of this amendment shall continue in office for the remainder of the respective terms for which they were elected or appointed.

§20-1-101 Bond and oath of district attorney and staff

&         1.)  Every district attorney, before entering upon the duties of his office, shall take and subscribe an oath to support the constitution of the United States and the organic law of the state and that he will faithfully discharge the duties[17] of his office.

 

§16-5-202

            Constitutional and statutory provisions relating to office of district attorney, though vesting district attorney[18] with authority to initiate criminal prosecutions for crimes committed within geographical boundaries of judicial district served by district attorney, do not vest a district attorney with authority to initiate a criminal prosecution for crimes committed outside his judicial district.  People v. Taylor, 1987, 732 P.2d 1172.

 

The statutory powers of the District Attorney are well defined.  In the matter before the Honorable Court there appears to be an intentional blurring of the demarcation between the various STATE and FEDERAL agencies involved and their duties and obligations as defined by Constitution and statute.  A government agent acting in excess of his official capacity ceases to represent the government and loses the color of authority associated with his office.

Constitution of Colorado Article III – Distribution of Powers

&         The powers of the government of this state are divided[19] into three distinct departments, - the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.

______________________________________________

 

II. Police Powers – Unlawful Arrest, Search & Seizure?

The three above noted prosecutions were instituted based upon an unlawful “Felony Traffic Stop” by COLORADO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE Investigator Gary Clyman and cohorts Donald L. Estep and Ed Loar commanding the Lakewood S.W.A.T. Team.  By “unlawful” Petitioner means:

1.      No valid warrant existed

2.      No exigent circumstance existed

3.      No crime had been committed

4.      No probable cause existed for either a warrant or arrest

5.      C.S.A.G. Investigator Clyman had NO authorization from Governor

 

Three innocent People were subjected to unlawful custodial interrogation by C.S.A.G. Investigator Clyman[20], while in hand-cuffs and by threat of heavily armed quasi-military agents with Ninja Masks and Nazi StormTrooper uniforms surrounding them, with high-capacity automatic weapons pointed and ready.

 

The private conveyance of an innocent bystander was unlawfully searched and a private, registered collection of Heirloom Number One Spyderco Folding Police Model folding knives was also unlawfully confiscated[21] that is irreplaceable and valued far in excess of $10,000.  Petitioner requests the immediate return of that Collection as part of the relief requested.

 

The Accused was unlawfully incarcerated by Investigator Clyman, without authority.  No valid warrant existed, no exigent circumstances existed and no crime had been committed in the presence of the arresting agents.

 

Colorado State Attorney General Investigator Gary Clyman was acting in excess of his official capacity on 19 September 2000 when he deployed the Lakewood S.W.A.T. Team in full battle array against three private citizens in a private conveyance in order to purportedly serve a void unsigned misdemeanor warrant. 

            Mr. Clyman, then continuing to exceed his statutory authority, conducted custodial interrogation of the unlawfully arrested People and subsequently offered a false document, containing materially false information to a public official, to-wit: Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant on unlawfully obtained information to Judge Jack Berryhill, a Jefferson County Judge, at 1:06 A.M. in order to unlawfully obtain a Search Warrant for a Denver County business location, founded on false and misleading information.  Mr. Clyman was acting without authorization by the Governor and in excess of his scope of employment.

            Private property, belonging to “uninterested parties” was unlawfully searched and seized upon a defective warrant, by government agents Donald L. Estep, Gary Clyman and Curtis Maleri.

III:  Pre-Trial Incarceration

            Petitioner was unlawfully incarcerated from 19 September, 2000 until 23 September, 2000 relative to case 00CR2419 {Dismissed 4-30-2001} resulting from the above noted unlawful arrest.  Petitioner was again unlawfully arrested in California, on 13 March, 2001 and has been unlawfully incarcerated continuously to present – approximately 300 days in maximum-security overcrowded, draconian prison conditions.  {See Exhibit #1}

            Petitioner has repeatedly requested by formal filing and oral petition in open court for pertinent Discovery of both the Grand Jury and other critical issues and has not yet received full Discovery from the COLORADO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.  As a direct result of on-going Rule 16 Violations by the “Prosecution,” Petitioner has not yet perfected the pre-arraignment challenge of the grand jury process. 

            Petitioner has repeatedly petitioned the District Court to SET A TRIAL DATE CERTAIN absent the entry of a plea so that the Defense would not be unlawfully required to waive the right to challenge an improperly convened grand jury and the resultant defective indictment.  Such relief has been denied.

Petitioner has repeatedly demanded, and been denied, a Speedy Trial.

IV:  The Remedy

The authority of the state, represented by the Attorney General, to invoke the remedy by quo warranto is quite extensive, but the right of an individual to the remedy is limited to the single case named in this section. State ex rel. Boyle v. Hall, 53 M 595, 165 P 757 (1917).

 

Common-law writ.  The writ of quo warranto was originally a prerogative writ of the crown against one who usurped any office, franchise, or liberty of the crown and was also used in the case of nonuse or long neglect of a franchise or misuse or abuse thereof.  At common law it served the function of testing title to public and corporate offices.  Burnes v. District Court, 144 Colo.259, 356 P.2d 245 (1960).

 

Rule substituted for common law and code.

Former provisions of the Code of Civil procedure were a substitute for the original common law quo warranto remedy and retained the purpose and scope of that which it supplanted.  These code provisions were superseded by this rule.  People ex rel. Mijares v. Kniss, 144 Colo 551, 357 P.2d 352 (1960)

 

The various procedural changes do not affect the basic purposes for which the writ of quo warranto was originally designed.  People ex rel. Mijares v. Kniss, 144 Colo 551, 357 P.2d 352 (1960)

 

The traditional concept of quo warranto relief is prevailing under this rule. 

            Subsection (a)(3) does not enlarge or abridge substantive rights.  This section is not a statute and does not, and cannot, have the force and effect of a statute, and cannot enlarge or abridge substantive rights.  Enos v. District Court, 124 Colo. 335, 238 P.2d 861 (1951).

 

Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition

Color of law - The appearance of semblance, without the substance, of legal right. Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because wrongdoer is clothed with authority of state, is action taken under "color of state law." Atkins v. Lanning, D.C.Okl., 415 F.Supp. 186, 188

 

Petitioner believes, and therefore alleges that the COLORADO STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE is acting without express authority from the Governor or the Legislature and in excess of constitutional or statutory authority and has caused Petitioner grievous and irreparable damages. 

 

Petitioner therefore seeks a Writ of Quo Warranto to issue and an Order for immediate release of Petitioner from pre-trial incarceration pursuant to Dismissal, with prejudice of all proceedings, - OR – Release on Personal Recognizance Bond pending trial.

 

Humbly submitted in good faith,

 

 

 

________________________________________    Friday, November 23, 2001

Steve D. Gartin – In Propria Persona – Sui Juris

 

 

 

 

Attachment #1: Overcrowding for profit

 

 

Certificate of Service

 

This is a True Copy of Writ of Quo Warranto to the Supreme Court for the STATE OF COLORADO Court VIA U.S. Mail deposited in the Jefferson County Jail Mail with sufficient postage attached and addressed to:

 


Clerk of the Court Mac V. Stanford

Colorado State Supreme Court

2 East 14th Street – 4th Floor

Denver, Colorado  80203

 

The Honorable Leland Paul Anderson        

STATE OF COLORADO–First Judicial District

100 Jefferson County Parkway            

Golden, Colorado  80401                                

 

 

Colorado State Attorney General

Kenneth Salazar

1525 Sherman Street – 5th Floor

Golden, Colorado  80401                                

 

Daniel Edwards, Esquire                                

1733 High Street                                             

Denver, Colorado  80218                                            

David J. Thomas, Esquire

500 Jefferson County Parkway

Golden, Colorado  80401



[1] Trial courts have jurisdiction to determine Federal Constitutional questions, and it is their duty to do so by virtue of paragraph 2 of article VI of the United States Constitution, which provides that the constitution of the United States and all laws made in pursuance thereof shall be the supreme law of the land and the judges of every state shall be bound thereby and by §8 of Article XII of the Colorado Constitution requiring officers to take an oath to support the constitution of the united States and of the state of Colorado, notwithstanding the provisions of the 1913 amendment to this section  which provided that the supreme court should have exclusive jurisdiction to determine such matters.  People v. Western Union Tel. Co. 70 Colo. 90, 198 P.146 (1921).

And any attempt to take away this jurisdiction is null and void.  When a federal constitutional question is raised in any of the trial courts of Colorado the right is given and the duty is imposed upon those courts, by that instrument itself, to adjudicate and determine it.  That right so given can neither be taken away nor that duty abrogated by the state of Colorado, by constitutional provision or otherwise, and any attempt to do so is null and void.  Such pretended constitutional inhibition is no part of the constitution of the state of Colorado, and the judge’s oath binding him to the support and enforcement of that instrument has no relation to such void provisions.  People v. Western Union Tel. Co. 70 Colo. 90, 198 P.146 (1921).

 

[2] Purpose of relief.  Traditionally, quo warranto was directed against one charged with usurping an office, to inquire by what authority he claims to hold such office, in order to adjudge his right thereto.  Its purpose was to protect the interest of the public and not to protect or promote private rights.  People ex rel. Mijares v. Kniss, 144 Colo 551, 357 P.2d 352 (1960)

 

[3] Refusal of district attorney to bring action is sufficient to authorize action by private parties.  It was alleged and proven that the district attorney upon request made by relators and their attorneys and upon complaint being submitted to him, refused to prosecute the proceedings, and under the circumstances in this case such refusal was sufficient to authorize the court to permit the prosecution upon the relation of such private parties without the aid or sanction of the district attorney.  Canon City Labor Club v. People ex rel. Jamieson, 21 Colo.App.37, 121 P.120 (1912).

[4] Constitution of Colorado Article III – Distribution of Powers

The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, - the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.

Each to perform its duties but to refrain from asserting power belonging to another department.  It is incumbent upon each department to assert and exercise all its powers whenever public necessity requires it to do so; otherwise, it is recreant to the trust reposed in it by the People.  It is equally incumbent upon it to refrain from asserting a power that does not belong to it, for this is equally a violation of the People’s confidence.  Indeed, the distinction goes so far as to require each department to refrain from in any way impeding the exercise of the proper functions belonging to either of the other departments.  City & County of Denver v. Lynch 92 Colo. 102, 18 P.2d 907 (1932); Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo., 35, 384 P.2d 738 (1963).

 

[5] Attorney general does not have powers beyond those granted by general assembly.  Gillies v. Schmidt, 38 Colo.App.233, 556 P.2d 82 (1976). 

 

[6] No authority to prosecute criminal actions absent governor’s command.  In the absence of a command from the governor, the attorney general is not authorized to prosecute criminal actions.  People ex rel. Tooley v. District Court 190 Colo. 486, 549 P.2d 774 (1976).

 

[7] Impaneling of statewide grand jury was proper where district court chief judge found that attorney general had made a showing of good cause, matter could not be effectively handled by county grand jury, and it was in the public interest to convene statewide grand jury.  People v. Cerrone, 867 P.2d 143 (Colo.App.1993) aff’d on other grounds, 900 P.2d 45 (Colo.1995)

 

[8] Attorney general prosecuting case is exercising district attorney’s powers.  When the governor requires the attorney general to prosecute a criminal case in which the state is a party, he becomes to all intents and purposes the district attorney, and may in his own name and official capacity exercise all the powers of that officer.  People v. Gibson, 54 Colo. 231, 125 P.531 (1912); People ex rel. Witcher v. District Court, 190 Colo.483, 549 P.2d 778 (1976).

 

[9] Error:  Authority to Prosecute:  When thereunto required by the governor, under section 6168 Rev.St., the attorney general may subscribe, present and prosecute an information against a public offender, with the same powers as the district attorney of the proper district.  People v. Gibson, 1912, 125 P. 531, 53 Colo. 231.

 

[10] Powers of attorney general are not enlarged by grand jury act.  The statutory powers granted to the attorney general under this section are not enlarged by the statewide grand jury act, §13-73-101 et seq.  People ex rel. Tooley v. District Court 190 Colo. 486, 549 P.2d 774 (1976).

 

[11] While cooperation of Attorney General and district attorneys in joint law enforcement efforts is to be encouraged, it is beyond authority of court to empower assistant attorney general to perform in duties assigned by statute to district attorney.  People ex rel. Brown v. District Court In and For Second Judicial Dist., 1976, 549 P.2d 774, 190 Colo. 486.

 

[12] Assistant Attorney general could not also serve for one case as deputy district attorney by special appointment of district attorney whose district had population over 25,000.  People ex re. Brown v. District Court In and For First Judicial District, 1978, 585 P.2d 593, 196 Colo. 359.

 

[13] Where by statute authority is given to a particular officer, its exercise by any other officer is forbidden by implication.  Atchinson, T. & S.F.R.R. v. People, 5 Colo.60 (1879).

 

[14]             In hearing defendant’s motion challenging sufficiency of evidence to show probable cause to indict, trial court must consider both sufficiency of evidence and whether prosecutorial misconduct infected validity of indictment by interfering with grand jury’s ability to weigh evidence independently in calm and di